Commonwealth v. Galloway

265 A.3d 810

COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania Appellant

v.David GALLOWAY

No. 2202 EDA 2020

Superior Court of Pennsylvania.

Submitted September 20, 2021

Filed November 2, 2021

Reargument Denied January 10, 2022

Catherine B. Kiefer, Assistant District Attorney, Media, for Commonwealth, appellant.

Dennis D. Woody, Assistant District Attorney, Media, for Commonwealth, appellant.

Melina M. Micich, Public Defender, Media, for appellee.

Emily L. Mirsky, Public Defender, Media, for appellee.

BEFORE: PANELLA, P.J., KUNSELMAN, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.^*

OPINION BY STEVENS, P.J.E.:

The Commonwealth appeals¹ from the October 16, 2020 order granting the pre-trial suppression motion filed by Appellee, David Galloway. After careful review, we reverse the suppression order and remand for proceedings consistent with this opinion.

The suppression court summarized the relevant facts of this case as follows:

On the evening of December 24, 2018, Trooper Luke McIlvaine of the Pennsylvania State Police ("PSP"), while working highway patrol on Interstate 95 Southbound, pulled over a Black Honda Civic bearing Delaware license number 541852 for traveling 64 mph in a 55 mph zone. The Trooper was working as part of a holiday evening enforcement unit, during which troopers stop many vehicles for traffic violations during busy holiday travel times to create a visible presence on the highway as a message to motorists. While Trooper McIlvaine was conducting the traffic stop, the dashcam video picked up a car in the left bound passing lane passing the trooper and [Appellee's] vehicles at a high rate of speed, and the trooper did not pull over that vehicle. Because of the location of the stop, Trooper McIlvaine approached the passenger side window of the vehicle so that he was not dangerously close to traffic. As Trooper McIlvaine approached, he noticed two occupants in the vehicle, a driver, John DeFebo, and Appellee sitting in the passenger seat. Trooper McIlvaine noticed that Appellee appeared nervous, as [Appellee] was not making eye contact with him, allowing ash from the cigarette he was smoking to fall on him, and [Appellee] was sweating profusely. [T]rooper [McIlvaine] testified that Appellee sweating was suspicious because it was a very cold December evening. Trooper McIlvaine notified the driver of the reason for the stop and took the driver's license, registration, and proof of insurance. The trooper also asked for Appellee's identification, which Appellee said he did not have on him. Trooper McIlvaine asked for Appellee's name, date of birth, and social security number, to ascertain his identification. The check of the driver's information showed that he was the proper owner of the vehicle, his license was not suspended, and he did not have any outstanding warrants. Trooper McIlvaine informed the driver that he would be letting the driver off with a warning on the speeding violation and that he would be free to leave shortly. Notably, however, Trooper McIlvaine never returned the driver's license, registration, nor proof of insurance. The trooper continued to question the driver and [Appellee] over where they were driving from, what they were doing, and the reason that [Appellee] was sweating so much. Both the driver and [Appellee] told the trooper that they had just come from Philadelphia, where they got cheesesteaks at Ishkabibble's on South Street. The trooper testified that in his experience, Philadelphia is a hub for narcotics distribution, with many drug dealers buying heroin there, since it is better quality heroin, and then driving the heroin to another area to sell it for a profit. Trooper McIlvaine testified that he believed he had a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity and intended to request a dog sniff, though he never followed up with the request. He asked [Appellee] to step out of the car, and when [Appellee] did so, the trooper noticed a marijuana bowl in the center console of the car in plain view. Trooper McIlvaine then conducted a vehicle search and found 1,575 bags of suspected heroin/fentanyl in an Oreo cookie box on the floor of the passenger side. The trooper arrested the driver and [Appellee] and read them Miranda^{[2 ]} warnings.

Suppression court opinion, 1/25/21 at 1-3 (citations to notes of testimony and footnote omitted).

Appellee was subsequently charged with possession with intent to deliver a controlled substance (PWID), possession of a controlled substance, and possession of drug paraphernalia.³ On February 25, 2020, Appellee filed a pre-trial motion to suppress the contraband found in the vehicle, arguing that "[t]he prolonged nature of the detention was illegal in that it went well beyond the reason for the traffic stop itself ... and was not supported by a reasonable suspicion[.]" See Motion to Suppress, 2/25/20 at ¶ 7. On September 11, 2020, the suppression court conducted a hearing on Appellee's motion, during which Trooper McIlvaine testified. Following the hearing, the suppression court granted Appellee's suppression motion on October 16, 2020. This timely appeal followed.⁴

The Commonwealth raises the following issues for our review:

1. Did the [suppression] court err by concluding that the traffic stop ended when Trooper McIlvaine informed the driver he planned to issue a warning?

2. Did the [suppression] court err by concluding that the trooper lacked reasonable suspicion to conduct an investigative detention beyond the initial traffic stop?

3. Did the trooper have probable cause and exigent circumstance to search the vehicle without a warrant?

4. Alternatively, after he observed the marijuana bowl in plain view ... Trooper McIlvaine had probable cause to obtain a search warrant. Because he could have obtained a warrant, would the suppressed evidence have inevitably been discovered?

Commonwealth's brief at 2-3.

Our standard of review in addressing a suppression court's order granting a suppression motion is well settled.

When the Commonwealth appeals from a suppression order, we follow a clearly defined standard of review and consider only the evidence from the defendant's witnesses together with the evidence of the prosecution that, when read in the context of the entire record, remains uncontradicted. The suppression court's findings of fact bind an appellate court if the record supports those findings. The suppression court's conclusions of law, however, are not binding on an appellate court, whose duty is to determine if the suppression court properly applied the law to the facts.

Our standard of review is restricted to establishing whether the record supports the suppression court's factual findings; however, we maintain de novo review over the suppression court's legal conclusions.

Commonwealth v. Korn , 139 A.3d 249, 253-254 (Pa.Super. 2016) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted), appeal denied , 159 A.3d 933 (Pa. 2016).

"Both the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article 1, Section 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution guarantee an individual's freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures." Commonwealth v. Bostick , 958 A.2d 543, 550 (Pa.Super. 2008) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted), appeal denied , 987 A.2d 158 (Pa. 2009). "To secure the right of citizens to be free from such intrusions, courts in Pennsylvania require law enforcement officers to demonstrate ascending levels of suspicion to justify their interactions with citizens to the extent those interactions compromise individual liberty." Commonwealth v. Reppert , 814 A.2d 1196, 1201 (Pa.Super. 2002) (citation omitted). This court has recognized three types of interactions between members of the public and the police:

The first of these is a "mere encounter" (or request for information) which need not be supported by any level of suspicion, but carries no official compulsion to stop or to respond. The second, an "investigative detention" must be supported by a reasonable suspicion; it subjects a suspect to a stop and a period of detention, but does not involve such coercive conditions as to constitute the functional equivalent of an arrest. Finally, an arrest or "custodial detention" must be supported by probable cause.

Commonwealth v. Way , 238 A.3d 515, 518 (Pa.Super. 2020) (citation omitted). Thus, pursuant to the Fourth Amendment, a person may not be lawfully seized, either by means of an investigative detention or a custodial detention, unless the police possess the requisite level of suspicion.

In the instant matter, the suppression court found that Trooper McIlvaine lacked reasonable suspicion to continue to detain Appellee following the initial traffic stop. Suppression court opinion, 1/25/21 at 5-6. The suppression court concluded that "at the moment Trooper McIlvaine told the occupants he would give them a warning, the traffic stop ended and [his] initial suspicion d[id] not justify the prolonged questioning and detention of [Appellee]." Id. The suppression court further opined:

This was a simple, low level speeding offense that was not investigable outside the initial stop, license check, and either the issuing of a ticket or giving of a warning. This Court believes that Trooper McIlvaine was not presented with sufficient particularized facts to constitute the reasonable suspicion required to continue detaining [the driver] and [Appellee] passed the point of writing a speeding ticket or issuing a warning.

Id. at 10.

The Commonwealth contends that the suppression court erred in concluding that Trooper McIlvaine's interaction with Appellee during the traffic stop transitioned into an unlawful investigative detention. Commonwealth's brief at 10-14. The Commonwealth maintains that "[u]p until Trooper McIlvaine removed [Appellee] from the vehicle to request a dog sniff, Trooper McIlvaine was reasonably investigating a traffic stop after witness[ing] the vehicle speeding[,]" and developed the requisite level of suspicion, based on the totality of the circumstances, "to extend the stop further to...