Commonwealth v. Getz

1

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA v. BRENT ROBERT GETZ Appellant

No. 224 EDA 2023

No. J-S36020-23

Superior Court of Pennsylvania

February 28, 2024

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered August 1, 2022 In the Court of Common Pleas of Carbon County Criminal Division at No(s): CP-13-CR-0000437-2019

BEFORE: BOWES, J., NICHOLS, J., and KING, J.

MEMORANDUM

NICHOLS, J.

Appellant Brent Robert Getz appeals from the judgment of sentence imposed following his convictions for rape of a child involuntary sexual deviate intercourse (IDSI) with a child aggravated indecent assault of a child, and indecent assault with a person under thirteen years of age.^[1] Appellant raises multiple claims concerning the trial court's jurisdiction, venue, and the scope of cross-examination. Appellant also challenges the weight and sufficiency of the evidence, the trial court's sentence, and his registration requirements under the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (SORNA).^[2] We affirm.

We adopt the trial court's summary of the underlying facts and procedural history. See Trial Ct. Op., 11/21/22, at 1-3. Briefly, Appellant was charged with multiple offenses after he sexually assaulted the minor victim multiple times between 2006 and 2010.^[3] Following a jury trial in March of 2022, Appellant was convicted of the aforementioned offenses. On July 15, 2022, the trial court sentenced Appellant to an aggregate term of sixteen to thirty-two years' incarceration followed by a mandatory term of three years' probation. Appellant was also ordered to pay restitution and comply with lifetime registration requirements under SORNA. Appellant filed a motion for reconsideration raising multiple claims, including a challenge to the imposition of restitution and his registration requirements under SORNA. Ultimately, the trial court issued an order granting Appellant's motion with respect to restitution,^[4] but denied the motion in all other respects.

Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal and a court-ordered Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement. The trial court issued a Rule 1925(a) opinion adopting the order and opinion disposing of Appellant's post sentence motions. Trial Ct. Op., 1/17/23, at 1-2.

On appeal, Appellant raises the following issues, which we have reordered as follows:

1. Did the trial court err when it did not dismiss the charges based upon the lack of adult court jurisdiction?

2. Does sentencing an individual in adult court for crimes he committed as a juvenile violate Appellant's constitutional right against cruel and unusual punishment?

3. Did the trial court err when it failed to grant Appellant a change of venue?

4. Did the trial court err when it did not allow [] Appellant to cross examine the Commonwealth's witnesses concerning recent criminal activity where there was an expectation of leniency towards the witnesses for their continued cooperation and testimony against [Appellant]?

5. Was the evidence insufficient to sustain a verdict of guilty on all counts?

6. Were the guilty verdicts on all the charges against the weight of evidence?

7. Did the trial court err when it failed to grant Appellant a new trial based upon after discovered evidence?

8. Did the trial court err when it imposed a sentence inconsistent with the Sentencing Code and/or contrary to the fundamental norms which underlie the sentencing process, in that said sentence constituted an abuse of discretion because the sentence imposed represented an unreasonable and excessive sentence which failed to consider mitigating factors?

9. Did the trial court err when it required the Appellant to register as a sex offender?

Appellant's Brief at 10-12 (some formatting altered).

Jurisdiction

In his first claim, Appellant argues that the trial court lacked jurisdiction over Appellant's case because he was a minor at the time that some of the offenses were committed. Id. at 42. Initially, Appellant acknowledges that the Juvenile Act barred him from being tried a juvenile because he was not charged with the instant offenses until after his twenty-first birthday. Id. at 42-44 (citing Commonwealth v. Armolt, 294 A.3d 364 (Pa. 2023)). However, Appellant claims that the Commonwealth had an improper motivation for the delay in prosecution, which resulted in him being charged at age twenty-eight. Id. at 44 (citing Commonwealth v. Monaco 869 A.2d 1026 (Pa. Super. 2005) (holding that adult offenders must be tried in adult criminal court "[a]bsent some improper motivation for the delay")). Specifically, Appellant contends that although the victim reported that she had been sexually abused in 2012, the Commonwealth did not discover the abuse until 2018, and therefore "failed in their duty to fully and completely investigate the allegations which would have uncovered [Appellant's] alleged participation in these crimes by failing to adequately interview the complainant." Id. at 46. In a related claim, Appellant argues that sentencing him as an adult for crimes he committed as a juvenile constituted "cruel and unusual punishment." Id. at 47-61.

The Commonwealth responds that Monaco's exception for an "improper motivation for the delay" does not apply to Appellant, as the defendant in Monaco committed the crimes when he was under eighteen years' old.

Commonwealth's Brief at 28. In any event, the Commonwealth argues that "any delay in charging defendant was not attributable to the Commonwealth" and "[t]here was no evidence to suggest that the Commonwealth's delay in filing charges was intentional or for an improper purpose." Id. at 29. In support, the Commonwealth notes that the victim's 2012 disclosure was to family members, not law enforcement, and that she did not make any allegations of abuse against Appellant to the VRC counselor. Id. The Commonwealth contends that it "was not responsible for the delay during the underlying police investigation because it could not react until the criminal conduct by [Appellant] was reported to law enforcement" which "did not occur until August 2018, when Officer Buoniauto resurrected the case and interviewed the victim, at which time she disclosed [Appellant's] sexual abuse . . . ." Id. Therefore, the Commonwealth concludes that Appellant was properly charged as an adult. Id. at 30.

Our Supreme Court has explained:

The question of whether [an adult defendant] fell within the jurisdiction of the juvenile court is a question of statutory interpretation we review de novo. The purpose of statutory interpretation is to "ascertain and effectuate the intention of the General Assembly" so as to give the statute its intended effect. 1 Pa.C.S. § 1921(a). To discern the General Assembly's intent, we first consider the language of the statute itself. "When the words of a statute are clear and free from all ambiguity, the letter of it is not to be disregarded under the pretext of pursuing its spirit." Id. § 1921(b). We may "ascertain the plain meaning of a statute by ascribing to the particular words and phrases the meaning which they have acquired through their common and approved usage, and in context." Commonwealth v. Gam by, 283 A.3d 298, 306 (Pa. 2022). When the language clearly and unambiguously sets forth the legislative intent, we are duty-bound to apply it and not look beyond the statutory language to ascertain its meaning. In other words, we may only resort to the rules of statutory construction . . . when there is an ambiguity in the provision.

[T]he Juvenile Act clearly and unambiguously refutes [the] appellant's position he should have been tried in a juvenile court. The General Assembly, through the Juvenile Act, conveyed limited jurisdiction to juvenile courts, the scope of which applies "exclusively to . . . [proceedings in which a child is alleged to be delinquent or dependent." 42 Pa.C.S. § 6303(a)(1). The Act explicitly defines a "child" as an individual who "is under the age of 18 years" or "is under the age of 21 years who committed an act of delinquency before reaching the age of 18 years." Id. § 6302. Thus, the Act plainly extends juvenile jurisdiction to offenders who committed an offense while under the age of eighteen only if they are prosecuted before turning twenty-one. Because we detect no ambiguity in this definition, we must abide by the letter of the statute. See 1 Pa.C.S. § 1921(b).

Armolt, 294 A.3d at 372 (some formatting altered, footnote and some citations omitted).

Here, the trial court explained:

[S]ome crimes did occur after [Appellant] reached majority age. At trial, there was testimony that [Appellant] was born on October 28, 1991, which means he would have attained the age of eighteen (18) on October 28, 2009. While there may have been a time . . . that the victim herself may not have known if [Appellant] was ever over the age of 18 during any of these incidents, she indirectly confirmed that he was eighteen during the following colloquy on cross examination by [Appellant's] counsel:

Q: Okay. You said this stopped in 2010 or 2009, because you were nine or ten then, right?

A: It was 2010. My birthday is in May. So I had not turned ten yet.

Q: You had not turned ten yet?

A: No. My birthday was in May.

Q: So the last time was in 2010, sometime between January 1, 2010 to May 27, 2010?

A: Yes.

Trial Ct. Op., 11/21/22, at 8-9 (quoting N.T. 3/8/22 at 63-64) (footnote omitted).

Here as noted by the trial court, Appellant committed the underlying offenses both before and after his eighteenth birthday. Cf. Monaco, 869 A.2d at 1027-28. However, Appellant was not criminally charged until he turned twenty-eight years' old. Consequently, Appellant was not entitled to be tried in Juvenile Court, and accordingly, the trial court did not err when it denied App...