Commonwealth v. Haines

168 A.3d 231

COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Appellee

v.Justin Mitchell HAINES, Appellant

No. 1760 MDA 2016.

Superior Court of Pennsylvania.

Argued June 20, 2017

Filed August 02, 2017

Timothy J. Barker, Assistant District Attorney, York, for Commonwealth, appellant.

Edward F. Spreha, Jr., Harrisburg, for appellee.

BEFORE: MOULTON, J., SOLANO, J., and MUSMANNO, J.

OPINION BY MOULTON, J.:

The Commonwealth appeals from the October 17, 2016 order entered in the York County Court of Common Pleas granting the motion to suppress filed by Justin Mitchell Haines.¹ Because the trial court did not make factual findings regarding whether Haines consented to the blood draw before or after being improperly warned about the consequences of refusal, we are unable to determine whether the court erred in finding Haines' consent was involuntary. We therefore reverse and remand with instructions.

The trial court set forth the following factual history:

[Haines] is charged with the following offenses; (1) Murder of the Third Degree, 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2502(c) ; (2) Aggravated Assault, 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2702(a)(1) ; (3) Homicide by Vehicle While Under the Influence of Alcohol or Controlled Substance, 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3735 ; (4) Aggravated Assault by Vehicle While Under the Influence of Alcohol or Controlled Substance, 74 Pa.C.S.A. § 3735.1; (5) Homicide by Vehicle, 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3732 ; (6) Aggravated Assault by Vehicle, 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3732.1 ; (7) two counts of DUI, 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3802(a)(1), (c) ; (8) Reckless Driving, 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3736 ; (9) Careless Driving, 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3714(a) ; (10) Careless Driving–Unintentional Death, 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3714(b) ; (11) Careless Driving—Serious Bodily Injury, 75 Pa.C.S.A. 3714(c) ; and (12) Driving Vehicle at Safe Speed, 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3361.

The incident that gave rise to these charges occurred in the early evening hours of February 8, 2015, in New Cumberland, York County, Pennsylvania at the intersection of Lewisberry and Poplar Road. According to the Commonwealth's testimony, this incident occurred as [Haines] was traveling west on Lewisberry Road in his black Honda Pilot. The victims, Kyle Richard Quigley and his wife, Amy L. Marburger, were entering Lewisberry Road from Poplar Road in Mr. Quigley's White Honda Civic, when they were hit by [Haines'] vehicle. Mr. Quigley, who was driving at the time of the incident, was ejected from his vehicle and later pronounced dead. Ms. Marburger sustained severe injuries, including, but not limited to, a brain injury, a shoulder injury, and internal injuries. Immediately following the incident, she was transported to Hershey Medical Center for treatment.

When [Sergeant] Timothy Dehoff and Sergeant Holland^[2] arrived on scene, they began the investigation of their reports. It was concluded that there were no adverse weather conditions and the roadway was dry at the time of the crash. Further, [Haines] did not have any visual obstructions as he was traveling west on Lewisberry Road approaching Poplar Road.

[Sergeant] Dehoff spoke with [Haines] on the scene after he was placed in the ambulance. [Haines] advised [Sergeant] Dehoff he was heading home at the time of the incident after picking up food for his family. At that time, the officer smelled a strong o[ ]der of alcohol coming from [Haines'] breath and when asked [Haines] stated he had consumed one beer earlier that day.

[Haines] was transported to Harrisburg Hospital for medical observation. [Sergeant] Dehoff drove to the hospital to determine if personnel were going to perform a medical blood draw on [Haines]. Medical personnel informed [Sergeant] Dehoff that the hospital was not going to draw blood due to the lack of [Haines'] significant injury. At that time, [Sergeant] Dehoff requested [Haines] to submit to a blood chemical test to determine his blood alcohol concentration ("BAC") based on the smell of intoxicants emanating from [Haines'] breath. After being verbally advised of the warnings set forth on Penn–DOT's "DL–26" form [Haines] submitted to the test. The blood sample was sent to Quest Diagnostics for testing. [Haines] BAC was measured at 0.250%. As a result of these facts, the aforementioned charges were filed.

Opinion in Support of Order Granting Defendant's Motion to Suppress Evidence of Blood Results, 10/17/16, at 1–4 ("Suppression Op.").

Haines filed a motion to suppress the blood test results. On August 24, 2016, the trial court held a hearing on the motion. On October 17, 2016, the trial court granted Haines' motion and suppressed the evidence. The Commonwealth filed a timely notice of appeal.

The Commonwealth raises the following issues on appeal:

1. The trial court erred in granting [Haines'] motion to suppress his blood alcohol results as [Haines] voluntarily consented to having his blood drawn for purposes of blood alcohol toxicological testing.

a. The trial court failed to consider the uncontested facts of record and controlling case law regarding the voluntary consent exception to the search warrant requirement, which allows for a warrantless blood draw where a defendant voluntarily consents to a blood draw.

b. The trial court misapplied Birchfield v. North Dakota, [––– U.S. ––––, 136 S.Ct. 2160, 195 L.Ed.2d 560] (2016) by performing an inapplicable exigent circumstances analysis rather than considering the voluntary consent exception to the search warrant requirement.

2. The trial court erred in granting [Haines'] motion to suppress his blood alcohol results, as [Haines'] blood draw is admissible pursuant to 75 Pa.C.S. § 3755.

a. The trial court erred in determining that 75 Pa.C.S. § 3755 was inapplicable despite [Haines] being transported by EMS to Harrisburg Hospital emergency room for medical treatment following a fatal vehicle crash, and where police officers possessed probable cause to believe that [Haines] committed a violation of 75 Pa.C.S. § 3802 and communicated said probable cause to hospital personnel.

b. The trial court erred in determining that 75 Pa.C.S. § 3755 was inapplicable based upon medical personnel's failure to comply with the mandates of § 3755, which required medical personnel to promptly take a blood sample from [Haines] based upon probable cause for violating 75 Pa.C.S. § 3802, as medical personnel's failure to comply with the mandatory dictates of § 3755 did not negate the admissibility of [Haines'] blood draw and blood alcohol results.

Cmwlth's Br. at 4–5.

When reviewing the grant of a suppression motion, we must determine whether the record supports the trial court's factual findings and "whether the legal conclusions drawn from those facts are correct." Commonwealth v. Brown, 64 A.3d 1101, 1104 (Pa.Super. 2013) (quoting Commonwealth v. Cauley, 10 A.3d 321, 325 (Pa.Super. 2010) ). We may only consider evidence presented at the suppression hearing. In re L.J., 622 Pa. 126, 79 A.3d 1073, 1085–87 (2013). In addition, because the defendant prevailed on this issue before the suppression court, we consider only the defendant's evidence and so much of the Commonwealth's evidence "as remains uncontradicted when read in the context of the record as a whole." Brown, 64 A.3d at 1104 (quoting Cauley, 10 A.3d at 325 ). We may reverse only if the legal conclusions drawn from the facts are in error. Id.

The United States Supreme Court has held that because "the taking of a blood sample" is a search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution, police officers may not compel the taking of a blood sample without a search warrant, absent an applicable exception. Birchfield, 136 S.Ct. at 2173, 2185.³ After concluding that "the search incident to arrest doctrine does not justify the warrantless taking of a blood sample," id. at 2185, the Birchfield Court considered whether implied-consent laws, which require cooperation with blood-alcohol testing as "a condition of the privilege of driving on state roads," could provide an exception to the warrant requirement consistent with the federal constitution. Id. at 2169, 2185–86. The Court held that, although implied-consent laws that impose civil penalties and evidentiary consequences for refusing to consent are constitutional,⁴ implied-consent laws that "impose criminal penalties" for refusing to consent to a blood test are unconstitutional because "motorists cannot be deemed to have consented to submit to a blood test on pain of committing a criminal offense." Id. at 2185–86.

In Commonwealth v. Evans, this Court reviewed Pennsylvania's implied-consent law⁵ and found that "the law undoubtedly ‘impose[s] criminal penalties on the refusal to submit to’ " a blood test. 153 A.3d 323, 331 (Pa.Super. 2016) (quoting Birchfield, 136 S.Ct. at 2185–86 ). In Evans, a police officer told the defendant that:

It is my duty as a police officer to inform you that if you refuse to submit to a chemical test, your operating privilege will be suspended for at least 12 months and up to 18 months. If you have prior refusals or have been previously sentenced to driving under the influence, in addition, if you refuse to submit to chemical test and you are convicted or plead to violating § 3802(a)(1) [,] related to impaired driving under the vehicle code, because of your refusal, you will be subject to more severe penalties set forth in § 3804(c)[,] relating to penalties, the same as if you were—if you would be convicted at the highest rate of alcohol, which can include a minimum of 72 consecutive hours in jail and a minimum fine of $1,000, to a maximum of [five] years in jail and a maximum fine of $10,000.

Id. at 325 (emphasis added).⁶ This Court vacated the judgment of sentence and remanded to the trial court to "reevaluate [Appellant's] consent ... [, based on] the totality of all the circumstances." Id. at 331 (quoting Birchfield, 136 S.Ct. at 2185–86 ) (alterations in original). We reasoned that the implied-consent warnings given to the defendant were "partially inaccurate" because they referenced enhanced criminal penalties that could not...