Commonwealth v. Hill

239 A.3d 175

COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Appellant

v.Sammy HILL

No. 377 MDA 2020

Superior Court of Pennsylvania.

Submitted August 03, 2020

Filed September 09, 2020

Julia B. Wilt, Assistant District Attorney, Huntingdon, for Commonwealth, appellant.

Christopher B. Wencker, Huntingdon, for appellee.

BEFORE: KUNSELMAN, J., McLAUGHLIN, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.^*

OPINION BY STEVENS, P.J.E.:

The Commonwealth appeals from the February 25, 2020, Order of the Court of Common Pleas of Huntingdon County dismissing, with prejudice, charges arising from Appellee, Sammy Hill's, possession of marijuana and drug paraphernalia while in prison.¹ After careful review, we reverse and remand the case to the trial court for further proceedings.

The trial court set forth its "Facts & Analysis " herein as follows:

[Appellee] is serving a life sentence for First Degree Murder. He now faces one felony and two misdemeanor charges arising from his possession of a small amount of synthetic marijuana in his cell at SCI Smithfield.¹ If convicted (which appears likely) he faces an additional twelve years in prison. Not surprisingly, he has rejected the District Attorney's plea offer, which would force this matter to a jury trial.

The Pennsylvania State Police have properly and appropriately investigated and initiated these charges. The District Attorney is now waiting to shoot his proverbial fish in a barrel, the [c]ourt -appointed defense attorney is preparing to go through the motions on a case he knows he is going to lose (and which distracts from matters truly needing his attention), and the [c]ourt's staff is dutifully processing the filings, assembling a jury pool, and preparing for trial.² What nobody is apparently doing is asking the most basic of questions: "Why?" Is it really worth all this time and cost to taxpayers to tell a life inmate that once he dies, he will have to serve an additional twelve years?

This [c]ourt (and this community) is all too familiar with the risks and problems presented by illicit drugs in our prisons. Prosecuting and sentencing [Appellee], however, serves none of the goals of our criminal justice system. There is no additional deterrence, protection of the public, or retribution to be had here.

[Appellee's] conditions of confinement will not change, nor will he have any fewer privileges-the DOC does not maintain different levels of confinement based on the total number of years (or total number of sentences) to be served. Parole is unavailable to inmates serving life sentences, so there is no chance that [Appellee] will be released sooner if his offense is not prosecuted. In sum, winning this case cannot even be characterized as a pyrrhic victory, as there is simply no victory to be had.

The Commonwealth's budget problems are well known, and cases like this represent a misguided attempt by the Commonwealth to address internal prison discipline problems for which they currently lack a solution. Additional prosecution through the courts only exacerbates, rather than addresses, those problems. While we appreciate the danger that drugs create within an institutional setting, the Department of Corrections should focus its resources more on effective methods to reduce the influx of (and demand for) narcotics in its facilities than on futile prosecutions that serve no real purpose.

We therefore respectfully suggest that the Department of Corrections should endeavor to establish an internal disciplinary program that constructively addresses and modifies inmate behavior, and that the General Assembly needs to provide a new statutory scheme that addresses the realities of modern prison life.³ It has been said that insanity is doing the same thing over and over again, but expecting a different result. It is time for a new approach.

¹ He has since been transferred to the State Correctional Institution at Dallas, meaning transporting him back to Huntingdon County for trial increases the cost of prosecuting him even further (along with the attendant security risks).

² While Huntingdon County is reimbursed for the costs of prosecution by the Commonwealth, we are not reimbursed for the time and resources these cases take. Additionally, although Huntingdon County taxpayers are spared from the direct expense of prosecuting these cases, Pennsylvania taxpayers, as a whole, foot the bill for thousands of [d]ollars spent on each of these meaningless cases.

³ The most logical resolution of such cases is to develop a series of summary offenses for conduct that occurs within the walls of State Correctional Institutions. Summary offenses do not entitle a defendant to representation by counsel or trial by jury, and the punishments would emphasize fines over additional incarceration. Upon conviction, these fines (and the associated court costs) could be deducted from an inmate's institutional account, and it would likely take a significant amount of time for an inmate to pay them off. Such punishment could conceivably have an impact on future similar conduct, and ultimately serve as a stronger deterrent.

Order and Opinion, filed 2/25/20, at 2-3.

The Commonwealth filed a timely notice of appeal on February 28, 2020.² The Commonwealth filed its Concise Statement of Matters Complained of on Appeal on March 17, 2020, and the trial court filed its Opinion in Support of Order Pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) on April 30, 2020. In its brief, the Commonwealth presents the following issues for our review:

1. Did the trial court abuse its discretion in dismissing charges sua sponte ?

2. Did the trial court violate the doctrine of separation of powers in dismissing charges sua sponte ?

Commonwealth's Brief at 3. As these issues are interrelated, we will consider them together.

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court recently observed the following as to the Separation of Powers Doctrine:

The separation of powers doctrine is essential to our triparte [sic] governmental framework and is the cornerstone of judicial independence. It is inherent in the Pennsylvania Constitution and makes manifest that the three branches of government are co-equal and independent, and divides power accordingly. The governing structure of our Commonwealth, like the federal government, is divided into three equal branches, the legislative, see Pa. Const. art II, § 1 ("The legislative power of this Commonwealth shall be vested in a General Assembly ...."); the executive, see Pa. Const. art. IV, § 2 ("The supreme executive power shall be vested in the Governor ...."); and the judicial, see Pa. Const. art. V, § 1 ("The judicial power of the Commonwealth shall be vested in a unified judicial system ....").

The rationale underlying this separation of powers is that it prevents one branch of government from exercising, infringing upon, or usurping the powers of the other two branches. Thus, to "avert the danger inherent in the concentration of power in any single branch or body," no branch may exercise the functions delegated to another branch. Jefferson County Court Appointed Employees Association v. Pennsylvania Labor Relations Board , 603 Pa. 482, 985 A.2d 697, 706-07 (2009) ; see generally Markham v. Wolf , 647 Pa. 642, 190 A.3d 1175, 1183 (2018). The prohibition on one branch of government encroaching upon a sister branch's powers is, in turn, related to the system of checks and balances, which prevents one branch from acting unchecked. Jefferson County , 985 A.2d at 706. For checks and balances to properly work, each branch must be kept from controlling or coercing the other. Insuring that each branch is co-equal and independent is the foundation of the separation of powers doctrine, and the avoidance of the concentration of governmental powers in one branch is essential to our freedom and liberty.

In our Commonwealth, the roots of the separation of powers doctrine run deep. The delineation of the three branches of government, each with distinct and independent powers, has been inherent in the structure of Pennsylvania's government since its genesis — the constitutional convention of 1776. Indeed for most of our Commonwealth's history, our Court has vigorously maintained separation of the powers of the branches, primarily relying on Article V, Section 1. See, e.g., Greenough v. Greenough , 11 Pa. 489 (1849) (finding the separation of powers doctrine, and the inherent powers of the judicial branch, were distributed in the Constitution in such a way that the legislature could not exercise any judicial power). Article V, Section 1 ’s perhaps rudimentary expression of the separation of powers doctrine became concrete with the 1968 amendments to the Pennsylvania Constitution. While Article V, Section 1 remained virtually unchanged in the 1968 Constitution, Article V, Section 10 (a) was added, granting to the Supreme Court general supervisory and administrative authority over the judicial branch. Moreover, Article V, Section 10(c) was also added, granting to the Supreme Court the power to enact rules governing all aspects of the judiciary. These newly-minted provisions expressly made the separation of powers between the branches of government explicit.

Michael Renner v. Court of Common Pleas of Lehigh County, County of Lehigh, John J. Sikora and Mark Surovy , 234 A.3d 411, 419–21 (Pa. 2020) (footnotes omitted).

A trial court cannot be permitted, as here, to ignore the separation of powers doctrine and to usurp the power not only of the District Attorney but also of the Legislature, the Department of Corrections, defense lawyers and juries as well.

At the outset of its Order and Opinion entered on February 25, 2020, the trial court explained the rationale underlying its dismissal of the instant charges with prejudice sua sponte as follows:

The [c]ourt bases its action upon no statute, Pennsylvania rule of court, or common law theory, other than the inherent power of the [c]ourt to manage its

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