Commonwealth v. Howard

257 A.3d 1217

COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Appellee

v.Waylynn Marie HOWARD, Appellant

No. 8 WAP 2020

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.

Argued: December 2, 2020

Decided: August 25, 2021

Cheryl Ann Brooks, Esq., for Amicus Curiae Defender Association of Philadelphia.

Brandon Paul Ging, Jamie Tesa Schuman, Esqs., Allegheny County Public Defender's Office, for Appellant.

Kevin Francis McCarthy, Michael Wayne Streily, Esqs., Allegheny County District Attorney's Office, for Appellee.

BAER, C.J., SAYLOR, TODD, DONOHUE, DOUGHERTY, WECHT, MUNDY, JJ.

OPINION ANNOUNCING THE JUDGMENT OF THE COURT

JUSTICE TODD

In this appeal by allowance, we consider whether evidence that a parent allowed her child to ride in a car-for-hire¹ without being restrained by a child safety seat (hereinafter, "car seat") is, without more, sufficient to support a conviction for endangering the welfare of children under 18 Pa.C.S. § 4304(a)(1). For the reasons that follow, we conclude that it was not. Accordingly, we reverse the Superior Court's decision, and vacate Appellant's conviction and judgment of sentence.

On February 15, 2017, Appellant, Waylynn Marie Howard (hereinafter, "Mother"), and her three-year-old daughter (hereinafter, "Child") were riding in a car-for-hire which was involved in a three-vehicle accident on Route 28, a state highway, near Pittsburgh. Specifically, the driver of Mother's car-for-hire rear-ended the car in front of her, which then hit another vehicle. At the time of the accident, Mother was sitting in the front passenger seat of the vehicle, and Child was sitting in the back seat, on the passenger side. There was no car seat in the vehicle, and none of the occupants were wearing seatbelts. None of the individuals involved sustained serious injuries. A police officer responded to the scene, and, based on his affidavit of probable cause, Mother was charged with reckless endangerment of another person, 18 Pa.C.S. § 2705,² and endangering the welfare of a child, id. § 4304(a)(1),³ a misdemeanor of the first degree. At a stipulated bench trial based entirely on the affidavit of probable cause, Mother was convicted of both offenses. The trial court imposed a sentence of one year probation for Mother's conviction for endangering the welfare of a child, and no further penalty for her conviction for reckless endangerment. Mother appealed, challenging the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain both of her convictions.

In an unpublished memorandum opinion, a divided panel of the Superior Court reversed Mother's conviction for reckless endangerment of another person, finding her actions did not rise to the level of criminal recklessness. Commonwealth v. Howard , 1281 WDA 2018 (Pa. Super. filed Nov. 19, 2019). However, the panel affirmed Mother's conviction for endangering the welfare of a child under Section 4304(a)(1). In doing so, the panel explained that, in order to support a conviction for endangering the welfare of children, the Commonwealth must establish that the accused:

(1) is aware of his or her duty to protect the child; (2) is aware that the child is in circumstances that threaten the child's physical or psychological welfare; and (3) has either failed to act or has taken actions so lame and meager that such actions cannot reasonably be expected to protect the child's physical or psychological welfare.

Id. at 3-4 (quoting Commonwealth v. Foster , 764 A.2d 1076, 1082 (Pa. Super. 2000).⁴

The panel concluded that the evidence supported Mother's conviction under Section 4304(a)(1) because, while the vehicle did not have an appropriate car seat, Mother "knowingly failed to fasten her daughter's seatbelt," despite an awareness that her conduct could result in harm to Child, as evidenced by the fact that she told the responding police officer that "she had feared that her daughter would fly from the back seat and hit the windshield."⁵ Id. at 4. The panel specifically rejected Mother's argument that, pursuant to 18 Pa.C.S. § 302(b)(2)(ii),⁶ in order to satisfy the culpability requirement of Section 4304(a)(1), Mother "would have had to be ‘practically certain’ that a car accident would occur in order to endanger her daughter's welfare." Id. at 4-5. The panel held that a conviction under Section 4304(a)(1) does not require that a child be in imminent threat of physical harm, but "only requires proof of circumstances that could threaten the child's physical or psychological welfare." Id. at 5 (quoting Commonwealth v. Martir , 712 A.2d 327, 330 (Pa. Super. 1998) ) (emphasis original).

Judge Carolyn Nichols authored a concurring and dissenting opinion wherein she agreed with the reversal of Mother's reckless endangerment conviction, but dissented from the affirmance of Mother's conviction for endangering the welfare of a child. Judge Nichols opined that, although the evidence arguably supported Mother's conviction, the Crimes Code is not the "appropriate tool" for punishing Mother's conduct, and Mother's judgment of sentence was too harsh. Howard , 1281 WDA 2018, at 1 (Nichols, J., dissenting). In particular, Judge Nichols observed that, under the Motor Vehicle Code, Mother would have received a less severe sentence had she been the operator of the vehicle and failed to securely fasten her daughter in a passenger restraint system.⁷ See 75 Pa.C.S. § 4581(b)(1) (failure to comply with § 4581(a), which requires the driver of a vehicle to securely fasten a child under age four, commits a summary offense and upon conviction shall be sentenced to pay a fine of $75). Judge Nichols further noted that the increased use of ride-sharing services will require parents to take a "hard look at whether to accept a ride from a driver whose vehicle does not contain an appropriate car seat." Howard , 1281 WDA 2018, at 2 (Nichols, J., dissenting).

Mother filed a petition for allowance of appeal, and we granted review to consider whether Mother's conduct in allowing Child to ride in a car-for-hire without using a car seat⁸ was sufficient to support a conviction for knowingly endangering the welfare of a child under 18 Pa.C.S. § 4304(a)(1), when there was no indication that the driver of the vehicle was driving in an unsafe manner.

Preliminarily, the instant matter involves the interpretation of a statute, and, thus, our standard of review is de novo and our scope of review is plenary. Commonwealth v. Lynn , 631 Pa. 541, 114 A.3d 796, 817-18 (2015). It is axiomatic that, in interpreting a statute, this Court's objective is to ascertain and give effect to the intent of our General Assembly. 1 Pa.C.S. § 1921(a). The best expression of this intent is found in the statute's plain language. Cagey v. Commonwealth , 645 Pa. 268, 179 A.3d 458, 462 (2018). We may not disregard the plain language under the guise of giving effect to its spirit. 1 Pa.C.S. § 1921(b) ; Commonwealth v. Walls , 592 Pa. 557, 926 A.2d 957, 962 (2007). Only when the language of a statute is ambiguous may courts consider statutory factors to discern legislative intent. 1 Pa.C.S. § 1921(c) ; Commonwealth v. McCoy , 599 Pa. 599, 962 A.2d 1160, 1166 (2009).

As noted above, Section 4304, which derived from Section 230.4 of the Model Penal Code, provides, in part, that "[a] parent, guardian, or other person supervising the welfare of a child under 18 years of age ... commits an offense if he knowingly endangers the welfare of the child by violating a duty of care, protection or support." 18 Pa.C.S. § 4304(a)(1). Further, as stated in the 1972 Official Comment to Section 4304, the offense of endangering the welfare of a child applies to both affirmative acts and omissions. See id. § 4304, cmt. ("This section consolidates and simplifies the various provisions concerning crimes endangering the welfare of children. The offense involves the endangering of the physical or moral welfare of a child by an act or omission in violation of legal duty even though such legal duty does not itself carry a criminal sanction.").

With respect to the required mens rea for a conviction under Section 4304, pursuant to 18 Pa.C.S. § 302, entitled "General requirements of culpability," a person acts "knowingly" with respect to a material element of an offense when,

(i) if the element involves the nature of his conduct or the attendant circumstances, he is aware that his conduct is of that nature or that such circumstances exist; and

(ii) if the element involves a result of his conduct, he is aware that it is practically certain that his conduct will cause such a result.

Id. § 302(b)(2). Section 302(b)(2) also derives from the Model Penal Code.

Mother contends that the Superior Court erred in affirming her conviction under Section 4304(a)(1) because the evidence was insufficient to establish, pursuant to 18 Pa.C.S. § 302, that she knowingly endangered the welfare of Child. She first maintains that, in determining whether a parent or guardian acts knowingly for purposes of Section 4304, courts must consider whether the parental conduct at issue offends the "common sense of the community" and the "sense of decency, propriety and the morality which most people entertain." Mother's Brief at 13 (quoting Lynn , 114 A.3d at 818 ).⁹ In arguing that her conduct did not offend the common sense of the community, Mother claims that she "faced a dilemma that many parents could face," namely, balancing the need to get her daughter home against the risks of placing her daughter in a car-for-hire without a car seat. Id. at 13. Emphasizing that there was no indication that the driver of the car-for-hire was operating the vehicle in an unsafe manner, no "warning signs" that an accident would occur, and "caselaw and national statistics show that accidents are uncommon in routine car rides," Mother submits that her decision to allow Child to ride in the vehicle without a car seat, even if mistaken in hindsight, did not offend the common sense of the community. Id.

Mother additionally argues that, in order to establish that she acted knowingly for...