Commonwealth v. Jackson

1

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA v. JAVEN T. JACKSON Appellant

No. 36 MDA 2023

No. J-S32011-23

Superior Court of Pennsylvania

November 29, 2023

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered December 20, 2022 In the Court of Common Pleas of Lancaster County Criminal Division at No(s): CP-36-CR-0006803-2019

BEFORE: DUBOW, J., KUNSELMAN, J., and NICHOLS, J.

MEMORANDUM

DUBOW J.

Appellant Javen T. Jackson, appeals from the Judgment of Sentence entered in the Lancaster County Court of Common Pleas following a jury conviction of, inter alia Second-Degree Murder and Robbery of a Motor Vehicle.^[1] He challenges the sufficiency of the evidence. After careful review, we affirm.

A.

We glean the following factual and procedural history from the certified record. On November 11, 2019, Tom Blackwell ("Decedent") asked the employees from an adjacent garage for help in removing Appellant from the Decedent's property.^[2] Nathan Bashore, one of the employees, arrived a short time later to assist Decedent.

When Mr. Bashore arrived, he observed the driver's side door of the Decedent's truck ajar and Appellant sitting in the driver's seat. Appellant was accelerating and reversing the truck while Decedent clung onto the truck and leaned his head and torso through the front drivers' side window. Decedent was yelling at Appellant to stop. Mr. Bashore grabbed onto the truck's front passenger-side door and leaned his upper body through the window.

The noise from the truck's motor alerted Elmer Stoltzfus. He arrived in time to see both Decedent and Mr. Bashore hanging onto the truck as it "ripp[ed] back and forth." N.T. Trial, 10/12/22, at 300.

Appellant did not stop until he lost control of the truck. At that point, Mr. Bashore was able to climb through the passenger side window, subdue Appellant, and recover the keys.

Decedent asked Mr. Stoltzfus to call the police and returned to his garage. After Mr. Stoltzfus got off the phone with police "a few minutes later," he found Decedent lying on his back on the ground and noted that Decedent had a blue pallor. Id. at 313. Mr. Stoltzfus called 911 again and another individual began CPR, but Decedent never regained consciousness.

The Commonwealth charged Appellant as stated above. On October 11, 2022, Appellant proceeded to a jury trial. Several witnesses testified, including Wayne Ross, M.D., the forensic pathologist who performed Decedent's autopsy. Dr. Ross testified that Decedent died from a traumatic brain injury: he had a five-inch skull fracture that caused subdural bleeding. He further opined that this injury was inconsistent with simply falling backwards. Rather, it was consistent with Decedent's head striking the B-pillar of the truck^[3] as Appellant accelerated and reversed the truck.

The jury convicted Appellant of the above charges. On December 20, 2022, following the completion of a pre-sentence investigation, the court sentenced Appellant to an aggregate term of life imprisonment without parole. Appellant did not file a post-sentence motion.

B.

Appellant timely filed a Notice of Appeal. Both Appellant and the trial court complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.

Appellant presents the following issues on appeal:

I. Did the Commonwealth fail to present sufficient evidence to support a conviction of Robbery of a Motor Vehicle by failing to present sufficient evidence that Appellant took control of the vehicle by force, intimidation, or by knowingly putting the decedent in fear of immediate bodily injury?

II. Did the Commonwealth present insufficient evidence to support a conviction of Second-Degree Murder where it failed to present sufficient evidence to support a conviction of robbery?

Appellant's Br. at 4 (capitalization altered).

C.

Appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting both of his convictions. Our standard of review for challenges to sufficiency of the evidence is well-settled. "A claim challenging the sufficiency of the evidence is a question of law." Commonwealth v. Widmer, 744 A.2d 745, 751 (Pa. 2000). When reviewing sufficiency challenges, we evaluate the record in the light most favorable to the verdict winner, giving the Commonwealth the benefit of all reasonable inferences to be drawn from the evidence. Commonwealth v. Trinidad, 96 A.3d 1031, 1038 (Pa. Super. 2014). This Court will not disturb a verdict when "there is sufficient evidence to enable the factfinder to find every element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt." Commonwealth v. Sipps, 225 A.3d 1110, 1113 (Pa. Super. 2019) (citation omitted). The Commonwealth can establish these elements using solely circumstantial evidence. Id. Furthermore, the factfinder is "entitled to draw reasonable inferences from the facts presented, resolve any issues of credibility and believe all, part or none of the evidence." Commonwealth v. Hankerson, 444 A.2d 727, 728 (Pa. Super. 1982).

D.

Appellant first challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his conviction of Robbery of a Motor Vehicle. Specifically, he argues that the Commonwealth failed to prove that he recklessly used force, intimidation, or the inducement of fear to accomplish the taking of the vehicle.^[4] Appellant's Br. at 8-9.

The legislature has provided the following definition of Robbery of a Motor Vehicle:

A person commits a felony of the first degree if he steals or takes a motor vehicle from another person in the presence of that person or any other person in lawful possession of the motor vehicle.

18 Pa.C.S. § 3702(a) (emphasis added).

In order to prove that a defendant is guilty of Robbery of a Motor Vehicle, the Commonwealth must establish the following three elements: "(1) the stealing, taking or exercise of unlawful control over a motor vehicle; (2) from another person in the presence of that person or any other person in lawful possession of the vehicle; and (3) the taking must be accomplished by the use of force, intimidation or the inducement of fear in the victim." Commonwealth v. George, 705 A.2d 916, 920 (Pa. Super. 1998).

Where, as here, the statute defining the offense does not include a specific mens rea, the offense is "established if a person acts intentionally, knowingly or recklessly[.]" 18 Pa.C.S. § 302(c). "A person acts recklessly with respect to a material element of an offense when he consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the material element exists or will result from his conduct." Id. at (b)(3). Recklessness requires "conscious action or inaction which creates a substantial risk of harm to others." Commonwealth v. Vogelsong, 90 A.3d 717, 719 (Pa. Super. 2014) (citation omitted).

Here, the trial court found that the evidence was sufficient to convict Appellant of Robbery of a Motor Vehicle because Appellant used force by accelerating and reversing the truck while attempting to steal Decedent's truck in the presence of the Decedent. See Trial Ct. Op., 4/12/23, at 2. We agree.

Initially, we note that Appellant has failed to support his argument with citations to the record and relevant and dispositive case law. Appellant's Br. at 8-9; see Pa.R.A.P. 2119 (b)-(c) (providing that citations relevant authorities and to the record must be included in the argument). These substantial briefing defects have not, however, precluded our ability to address the merits of Appellant's argument.

Viewing the record in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth establishes that Appellant repeatedly accelerated and reversed the truck while the Decedent clung to the door. N.T. Trial, 10/12/22, at 323-25. Appellant did not stop until he lost control of the truck. At that point, Mr. Bashore was able to climb through the passenger side window, subdue Appellant and secure the keys. Id. at 325-26. Based on this evidence, it was reasonable for the jury to infer that, by continuing to accelerate and reverse Decedent's car, Appellant recklessly used "force, intimidation or the inducement of fear" to exercise unlawful control over the vehicle.

Accordingly, we conclude that the sufficient evidence supported Appellant's conviction of Robbery of a Motor Vehicle.

E.

In his second issue, Appellant avers that there was insufficient evidence to convict him of Second-Degree Murder because the Commonwealth did not "prove" the elements of Robbery under 18 Pa.C.S. § 3701. Appellant's Br. at 9-12. Specifically, he contends that "no evidence was presented showing that he recklessly inflicted serious bodily injury or that Appellant intentionally placed Decedent in fear of bodily injury." Id. at 10.^[5] The Second-Degree Murder statute requires proof that a victim died while a defendant "was engaged as a principal or an accomplice in the perpetration of a felony." 18 Pa.C.S. § 2502(b) (emphasis added). The decedent does not need to die immediately as long as the Commonwealth can demonstrate an "unbroken chain of causation" between the felony and the decedent's death. Commonwealth v. Thompson, 660 A.2d 68, 70-71 (Pa. Super. 1995) (upholding Second-Degree Murder conviction where decedent died months after being injured during a robbery because the Commonwealth's medical experts demonstrated that the injury caused decedent's death).

The Second-Degree Murder statute defines "perpetration of a felony" as including "[t]he act of the defendant in engaging in . . . attempting to commit robbery . . . by force or threat of force." Id. at 2502(d). The second-degree murder statute does not specifically cite to the offense of Robbery as codified in 18 Pa.C.S. § 3701(d). As we have often recognized, "the General Assembly's intent is best expressed through the plain language of the statute." Commonwealth v Gamby, 283 A.3d 298, 306 (Pa. 2...