Commonwealth v. Jefferson

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA v. TAYLOR JEFFERSON, Appellant.

J-A14019-19

No. 1119 WDA 2018

SUPERIOR COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

AUGUST 2, 2019

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered, June 12, 2018, in the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County, Criminal Division at No(s): CP-02-CR-0007306-2017.

BEFORE: OTT, J., KUNSELMAN, J., and MUSMANNO, J.

MEMORANDUM BY KUNSELMAN, J.:

Taylor Jefferson appeals from the judgment of sentence imposed following his conviction of firearms not to be carried without a license.¹ We vacate the judgment of sentence, reverse the order denying suppression, and remand for further proceedings consistent with this memorandum.

The trial court, in disposing of Jefferson's motion to suppress, set forth the following factual history:

On April 25, 2017, around 11:00 p.m., Officers Alexandria Taylor and Nathan Detting with the Pittsburgh Bureau of Police were patrolling the Homewood area of Pittsburgh. As part of their routine patrol, the officers ran license plate numbers of various vehicles through their computer system to check for stolen vehicles and any vehicle code violations.

When the officers ran the license plate of a vehicle that was being driven by [Jefferson], the officers learned that there was a "full extradition warrant out of Pennsylvania" for an individual named Taylor Jefferson. The officers also learned that Taylor Jefferson was the registered owner of the vehicle. The [National Crime Information Center ("NCIC")] system that the officers used to run the license plate did not provide the officers with a picture of Mr. Jefferson, and the officers were not otherwise familiar with [him] or his name.

As the officers were attempting to validate the warrant, and before the officers had made any contact with [Jefferson's] vehicle, [Jefferson] pulled over to the side of the road and lawfully parked the vehicle. Officers Taylor and Detting pulled over behind [Jefferon's] vehicle and activated a spotlight. The officers' vehicle did not block [Jefferson] from being able to leave the parking space. The officers pulled over behind [Jefferson's] vehicle in order to identify the driver and to investigate whether he was the registered owner of the vehicle, and thus the person for whom there was an arrest warrant.

Officer Detting and Officer Taylor simultaneously approached the vehicle, with Officer Detting approaching the driver's side and Officer Taylor approaching the passenger side. [Jefferson] was about to exit the vehicle, with one foot already on the ground, when the officers approached the car. Officer Netting told [Jefferson] to remain in the vehicle and asked for his identification. [Jefferson] informed Officer Detting that he had left his ID at home, but he provided his full name to the officer.

As Officer Detting was speaking to [Jefferson], Officer Taylor observed [Jefferson] "slowly and deliberately reach into his right sweat pants pocket" with his right hand. She was able to notice this movement because the officers had illuminated the inside of the vehicle with a spotlight. Officer Taylor was about to tell [Jeferson] to remove his hand from his pocket when she saw him "start to pull his hand out of his pocket." As he pulled his hand out of his pocket, Officer Taylor saw that [Jefferson] had a "good grip" on a firearm. Upon seeing the firearm, Officer Taylor drew her weapon and yelled "gun, gun, gun." Officer Detting drew his weapon, and [Jefferson] promptly handed the firearm to Officer Detting. Officer Detting retrieved [Jefferson's] weapon and asked [Jefferson] to exit the vehicle. [Jefferson] was handcuffed, and the officers ultimately determined that [he] did not have a licenseto carry a concealed firearm. [Jefferson] was then taken into custody.

Trial Court Opinion, 2/8/18, at 1-3 (numbering and formatting omitted).

Jefferson was subsequently charged with one count each of firearms not to be carried without a license, persons not to possess firearms,² and of possession of a firearm with an altered manufacturer's number.³ After the preliminary hearing, the trial court dismissed the charge of possession of a firearm with an altered manufacturer's number, but held the remaining charges for trial.

Jefferson filed a motion to suppress the firearm. Following a hearing, the trial court denied the motion. The case proceeded to a non-jury trial. The charge of persons not to possess firearms was nolle prossed, and the trial court convicted Jefferson of firearms not to be carried without a license. On June 12, 2018, the trial court sentenced Jefferson to three and one-half to seven years of incarceration. Jefferson filed a post-sentence motion to reconsider the sentence, which the trial court denied. Jefferson filed a timely notice of appeal. Both Jefferson and the trial court complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.

Jefferson raises one issue on appeal: "Whether the trial court erred in denying [his] motion to suppress because, although the trial court correctly concluded that the police officers subjected [him] to an investigativedetention, the police officers did not possess reasonable suspicion to justify that seizure?" Jefferson's Brief at 4.

On appeal from the denial of a suppression motion,

Our standard of review . . . is whether the record supports the trial court's factual findings and whether the legal conclusions drawn therefrom are free from error. Our scope of review is limited; we may consider only the evidence of the prosecution and so much of the evidence for the defense as remains uncontradicted when read in the context of the record as a whole. Where the record supports the findings of the suppression court, we are bound by those facts and may reverse only if the court erred in reaching its legal conclusions based upon the facts.

Commonwealth v. Galendez, 27 A.3d 1042, 1045 (Pa. Super. 2011) (en banc) (citation omitted). Additionally, "appellate courts are limited to reviewing only the evidence presented at the suppression hearing when examining a ruling on a pretrial motion to suppress." Commonwealth v. Bush, 166 3.Ad 1278, 1281-82 (Pa. Super 2017) (citation omitted).

Here, the parties do not dispute that the trial court correctly determined that Jefferson "was subjected to an investigatory detention at the time the officers approached his vehicle and instructed him to remain inside of the vehicle." Trial Court Opinion, 2/8/18, at 4. We discern no abuse of discretion in that ruling. See Commonwealth v. Hicks, 208 A.3d 916, 926-27 (Pa. 2019) (finding that "[f]or purposes of the Fourth Amendment, a person is seized when, in view of all the circumstances surrounding the incident, a reasonable person would have believed that he was not free to leave") (internal quotations and citations omitted). Accordingly, the sole questionpresented for review is whether the officers had the requisite level of suspicion to justify the detention.

When reviewing the legality of a vehicle stop based upon suspected criminal activity, as herein occurred, we adhere to the following considerations:

The United States Supreme Court in [Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 . . . (1968),] and in Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143 . . . (1972), has suggested that even in the absence of probable cause there may be, under certain circumstances, justification for a limited intrusion upon the privacy of an individual. Under these decisions the Court has suggested that a brief stop of a suspicious individual, in order to determine his identity or to maintain the status quo momentarily while obtaining additional information may in fact be reasonable although the officer at that time did not possess probable cause that would justify an arrest. In the Terry, supra and Adams, supra decisions, the Court was required to struggle with the balancing of the right of society and the right of an individual in street encounters. Because a motorist's extreme mobility may otherwise allow him to avoid police confrontation, the State has an equally strong interest in these cases in stopping a moving vehicle to freeze momentarily a situation of suspected criminality. However, these decisions have made it clear that to justify the intrusion the police officer must be able to point to specific and articulable facts which taken together with rational inferences from those facts reasonably warranted the intrusion. See Adams v. [Williams ], supra; Terry v. Ohio, supra. Thus, it is also clear that an investigative stop of a moving vehicle[,] to be valid[,] must be based upon objective facts creating a reasonable suspicion that the detained motorist is presently involved in criminal activity.

Commonwealth v. Feczko, 10 A.3d 1285, 1288 (Pa. Super. 2010) (en banc) (quoting Commonwealth v. Murray, 331 A.2d 414, 418 (Pa. 1975) (some brackets in original)).

In determining whether police had reasonable suspicion to initiate an investigative detention, "the fundamental inquiry is an objective one, namely, whether the facts available to police at the moment of the intrusion warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that the action taken was appropriate." Commonwealth v. Gray, 784 A.2d 137, 142 (Pa. Super. 2001). Reasonable suspicion is dependent on both the quantity and quality of the information police possess prior to detaining an individual. Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 330, (1990); see also Commonwealth v. Wiley, 858 A.2d 1191, 1197 (Pa. Super. 2004) (holding that reasonable suspicion is measured by what the police knew prior to conducting a search or seizure). In order to assess the facts available to police, we must consider the totality of the circumstances. Id. While reasonable suspicion is a less stringent standard than probable cause, the detaining officer "must be able to articulate something more than an inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or hunch." United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7 (1989) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

Jefferson contends that the trial...