Commonwealth v. Klein

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA v. KYLE KLEIN Appellant COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA v. KYLE KLEIN Appellant

Nos. 2072 EDA 2021, 2073 EDA 2021

No. J-S31014-22

Superior Court of Pennsylvania

December 28, 2022

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered August 19, 2021 In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-0001638-2020 CP-51-CR-0001639-2020

BEFORE: BOWES, J., NICHOLS, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E ^[*]

MEMORANDUM

BOWES J.

Kyle Klein appeals from his August 19, 2021 judgments of sentence that amounted to an aggregate term of fifteen to thirty years of incarceration, which were imposed after he was found guilty at a consolidated non-jury trial of arson of an occupied building or structure, abuse of a corpse, criminal conspiracy, tampering with physical evidence, and obstructing administration of law at Case No. CP-51-CR-0001638-2020 ("Case No. 1638"), and voluntary manslaughter and possessing an instrument of crime at Case No. CP-51-CR-0001639-2020 ("Case No. 1639"). After careful review, we affirm.

These cases concern the violent death of Jamil Odom ("the victim"), which occurred on June 2, 2016, and Appellant's conduct thereafter.^[1] Around that time, Appellant was simultaneously involved in entangled romantic relationships with the victim and a then-sixteen-year-old, Steffanie Hart. During this same period, Appellant was serving a sentence of house arrest in an unrelated case at his parents' house at 221 East Price Street in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, where Ms. Hart and the victim occasionally stayed with Appellant. When not at 221 East Price Street, all three individuals regularly utilized an unoccupied home across the street at 222 East Price Street as an ad hoc residence and gathering place.

On the day of the victim's death, Appellant had decided to abscond from house arrest with Ms. Hart and not the victim. Prior to fleeing, Ms. Hart and Appellant confronted the victim at 222 East Price Street, sharing their intention to leave without the victim. The victim became angry and declared that she would not allow Appellant to leave with Ms. Hart. The victim then retrieved a "butcher's knife" from inside of a nearby chest of drawers and charged at Ms. Hart. N.T. Trial, 6/9/21, at 99-100, 150-51. Appellant tackled the victim before she reached Ms. Hart. During the ensuing struggle, Appellant disarmed the victim and the knife fell to the floor. Thereafter, both Appellant and the victim attempted to grab it. Id. at 178-79. Ultimately, Appellant prevailed and secured control of the knife. While the victim was still "on the ground," Appellant stabbed her repeatedly in the neck, chest, and back until she was "no longer moving." Id. at 103-04, 142-44. Afterwards, Appellant wrapped the victim's body a plastic sheet, forced her remains inside of a small wooden chest, and moved the container to the basement of 222 East Price Street. Then, he and Ms. Hart fled to temporary housing in a different area of Philadelphia for several weeks.

On June 25, 2016, Appellant and Ms. Hart returned to 222 East Price Street. While Ms. Hart kept watch outside, Appellant ventured inside of the residence and exited several minutes later. Shortly thereafter, smoke began to pour from the house. The resulting structural fire did significant damage to the building. Emergency responders quickly discovered the victim's body, which was found "wrapped in plastic and stuffed inside of a wooden chest." Trial Court Opinion, 12/10/21, at 2-3. The Fire Marshal's Office of Philadelphia determined that the fire had been caused by "open flame applied to combustibles" inside of the home and that the conflagration had "originated next to the [victim]'s body[.]" Id. An autopsy confirmed the victim died from stab wounds to her heart and left lung. See N.T. Trial, 6/8/21, at 123-25. Thereafter, the case went cold for more than three years.

In November 2019, Ms. Hart was taken into custody during an unrelated inquiry and provided a statement reciting the events described above to homicide detectives. Appellant was taken into custody shortly thereafter and charged with the crimes noted above, except at Case No. 1639 the Commonwealth originally charged Appellant with one count of ungraded homicide. In exchange for Appellant waiving his right to a jury trial, the Commonwealth agreed not to seek a first-degree murder conviction in connection with the ungraded homicide charge. Although the Commonwealth did not revise the information, Appellant essentially faced one count of third-degree murder in addition to the other charges noted above. See N.T. Trial, 6/7/21, at 18-19 ("So third degree murder is the highest charge that you are facing in a waiver, in a [j]udge trial.").

Following this agreement, a consolidated, non-jury trial was held from June 7 through June 10, 2021, wherein Ms. Hart testified extensively regarding the death of the victim and the fire at 222 East Price Street. See N.T. Trial, 6/9/21, at 56-187. At the conclusion of the Commonwealth's case, Appellant requested either a judgment of acquittal as to third-degree murder on the basis that Appellant had slain the victim in defense of Ms. Hart, or, in the alternative, a finding of voluntary manslaughter. See N.T. Trial, 6/10/21, at 16-17. Appellant also requested the trial court enter a judgment of acquittal as to the charge of arson, arguing the residence at 222 East Price Street did not meet the definition of an "occupied structure." Id. at 16-23.

Ultimately, the trial court found Appellant guilty of voluntary manslaughter along with the other crimes noted above and imposed an aggregate sentence of fifteen to thirty years of incarceration on all counts. Appellant filed timely post-sentence motions at both cases asserting, inter alia, that the convictions were contrary to the sufficiency and weight of the evidence, which were denied. Thereafter, Appellant filed separate, timely notices of appeal.^[2] On October 20, 2021, the trial court directed Appellant to file concise statements of errors pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) within twenty-one days. On November 11, 2021, Appellant filed his statements. In response, the trial court filed a Rule 1925(a) opinion addressing the merits of his issues.^[3] On appeal, this Court consolidated these cases sua sponte.

Appellant has raised the following issues for our consideration:

1. Whether the evidence was insufficient to support Appellant's conviction for voluntary manslaughter.

2. Whether the evidence was insufficient to support Appellant's conviction for first-degree arson.

3. Whether Appellant's conviction for voluntary manslaughter was against the weight of the evidence.

4. Whether Appellant's conviction for first-degree arson was against the weight of the evidence.

Appellant's brief at 8 (issues reordered for ease of disposition). We will address each of these claims seriatim.

Appellant first alleges that the Commonwealth failed to adduce sufficient evidence to support Appellant's conviction for voluntary manslaughter. See Appellant's brief at 18 ("[T]he Appellant's justification defense has not been disproved because the Commonwealth has failed to present sufficient evidence"). We bear the following basic legal principles in mind:

Our standard of review in assessing whether sufficient evidence was presented to sustain an appellant's conviction is well-settled. The standard we apply in reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence is whether viewing all the evidence admitted at trial in the light most favorable to the verdict winner, there is sufficient evidence to enable the fact-finder to find every element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. In applying [this] test, we may not weigh the evidence and substitute our judgment for the fact-finder. In addition, we note that the facts and circumstances established by the Commonwealth need not preclude every possibility of innocence. Any doubts regarding a defendant's guilt may be resolved by the fact-finder unless the evidence is so weak and inconclusive that as a matter of law no probability of fact may be drawn from the combined circumstances. The Commonwealth may sustain its burden of proving every element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt by means of wholly circumstantial evidence. Moreover, in applying the above test, the entire record must be evaluated and all evidence actually received must be considered. Finally, the trier of fact while passing upon the credibility of witnesses and the weight of the evidence produced, is free to believe all, part or none of the evidence.

Commonwealth v. Boyer, 282 A.3d 1161, 1171 (Pa.Super. 2022). A challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence presents a question of law and, consequently, it subject to plenary review under a de novo standard. See Commonwealth v. Smith, 234 A.3d 576, 581 (Pa. 2020).

Instantly, Appellant does not deny killing the victim but asserts that he acted in defense of Ms. Hart. This argument is essentially an "amalgam of defense of others, 18 Pa.C.S. § 506(a) ("Use of force for the protection of other persons") and voluntary manslaughter[.]" Commonwealth v. Sepulveda, 55 A.3d 1108, 1121 n.11 (Pa. 2012). The use of force to protect another is enshrined in statute, which states as follows:

(a) General rule.-The use of force upon or toward the person of another is justifiable to protect a third person when:

(1) the actor would be justified under section 505 (relating to use of force in self-protection) in using such force to protect himself against the injury he believes to be threatened to the person whom he seeks to protect (2) under the circumstances as the actor believes them to be, the person whom he seeks to protect would be

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