Commonwealth v. Lehman

311 A.3d 1034

COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Appellant

v.Ronnie LEHMAN, Appellee

No. 41 WAP 2022

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.

Submitted: June 21, 2023

Decided: March 21, 2024

Appeal from the Order of the Superior Court entered June 23, 2022, at No. 601 WDA 2021, vacating the Order of the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County entered April 14, 2021, at No. CP-02-CR-0003380-2018, and remanding. Jill E. Rangos, Administrative Judge - Criminal Division

Amy Elizabeth Constantine, Esq., Ronald Michael Wabby Jr., Esq., Pittsburgh, Stephen Andrew Zappala Jr., Esq., Allegheny County District Attorney’s Office, for Appellant.

Suzanne M. Swan, Esq., Pittsburgh, for Appellee.

TODD, C.J., DONOHUE, DOUGHERTY, WECHT, MUNDY, BROBSON, McCAFFERY, JJ.

OPINION

JUSTICE BROBSON

Section 5123(a.2) of the Crimes Code¹ provides, in relevant part, that "[a] prisoner or inmate commits a felony of the second degree if he unlawfully has in his possession or under his control any controlled substance in violation of [S]ection 13(a)(16) of The Controlled Substance, Drug, Device and Cosmetic Act" (Controlled Substance Act).² Section 5123(e) of the Crimes Code³ defines "inmate" as "[a] male or female offender who is committed to, under sentence to or confined in a penal or correctional institution." The question that we must decide in this case, in the context of an ineffective assistance of counsel claim brought under the Post Conviction Relief Act (PCRA),⁴ is whether Ronnie Lehman (Lehman), who was residing at Renewal Center as a condition of his parole, was an "inmate" at the time that he unlawfully possessed a controlled substance in violation of Section 13(a)(16) of the Controlled Substance Act. After careful consideration, we hold that, under the circumstances presented here, Lehman was an "inmate" as that term is used and defined in Section 5123(a.2), (e) of the Crimes Code, and, therefore, the evidence was sufficient to sustain his conviction for a violation of Section 5123(a.2). Because the Superior Court concluded otherwise and granted Lehman post-conviction relief on his ineffective assistance of counsel claim, we reverse the judgment of that court.

I. BACKGROUND

The relevant facts and procedural history underlying this matter, which do not appear to be in dispute, are summarized as follows. Lehman was residing at Renewal Center located in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, as a condition of his parole from a state sentence of incarceration.⁵ On March 5, 2018, Renewal Center staff encountered Lehman unresponsive on a bathroom floor from an apparent drug overdose. In the course of rendering life-saving aid, Renewal Center staff performed a pat-down search of Lehman’s person. During that search, Renewal Center staff discovered in the pocket of Lehman’s pants a hypodermic needle and a bundle—i.e., ten stamp bags—of what was later determined to be a combination of heroin, fentanyl, and cocaine.

Based on the foregoing, the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania (Commonwealth) charged Lehman with the following: (1) a violation of Section 5123(a) of the Crimes Code (providing a controlled substance to a confined person);⁶ (2) a violation of Section 13(a)(16) of the Controlled Substance Act (possession of a controlled substance); and (3) a violation of Section 13(a)(32) of the Controlled Substance Act (possession of drug paraphernalia).⁷ Lehman filed a motion to dismiss all three charges pursuant to what is commonly referred to as the Drug Overdose Response Immunity Act (DORIA),⁸ which, inter alia, shields a person experiencing a drug overdose event from prosecution for certain enumerated offenses, including, but not limited to, possession of a controlled substance and possession of drug paraphernalia. In response to that motion, the Commonwealth nolle prossed the possession of a controlled substance and possession of drug paraphernalia charges. The Commonwealth also filed a motion to amend the criminal information, wherein it sought to replace the charge of providing a controlled substance to a confined person with a charge alleging a violation of Section 5123(a.2) of the Crimes Code (possession of a controlled substance by a prisoner or inmate). The Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County, acting in its capacity as the trial court, granted the Commonwealth’s motion to amend. Thus, the sole remaining charge filed against Lehman was for a violation of Section 5123(a.2). While Lehman acknowledged that a violation of Section 5123(a.2) was not an offense enumerated within DORIA, he, nevertheless, maintained that DORIA shielded him from prosecution therefor, and, as a result, he was entitled to a dismissal of that charge. In support, Lehman contended that, because DORIA shielded him from prosecution for possession of a controlled substance, that same act of possession could not form the basis for a violation of Section 5123(a.2). The trial court disagreed and denied Lehman’s motion to dismiss.

The matter proceeded to a stipulated, nonjury trial. At the conclusion thereof, the trial court found Lehman guilty of a violation of Section 5123(a.2) of the Crimes Code and sentenced him to 35 to 90 months’ incarceration. Lehman filed a di- rect appeal with the Superior Court, arguing that the trial court erred by denying his motion to dismiss because he was immune from prosecution under DORIA. Commonwealth v. Lehman, 231 A.3d 877, 880 (Pa. Super. 2020). Ultimately, the Superior Court affirmed Lehman’s judgment of sentence, holding that DORIA did not afford him immunity because DORIA "provides immunity for only certain, specifically[ ]enumerated offenses" and a violation of Section 5123(a.2) was not one of those specifically enumerated offenses. Id. at 881. In response to Lehman’s contention that he should, nevertheless, be entitled to immunity because an element of a violation of Section 5123(a.2) "is the crime of possession of a controlled substance, which is an enumerated offense" under DORIA, the Superior Court explained: (1) although possession of a controlled substance may be an element of possession of a controlled substance by a prisoner or inmate, "the crimes are nevertheless distinct;" (2) a conviction under Section 5123(a.2) is "graded as a second-degree felony," and DORIA "was not intended to provide immunity for serious offenses;" and (3) "the mere fact that the crime of possession of a controlled substance is an element of the crime of possession of [a controlled substance by a prisoner or inmate] is not indicative of any [l]egislative intent to provide immunity for all offenses involving possession of drugs."⁹ Id. at 882. Lehman thereafter filed a petition for allowance of appeal with this Court, which we denied.

[1] Subsequent thereto, Lehman filed a timely pro se PCRA petition. The Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County, now acting in its capacity as the PCRA court, appointed counsel, who filed an amended PCRA petition. Therein, Lehman asserted that his trial and appellate counsel were ineffective¹⁰ for failing to challenge the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his conviction under Section 5123(a.2) of the Crimes Code. In support, Lehman contended that his sufficiency claim had arguable merit because, given his status as a parolee who was voluntarily placed at Renewal Center as a condition of his parole, the Commonwealth failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he was an "inmate" or "prisoner" at the time that he unlawfully possessed a controlled substance. See Section 5123(a.2), (e) of the Crimes Code. Thus, Lehman maintained that, had his trial counsel argued that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction under Section 5123(a.2), the trial court would not have found him guilty of that charge, or, alternatively, had his appellate counsel raised the issue on direct appeal, the Superior Court would have vacated his conviction. Lehman further contended that his trial and appellate counsel did not have a reasonable basis for their omissions in this regard and that he was prejudiced thereby because the trial court ultimately found him guilty and sentenced him for a crime that the Commonwealth failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt and the Superior Court thereafter affirmed that conviction.

The PCRA court, after providing the requisite notice of its intent to do so, dismissed Lehman’s PCRA petition without a hearing pursuant to Pennsylvania Rule of Criminal Procedure 907. Lehman appealed to the Superior Court, arguing that the PCRA court abused its discretion by doing so because he had established that there was insufficient evidence to sustain his conviction under Section 5123(a.2) of the Crimes Code insofar as he was not a "prisoner" or "inmate" at the time that he unlawfully possessed a controlled substance. In its opinion issued pursuant to Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure 1925(a), the PCRA court concluded that Lehman’s trial and appellate counsel were not ineffective because his underlying sufficiency claim lacked arguable merit. To that end, the PCRA court explained that Lehman satisfied the definition of "prisoner" or "inmate" for the purposes of Section 5123(a.2) because he was involuntarily committed to Renewal Center as a condition of his parole and, if he left Renewal Center without express permission, he would have violated the terms and conditions of his parole.

[2] In a divided, published opinion, a three-judge panel of the Superior Court vacated the PCRA court’s order and remanded the matter to the PCRA court for further proceedings.¹¹ Commonwealth v. Lehman, 278 A.3d 321 (Pa. Super. 2022). After noting that the parties seemed to agree that Lehman was not a "prisoner" or "confined" at the time he unlawfully possessed a controlled substance in violation of Section 13(a)(16) of the Controlled Substance Act and that, "[a]s a community corrections center, Renewal [Center] indisputably qualifies as a correctional institution," the Superior Court indicated that the narrow issue before it was "whether a...