Commonwealth v. Lehman

201 A.3d 1279

COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania

v.Michael A. LEHMAN, Appellant

No. 1556 MDA 2017

Superior Court of Pennsylvania.

Argued November 14, 2018

Filed: January 4, 2019

William H. Graff, Jr., York, for appellant.

Justin M. Talarowski, Assistant District Attorney, York, for Commonwealth, appellee.

BEFORE: LAZARUS, J., OLSON, J., and MUSMANNO, J.

OPINION BY OLSON, J.:

More than 28 years ago, the trial court sentenced Appellant, Michael A. Lehman, to the then-mandatory term of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole for a murder committed when he was 14 years old. On April 4, 2017, he was resentenced to 30 years to life imprisonment in light of intervening decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States. See Miller v. Alabama , 567 U.S. 460, 132 S.Ct. 2455, 183 L.Ed.2d 407 (2012) ; see also Montgomery v. Louisiana , ––– U.S. ––––, 136 S.Ct. 718, 193 L.Ed.2d 599 (2016). In addition, the trial court ordered him to pay costs associated with that resentencing.¹ Appellant appeals from that judgment of sentence, challenging the trial court's authority to sentence him for first-degree murder and to require payment of the costs. After careful consideration, we hold that, although Appellant's sentence of imprisonment is lawful, a trial court lacks authority to impose costs associated with a resentencing proceeding necessitated by the imposition of a prior illegal sentence. We, therefore, affirm in part, vacate in part, and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

In June 1988, Appellant was 14 years old. He and two other residents escaped from the Children's Home of York County ("the Home"). Appellant was apprehended. The same day, however, he fled the Home again. He, along with his confederates, then plotted to murder one of the Home's staff members. They returned to the Home and Appellant served as a lookout while his confederates viciously murdered the staff member by stabbing him 21 times.

Appellant was convicted of first-degree murder,² burglary,³ robbery,⁴ and criminal conspiracy.⁵ On October 22, 1990, the trial court sentenced Appellant to the then-mandatory term of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. See 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 1102(a) (West 1988) (requiring sentence of life imprisonment); 61 Pa.C.S.A. § 6137(a)(3) (West 1988) (barring parole for individuals sentenced to life imprisonment). This Court affirmed. Commonwealth v. Lehman , 418 Pa.Super. 634, 606 A.2d 1231 (1991) (unpublished memorandum).

On October 8, 1998, Appellant filed his first petition pursuant to the Post-Conviction Relief Act ("PCRA"), 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541 - 9546. On May 26, 1999, the PCRA court denied the petition. This Court affirmed and our Supreme Court denied allowance of appeal. Commonwealth v. Lehman , 754 A.2d 19 (Pa. Super. 2000) (unpublished memorandum), appeal denied , 564 Pa. 706, 764 A.2d 1066 (2000). On July 1, 2010, Appellant filed his second PCRA petition. The PCRA court dismissed that petition on August 26, 2010. Again, this Court affirmed and our Supreme Court denied allowance of appeal. Commonwealth v. Lehman , 34 A.3d 221 (Pa. Super. 2011) (unpublished memorandum), appeal denied , 613 Pa. 662, 34 A.3d 827 (2011).

On August 21, 2012, Appellant filed his third PCRA petition in which he alleged that Miller entitled him to relief. In Miller , the Supreme Court of the United States held that juvenile homicide offenders may not be sentenced pursuant to schemes that impose mandatory life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. Miller , 567 U.S. at 469-489, 132 S.Ct. 2455. Thereafter, in Commonwealth v. Cunningham , 622 Pa. 543, 81 A.3d 1 (2013), our Supreme Court held that Miller did not apply retroactively. Id. at 4-11. On November 20, 2013, the PCRA court dismissed Appellant's third petition based on Cunningham . Bound by Cunningham , this Court affirmed. Commonwealth v. Lehman , 122 A.3d 1131 (Pa. Super. 2015) (unpublished memorandum).

The following year, resolving a split amongst state courts of last resort, the Supreme Court of the United States held that Miller applied retroactively. Montgomery , 136 S.Ct. at 732-737. On March 16, 2016, Appellant filed his fourth PCRA petition. Prior to the PCRA court ruling on that petition, the United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania granted Appellant a writ of habeas corpus and ordered the trial court to resentence Appellant.⁶ Lehman v. Commonwealth , 15cv843 (M.D. Pa. Aug. 8, 2016).

On April 7, 2017, the trial court resentenced Appellant to an aggregate term of 30 years to life imprisonment. The trial court also ordered Appellant to pay costs associated with the resentencing proceedings. The Commonwealth filed a post-sentence motion challenging the discretionary aspects of Appellant's sentence. On September 18, 2017, the trial court denied the post-sentence motion. This timely appeal followed.⁷

Appellant presents three issues for our review:

1. Was [Appellant] granted relief under the [PCRA] or pursuant to a petition for a writ of habeas corpus ?

2. [Did the trial court impose an illegal sentence by ordering Appellant to serve 30 years to life imprisonment?

3. Did the trial court impose an illegal sentence by ordering Appellant to pay the costs associated with the resentencing proceedings?]

Appellant's Brief at 3.⁸

In his first issue, Appellant argues that he obtained relief pursuant to the writ of habeas corpus issued by the United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania and not because the PCRA court granted him relief. This issue is moot because the trial court resentenced Appellant. Cf. In re S.H ., 71 A.3d 973, 976 (Pa. Super. 2013) (citation omitted) ("If events occur to eliminate the claim or controversy at any stage in the process, the [issue] becomes moot."). For purposes of the central issues presented in this appeal from Appellant's judgment of sentence, it is immaterial whether Appellant was before the trial court for resentencing pursuant to an order issued under the PCRA or the writ of habeas corpus issued by the United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania. Accordingly, we decline to address Appellant's first issue.

In his second issue, Appellant argues that the trial court imposed an illegal sentence by ordering him to serve 30 years to life imprisonment for his first-degree murder conviction.⁹ According to Appellant, there was no statutory authority by which the trial court could sentence Appellant for first-degree murder because 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 1102, when combined with 61 Pa.C.S.A. § 6137(a)(3), was deemed unconstitutional in Miller . Appellant argues that the trial court was required to (1) sentence him for third-degree murder, a crime he was not convicted of committing, or (2) discharge him. We review an illegal sentencing claim de novo and our scope of review is plenary. Commonwealth v. White , 193 A.3d 977, 985 (Pa. Super. 2018) (citation omitted).

Our Supreme Court and this Court have rejected Appellant's argument on numerous occasions. E.g. Commonwealth v. Batts , 640 Pa. 401, 163 A.3d 410, 421 (2017) ; Commonwealth v. Olds , 192 A.3d 1188, 1193 (Pa. Super. 2018) ; Commonwealth v. Foust , 180 A.3d 416, 430 (Pa. Super. 2018) ; Commonwealth v. Seskey , 170 A.3d 1105, 1106 (Pa. Super. 2017).¹⁰ Pursuant to these binding decisions, the trial court was required to impose a sentence for first-degree murder. The sentencing options available to the trial court offered no mandatory minimum and a mandatory maximum term of life imprisonment. The trial court imposed such a sentence. Hence, Appellant's sentence of 30 years to life imprisonment was legal.

In his final issue, Appellant argues that the trial court imposed an illegal sentence by ordering him to pay costs associated with his resentencing proceedings, which came about because of the illegality of his original sentence. In essence, Appellant's claim is that expenses incurred by reason of resentencing proceedings undertaken after the initial imposition of an unlawful sentence fall outside the trial court's authority to impose costs. The Commonwealth, on the other hand, contends that Appellant's claim challenges the discretionary aspects of his sentence. Because Appellant challenges the trial court's authority to impose costs as part of its resentencing order, we conclude that the Appellant's claim implicates the legality of his sentence and, thus, he was not required to include a statement pursuant to Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure 2119(f) in his brief or to raise the issue before the trial court. See Commonwealth v. Robinson , 7 A.3d 868, 871 (Pa. Super. 2010). We apply a de novo standard of review to such a claim and our scope of review is plenary. See White , 193 A.3d at 985 (citation omitted).

Preliminarily, we set forth the legal framework governing this issue. It is unclear from the record whether the trial court imposed costs pursuant to the common law, pursuant to 16 P.S. § 4403,¹¹ or both.¹² Ultimately, we conclude that it is immaterial for purposes of this decision whether costs were imposed under the common law, section 4403, or both because the result is the same. Hence, we set forth the framework for both the common law and section 4403.

The Judicial Code provides that, "The governing authority shall prescribe by general rule the standards governing the imposition and taxation of costs, including the items which constitute taxable costs, the litigants who shall bear such costs, and the discretion vested in the courts to modify the amount and responsibility for costs in specific matters." 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 1726(a). Our Supreme Court has not, pursuant to section 1726(a), prescribed by general rules such standards in criminal cases.

As our Supreme Court explained:

The Judicial Code was created by the Judiciary Act of 1976, which, in conjunction with the Judiciary Act Repealer Act ( ["]JARA["] ) and the Judiciary Act Repealer Act of 1980 [ ], represented the culmination of a ten year effort to

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