Commonwealth v. Life Care Ctr.S Of Am. Inc

456 Mass. 826

926 N.E.2d 206

COMMONWEALTHv.LIFE CARE CENTERS OF AMERICA, INC.

SJC-10546

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Middlesex.

Argued March 1, 2010.

Decided May 19, 2010.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Don Howarth, Las Angeles, CA (Suzelle M. Smith, of California, R. Matthew Rickman, Boston, & Alathea E. Porter with him) for the defendant.

Randall E. Ravitz, Assistant Attorney General, for the Commonwealth.

The following submitted briefs for amici curiae:

Kelly Bagby & Michael Schuster, of the District of Columbia, for AARP & others.

Scott Harshbarger & Amy Crafts, Boston, for Massachusetts Senior Care Association & another.

Ben Robbins & Martin J. Newhouse, Boston, for New England Legal Foundation & others.

Harold J. Bressler, Oakbrook Terrace, & Ila S. Rothschild, IL &Marc C. Laredo, Boston, for The Joint Commission.

Max D. Stern & Alexandra H. Deal, Boston, for Massachusetts Association of 766 Approved Private Schools.

John J. Barter, Boston, for Professional Liability Foundation, Ltd.

Present: MARSHALL, C.J., IRELAND, SPINA, COWIN, CORDY, BOTSFORD, & GANTS, JJ.

COWIN, J.

A resident of the Life Care Center of Acton nursing home (nursing home), a long-term care facility, died in 2004 from injuries sustained when she fell down the front stairs while attempting to leave the facility in her wheelchair. The resident was able to leave the facility because she was not wearing a prescribed security bracelet that both set off an alarm and temporarily locked the front doors if the resident approached within a certain distance of those doors. The defendant, Life Care Centers of America, Inc., a corporation that operates the nursing home, was indicted for involuntary manslaughter and neglect of a resident of a long-term care facility.¹

Prior to trial, the prosecutor stated in a bill of particulars that the Commonwealth intended to establish the corporation's criminal liability by aggregating the knowledge and actions of multiple employees even if no one employee was criminally liable individually for the crime. At the Commonwealth's request, the judge reported two questions of law to the Appeals Court seeking a determination whether corporate criminal liability may be based on this theory of aggregation. See Mass. R.Crim. P. 34, as amended, 442 Mass. 1501 (2004). These questions are:

“1. May a corporation be found guilty of involuntary manslaughter under General Laws chapter 265 section 13 based upon a theory of collective knowledge and conduct of multiple of its employees, in the absence of one specific

employee who is criminally liable for the commission of that crime?

“2. May a corporation be found guilty of neglect of a resident of its long-term care facility under General Laws chapter 265 section 38, repealed [after the death of the resident] by St.2004 chapter 501 section 9, based upon a theory of collective knowledge and conduct of multiple of its employees, in the absence of one specific employee who is criminally liable for the commission of that crime?” ²

We granted the defendant's application for direct appellate review and answer both questions “No.” ³

1. Facts and procedural history. We summarize the facts reported by the judge and the relevant procedural history.⁴ Julia McCauley became a resident of the nursing home in 1996. She suffered from, among other ailments, brain damage and dementia. On one occasion in 1999, McCauley, sitting in a wheelchair, was found in the facility's entrance foyer between the two sets of entry doors. Nursing home staff determined that she was at risk of leaving the nursing home unattended, and a physician ordered that she wear a “WanderGuard” signaling device at all times.⁵ At least two nursing home employees knew that after that, McCauley attempted to leave the nursing home through the front doors on multiple occasions.

Nursing home procedure provided that physician's treatment orders be transcribed to a sheet of paper (treatment sheet) containing a box for each day of the month. After treatment was carried out on a given day, the nurse administering the treatment was required to check the box for that day. McCauley's treatment order required that a nurse check once daily, during the 11 p.m. to 7 a.m. shift, that McCauley was wearing the WanderGuard and that it was operational.

According to nursing home policy, treatment sheets were “edited” by two nurses at the beginning of each month. Those nurses checked that the physician's orders were transcribed correctly on the treatment sheets. In an effort to prevent mistakes from occurring, the two nurses completed this process independently.

In January, 2004, the nursing home's director of nursing asked an administrative employee to “clean[ ] up” all residents' treatment sheets. Misinterpreting this instruction, the employee removed numerous physician's orders, including WanderGuard orders, from the treatment sheets. The omission of the WanderGuard order from McCauley's treatment sheet was not discovered during the monthly editing process in February or March, 2004.⁶

On the evening of April 16, 2004, McCauley's unit was “short-staffed.” A substitute from another unit replaced McCauley's regular nurse. He did not know McCauley and was not aware that she was supposed to wear a WanderGuard. It was his practice to ensure that a WanderGuard was in place if there was an order for one on the treatment sheet; if there was no such order, he did not check for a WanderGuard. Shortly before 7 a.m. on the morning of April 17, 2004, a nurse's aide wheeled McCauley to the nurses' station near the front entry. A few minutes later, McCauley, who was not wearing a WanderGuard, left the nursing home in her wheelchair through the two sets of double doors. After passing through the doorways, she fell down eight steps and died as a result of injuries suffered during the fall. A grand jury indicted the defendant on charges of involuntary manslaughter, see G.L. c. 265, § 13; abuse, neglect, or mistreatment of a resident of a long-term care facility, see G.L. c. 265, § 38, repealed by St.2004, c. 501, § 9; and making a false Medicaid claim, see G.L. c. 118E, § 40. The defendant filed a motion to dismiss all counts of the indictment. In support of its motion, the defendant argued, inter alia, that the indictments did not effectively state a criminal offense because they sought to impose criminal liability based on the collective knowledge and actions (or failures to act) of the corporation's employees where no individual employee was criminally responsible by himself ⁷; the defendant emphasized that the Commonwealth's theory of aggregation had never been recognized in the Commonwealth. The charge of making a false Medicaid claim was dismissed because the evidence presented to the grand jury did not establish that the defendant made any false statement or representation of a material fact. The motion to dismiss was denied with respect to the other charges; the judge did not decide whether the Commonwealth's aggregation theory was a permissible basis for those charges because she determined that the Commonwealth could proceed against the defendant based solely on Edwards's conduct.

The defendant subsequently filed a motion in limine to exclude any evidence relevant only to a theory of criminal liability based on collective knowledge and conduct. The judge allowed the motion⁸ but, as stated, reported the questions concerning the validity of the collective knowledge and conduct theory to the Appeals Court.⁹ We granted the defendant's application for direct appellate review.

We conclude that the judge who allowed the motion in limine determined correctly that the Commonwealth may not prosecute a corporation for criminal conduct based on a theory that requires aggregating the knowledge and conduct of multiple employees.¹⁰ A corporation may be criminally liable for the crimes alleged here only where at least one of its employees could be found individually liable for the crime.

2 Discussion. a Criminal liability of corporation for involuntary manslaughter based on theory of collective knowledge and conduct of multiple employees. The Commonwealth argues that criminal liability may attach to a corporation based on the aggregate knowledge and conduct of its employees even where no individual employee has committed a crime.¹¹ Specifically, the Commonwealth argues that the defendant may be convicted of involuntary manslaughter in this case by accumulating the removal of the WanderGuard order from McCauley's chart; the knowledge of her regular nurses that she was supposed to wear the WanderGuard; the knowledge of various employees that McCauley had a tendency to attempt to leave the nursing home; the knowledge of the nursing supervisor that the WanderGuard order had been removed from the chart together with her failure to have the treatment order re-entered; and the failure of the substitute nurse to check that McCauley was wearing her WanderGuard. Although the Commonwealth admits that its theory of corporate criminal liability has not been recognized under Massachusetts law, it argues that this theory follows naturally from the principles underlying corporate liability in other contexts. We are not persuaded.

Pursuant to the theory of respondeat superior, a corporation is responsible for both the acts and omissions of any one of its employees. See Commonwealth v. Angelo Todesca Corp., 446 Mass. 128, 133-135, 842 N.E.2d 930 (2006). This is the case whether those acts are intentional, negligent, wanton, or reckless. See id. at 134, 842 N.E.2d 930. By its theory of aggregation, the Commonwealth is attempting to promote conduct that is no more than negligent on the part of one or more employees into wanton or reckless conduct on the part of the corporation. This theory is illogical and such an argument cannot succeed. If at least one employee did not act wantonly or recklessly, then the corporation cannot be held to a higher standard of culpability by...