Commonwealth v. Littlejohn

1

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA v. GREGORY LITTLEJOHN Appellant

No. 1248 WDA 2023

No. J-S10027-24

Superior Court of Pennsylvania

September 13, 2024

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered September 18, 2023 In the Court of Common Pleas of Mercer County Criminal Division at No(s): CP-43-CR-0001528-2021

BEFORE: OLSON, J., KING, J., and LANE, J.

MEMORANDUM

KING J.

Appellant Gregory Littlejohn, appeals from the judgment of sentence entered in the Mercer County Court of Common Pleas, following his no-contest plea to possession of a firearm prohibited.^[1] We affirm.

The relevant facts and procedural history of this case are as follows. On the evening of December 7, 2021, Pennsylvania State Police Trooper Gary Knott^[2] was patrolling eastbound traffic on I-80, when he observed a black car with a New York license plate driving in the left lane, with no headlights, and with very dark tinted windows.

Trooper Knott performed a routine traffic stop for these violations of the vehicle code. When Trooper Knott approached the passenger side of the vehicle, Appellant partially lowered the window and Trooper Knott observed that Appellant was on a video call on Facetime. Trooper Knott smelled a strong odor of fresh green raw marijuana and had to ask Appellant twice to put the window all the way down.

Appellant told Trooper Knott that he was from Brooklyn, New York, and was returning from his grandfather's funeral in Milwaukee, Wisconsin. Appellant also stated that he was driving his wife's car, and Appellant showed the officer insurance cards that he alleged provided his wife's name. Trooper Knott then leaned into the vehicle to better hear Appellant and to view documents that Appellant was showing him.

Trooper Knott indicated that he wanted to investigate further based on Appellant's presentation of a New York driver's license and the odor of marijuana. Trooper Knott told Appellant that he intended to check his license and asked Appellant to exit the vehicle for the purpose of facilitating communication and for officer safety. The Trooper indicated that the safest possible location for anybody to be in during a traffic stop is the front seat of a police vehicle.

When Trooper Knott asked Appellant to exit the vehicle, Appellant became agitated. Eventually, however, Appellant exited the vehicle. Trooper Knott was concerned that Appellant had a weapon and patted him down for officer safety. The pat down revealed no weapons, and Appellant then sat in the passenger seat of the police cruiser. Trooper Knott ran Appellant's license and learned that Appellant was a known gang member with a criminal history in two states. Trooper Knott used his computer to call for backup, and was soon joined by his supervisor, Corporal Reed Grenci. Corporal Grenci stood outside the passenger door of the police cruiser and took part in the conversation with Appellant.

Trooper Knott asked Appellant for consent to search the vehicle and explained that if the marijuana was the only thing discovered, it would be sent to the lab and Appellant would be released. Appellant then called his mother and discussed his options regarding the search. During the phone call, the trooper overheard Appellant's mother ask if Appellant had a gun in the car and noticed that Appellant became agitated with his mother. After Corporal Grenci told Appellant that if he did not consent to the search he would be detained up to three hours while the troopers obtained a search warrant, Appellant verbally consented to the search. Corporal Grenci conducted the search of the vehicle and discovered a gun and magazine in the center console, as well as a bag of marijuana and related paraphernalia.

Appellant was then read his Miranda^[3] warnings and requested an attorney. Although the officers stopped questioning him, during transport to the barracks, Appellant continually asked questions regarding his punishment, penalties, and possible charges. Appellant also made an unsolicited statement that he did not do anything illegal with the gun that was found.

On December 8, 2021, the Commonwealth charged Appellant with possession of a firearm prohibited, possession of a firearm without a license, possession of marijuana, possession of drug paraphernalia, and related summary offenses. On May 24, 2022, Appellant filed an omnibus pretrial motion, which sought, inter alia, suppression of the evidence related to the traffic stop and the statements he made thereafter. The Commonwealth filed a motion to quash Appellant's suppression motion as untimely. The trial court conducted a suppression hearing on June 7, 2022, after which it directed the parties to file supplemental briefs.

On January 18, 2023, the trial court entered an order which denied the Commonwealth's motion to quash, finding that the pre-trial motion was filed promptly after counsel was retained by Appellant and any delay did not adversely affect the Commonwealth. The court granted in part and denied in part Appellant's motion to suppress. Specifically, the court found that based on the totality of the circumstances after the initial stop, Trooper Knott had the authority to detain Appellant for an investigative search. The court found that Trooper Knott's actions of leaning into the vehicle to view the documents and better hear Appellant was not an improper search of the vehicle. Nevertheless, the court found that Trooper Knott did not have reasonable suspicion that Appellant was armed and dangerous, and therefore decided that the initial frisk was improper and without justification. However, because nothing was obtained from Appellant's person which could be suppressed, the court found the improper search irrelevant. The trial court also stated that the duration of the stop was appropriate based on the progression of the initial stop and investigatory detention.

The court further determined that Appellant was in custody and not given his Miranda warnings before he was questioned while seated in the front seat of the police cruiser, such that suppression of his statements to police was proper. Nevertheless, the court found that Appellant was not entitled to suppression of the evidence seized from the vehicle based on Appellant's consent and the fact that such evidence would have been inevitably discovered by a search warrant had Appellant not consented.

On January 31, 2023, Appellant filed a motion to reconsider the denial of the motion to suppress evidence from the search. On February 14, 2023, the Commonwealth filed a motion to reconsider the portion of the court's order granting Appellant's motion to suppress statements. On June 20, 2023, the trial court denied both motions to reconsider.

On September 18, 2023, Appellant pled no-contest to one count of possession of firearm prohibited. As part of his plea, Appellant retained the right to appeal the denial of his motion to suppress evidence.^[4] Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal on October 17, 2023. Pursuant to the trial court's order, Appellant filed a concise statement of errors complained of on appeal per Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) on October 26, 2023.

Appellant raises the following issues for our review:

1. Did the trial court [err] in denying Appellant's motion to suppress evidence as the duration of the traffic stop was unreasonably extended.

2. Did the trial court erred in denying Appellant's motion to suppress evidence based [on] the inevitable discovery doctrine.

(Appellant's Brief at 7) (unnecessary capitalization omitted).

In his first issue, Appellant argues that the trial court erred when it found that the trooper had reasonable suspicion to conduct an investigative detention. Appellant concedes that the initial traffic stop was valid; however, he claims that the officer prolonged the traffic stop beyond the time reasonably required. Appellant insists that the 23-minute duration of the traffic stop, on its face, exceeded the acceptable and normal time limits to issue a traffic ticket or warning. Appellant contends the trial court erred when it concluded that he was not subject to an unconstitutional seizure because of the prolonged detention.

Alternatively, if the duration of the stop was not itself unreasonable, Appellant claims that the officers lacked reasonable suspicion to seize him in the first place. Appellant argues that the smell of marijuana alone does not establish reasonable suspicion, as the trooper never asked whether Appellant had a medical marijuana card. Appellant also maintains that the fact that he was directed twice to roll down the window was reasonable as it was chilly outside. Additionally, Appellant insists that the fact that he was driving on a known drug corridor, alone, does not establish reasonable suspicion, especially where Appellant challenges the trooper's statements that Appellant was acting agitated. Appellant further posits that none of his statements supplied evidence that criminal activity was afoot. Appellant concludes that the suppression court erred in finding that Trooper Knott had reasonable suspicion to effectuate an investigatory detention, and this Court must grant relief. We disagree.

Our standard of review of a trial court's ruling on a suppression motion is "whether the factual findings are supported by the record and whether the legal conclusions drawn from those facts are correct." Commonwealth v. Rosario, 248 A.3d 599, 607 (Pa.Super. 2021). We are bound by the facts found by the trial court so long as they are supported by the record, but we review its legal conclusions de novo. Id. at 607-08. The trial court has sole authority to pass on the credibility of witnesses and the weight to be given to their testimony. Id. at 608. "Our

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