Commonwealth v. Lyles

54 A.3d 76

2012 PA Super 191

COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Appellant

v.Haleem L. LYLES, Appellee.

Superior Court of Pennsylvania.

Submitted April 16, 2012.

Filed Sept. 10, 2012.

Hugh J. Burns, Jr., Assistant District Attorney, Philadelphia, for Commonwealth, appellant.

Paul J. Hetznecker, Philadelphia, for appellee.

BEFORE: BENDER, J., LAZARUS, J., and STRASSBURGER, J.^*

OPINION BY BENDER, J.:

The Commonwealth appeals the suppression court's ruling on Appellee's motion to suppress the evidence entered on the record on March 15, 2011. Finding no reasonable suspicion to request Appellee's identification, the court suppressed the narcotics subsequently seized on Appellee's person as fruit of the poisonous tree. After careful review, we reverse.

The suppression court summarized the “sum and substance of the credible testimony and evidence from the suppression hearing” as follows:

On July 11, 2009 at approximately 4:30 PM, while patrolling the neighborhood in a marked police car, Police Officers Dobbins and Lai observed Appellee and another male sitting in front of an apparently vacant building at 1048 South Dorrance Street. Officer Dobbins testified that, due to the large number of burglaries that had been reported in the area, he approached Appellee and his companion to question their reason for being there. After Appellee explained that he was on the street because his grandmother lived on that block, Dobbins requested his identification. While Dobbins was writing down the information on Appellee's identification card, he observed Appellee turning his right side away from easy view and placing his hand in his right shorts pocket. Dobbins told Appellee to remove his hand from his pocket and stop moving, and Appellee complied. Appellee again put his hand into his right pocket and Dobbins, believing he may have been reaching for a concealed weapon, instructed him a second time to remove his hand. Subsequently, Appellee put his hand into his pocket a third time, prompting Dobbins to put Appellee against the wall to frisk him and check for weapons. Appellee again placed his hand in his pocket, and when Dobbins forcibly removed Appellee's hand, a plastic bag was visible at the top of the pocket containing blue packets filled with an off-white chunky substance, allegedly crack cocaine. Officer Lai handcuffed Appellee and completed the search, which also uncovered a plastic bag containing a green leafy substance, allegedly marijuana.

Suppression Court Opinion (S.C.O.), 7/13/11, at 1—2.¹

The applicable standard of review in a Commonwealth appeal from an order of suppression is well-settled. We “must first determine whether the factual findings are supported by the record, and then determine whether the inferences and legal conclusions drawn from those findings are reasonable.” Commonwealth v. Luv, 557 Pa. 570, 735 A.2d 87, 90 (1999) (citing Commonwealth v. Hall, 549 Pa. 269, 701 A.2d 190 (1997)). We may “consider only the evidence from the defendant's witnesses together with the evidence of the prosecution that, when read in the context of the entire record, remains uncontradicted.” Commonwealth v. Carter, 779 A.2d 591, 592–93 (Pa.Super.2001) (quoting Commonwealth v. Nester, 551 Pa. 157, 709 A.2d 879, 880–81 (1998)). When “the evidence supports the suppression court's findings of fact ..., this Court may reverse only when the legal conclusions drawn from those facts are erroneous.” Id. at 593 (quoting Commonwealth v. Valentin, 748 A.2d 711, 713 (Pa.Super.2000)).

Our courts have long recognized three levels of interaction that occur between the police and citizens that are relevant to the analysis of whether a particular search or seizure conforms to the requirements of U.S. CONST. amend. IV and P.A. CONST. art. I, § 8.

The first of these is a “mere encounter” (or request for information) which need not be supported by any level of suspicion, but carries no official compulsion to stop or respond. The second, an “investigative detention” must be supported by reasonable suspicion; it subjects a suspect to a stop and period of detention, but does not involve such coercive conditions as to constitute the functional equivalent of arrest. Finally, an arrest or “custodial detention” must be supported by probable cause.

Commonwealth v. Phinn, 761 A.2d 176, 181 (Pa.Super.2000) (quoting Commonwealth v. Ellis, 541 Pa. 285, 662 A.2d 1043, 1047 (1995) (citations and footnotes omitted)).

[I]n assessing the lawfulness of citizen/police encounters, a central, threshold issue is whether or not the citizen-subject has been seized. Instances of police questioning involving no seizure or detentive aspect (mere or consensual encounters) need not be supported by any level of suspicion in order to maintain validity. Valid citizen/police interactions which constitute seizures generally fall within two categories, distinguished according to the degree of restraint upon a citizen's liberty: the investigative detention or Terry stop, which subjects an individual to a stop and a period of detention but is not so coercive as to constitute the functional equivalent of an arrest; and a custodial detention or arrest, the more restrictive form of permissible encounters. To maintain constitutional validity, an investigative detention must be supported by a reasonable and articulable suspicion that the person seized is engaged in criminal activity and may continue only so long as is necessary to confirm or dispel such suspicion; whereas, a custodial detention is legal only if based on probable cause. To guide the crucial inquiry as to whether or not a seizure has been effected, the United States Supreme Court has devised an objective test entailing a determination of whether, in view of all surrounding circumstances, a reasonable person would have believed that he was free to leave. In evaluating the circumstances, the focus is directed toward whether, by means of physical force or show of authority, the citizen-subject's movement has in some way been restrained. In making this determination, courts must apply the totality-of-the-circumstances approach,with no single factor dictating the ultimate conclusion as to whether a seizure has occurred.

Commonwealth v. Strickler, 563 Pa. 47, 757 A.2d 884, 889–90 (2000) (internal citations and footnotes omitted).

The sole issue presented for review in the instant appeal is whether an investigative detention occurred when Officer Dobbins requested Appellee's identification. If Appellee's interaction with Officer Dobbins rose to the level of an investigative detention when Dobbins requested Appellee's identification, then the subsequent discovery of contraband on Appellee's person should have been suppressed as fruit of the poisonous tree because the suppression court found that Dobbins did not have a reasonable suspicion to suspect that criminal activity was afoot at that moment in time.² If, however, the encounter did not rise to the level of an investigative detention when the request for identification was made, then Dobbins and Appellee were only engaged in a mere encounter. In the latter case, Dobbins' subsequent observations of Appellee's furtive movements, justifying Dobbins limited search for weapons for officer safety and which ultimately revealed the contraband, should not have been suppressed.

The suppression court determined that Dobbins' request for Appellee's identification elevated a mere encounter into an investigative detention because:

By asking for proof of Appellee's identification, Dobbins made it clear that he was not satisfied with Appellee's explanation for his presence. Dobbins ['] request for identification indicated an intention to investigate further, and left Appellee with no option to leave, unless he wished to leave his identification card behind. Even Dobbins believed that Appellee was not free to leave at that point. While the test for whether a seizure occurred is not whether the officer or individual actually believed the individual was free to leave, the fact that the officer in question did not believe Appellee was free to leave is highly suggestive of the tenor of their encounter. Under the circumstances here, a reasonable person simply would not have felt free to ignore the officer's request and go on his or her way.

S.C.O., at 4. Thus, the court suppressed the subsequently seized contraband. Its decision was based upon the above factual findings and inferences, as well as two prior decisions of this court, Commonwealth v. Stevenson, 832 A.2d 1123 (Pa.Super.2003), and Commonwealth v. Au, 986 A.2d 864 (Pa.Super.2009)(en banc), rev'd,––– Pa. ––––, 42 A.3d 1002 (2012).

The Commonwealth argues that the suppression court erred in granting suppression. The Commonwealth asserts that Dobbins' request for Appellee's identification did not constitute a seizure in the totality of the circumstances presented to the court in this case. The Commonwealth supports this argument by the fact that Appellee voluntarily parted with his identification card, Appellee did not refuse to hand it over, and he did not ask Dobbins to return it to him. Commonwealth's Brief, at 12. The Commonwealth argues that these facts undermine the suppression court's inference that Appellee was left “with no option to leave, unless he wished to leave his identification card behind.” S.C.O., at 4.

In Au, an en banc panel of the Superior Court considered the following factual circumstances:

While on routine patrol on May 31, 2007, Sergeant Ryan Hendrick of the Ferguson Township Police Department observed a vehicle backed in and parked at Watkins Dariette (hereinafter “Dariette”) on East Pine Grove Road at approximately 12:29 a.m. The Dariette closed several hours earlier, between 9:00 p.m. and 10:00 p.m. Sgt. Hendrick noted that the car was not parked at the Dariette several minutes earlier when he patrolled the same area. He pulled into the parking lot and positioned his marked cruiser so that his...