Commonwealth v. Machicote

206 A.3d 1110

COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Appellee

v.Anthony MACHICOTE, Appellant

No. 14 WAP 2018

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.

Argued: October 24, 2018

Decided: April 26, 2019

OPINION

JUSTICE MUNDY

In this matter, Appellant asks this Court to determine whether his sentence was illegal because he was subject to a potential sentence of life without parole, and prior to imposing his sentence, the trial court did not consider the factors enumerated in Miller v. Alabama , 567 U.S. 460, 132 S.Ct. 2455, 183 L.Ed.2d 407 (2012), as adopted by this Court in Commonwealth v. Batts , 620 Pa. 115, 66 A.3d 286 (2013) ( Batts I ) and Commonwealth v. Batts (Batts II ), 640 Pa. 401, 163 A.3d 410 (2017). The Superior Court concluded that Appellant's challenge in this regard, was moot because he was ultimately not sentenced to life without the possibility of parole. We conclude the issue is not moot, and the trial court erred when it failed to consider the Miller factors on the record when it resentenced Appellant.

This case originates in 2003 when Appellant was 17 years old and a resident at George Junior Republic, a residential treatment facility for at-risk youth. Appellant and a co-resident, Jeremy Melvin, devised a plan to subdue a night supervisor at the facility in order to escape. On November 10, 2003, Appellant commenced the scheme and called the night supervisor, Wayne Urey, Jr., to his room. Melvin, who was hiding, attacked Urey from behind, put him in a chokehold, and brought him to the ground. Appellant and Melvin bound and gagged Urey, and proceeded to steal his keys, wallet, and truck. Appellant and Melvin escaped, and Urey ultimately died of suffocation.

Appellant and Melvin turned themselves in later that same day. Appellant was charged with homicide, robbery, and related offenses. On November 3, 2004, Appellant pled guilty to second-degree murder and the remaining charges were dismissed. On January 6, 2005, Appellant was sentenced to life without the possibility of parole.¹ Appellant did not appeal his sentence.

On January 11, 2006, Appellant filed a timely pro se Post Conviction Relief Act (PCRA) petition challenging the voluntariness of his plea, and asserting ineffective assistance of counsel. A hearing was held, and Appellant's petition was denied. The Superior Court affirmed the PCRA court's decision, and this Court denied Appellant's petition for allowance of appeal. Commonwealth v. Machicote , 929 A.2d 242 (Pa. Super. 2007), appeal denied , 594 Pa. 677, 932 A.2d 1287 (2007).

Before turning to the subsequent procedural history leading to the instant appeal, a brief discussion of the evolution of juvenile sentencing cases is required. We begin with cases decided by the United States Supreme Court over the last decade and a half and the categorical rules that have emerged in their wake, as they are integral to the development of individualized sentencing. In Roper v. Simmons , 543 U.S. 551, 125 S.Ct. 1183, 161 L.Ed.2d 1 (2005), the United States Supreme Court held "[t]he Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments forbid imposition of the death penalty on offenders who were under the age of 18 when their crimes were committed." Roper , 543 U.S. at 578, 125 S.Ct. 1183. Five years later, in Graham v. Florida , 560 U.S. 48, 130 S.Ct. 2011, 176 L.Ed.2d 825 (2011), the United States Supreme Court held that "the Eighth Amendment prohibits a State from imposing a life without parole sentence on a juvenile nonhomicide offender." Graham , 560 U.S. at 75, 130 S.Ct. 2011. Critical to the reasoning in each of these decisions was an emphasis on the need for individualized sentencing for juvenile offenders.

Two years later in Miller , the United States Supreme Court again revisited the area of juvenile sentencing schemes. The Court in Miller held, "that mandatory life without parole for those under the age of 18 at the time of their crimes violates the Eighth Amendment's prohibition on ‘cruel and unusual punishments.’ " Miller , 567 U.S. at 465, 132 S.Ct. 2455. Importantly, although the Court held the mandatory nature of the sentence was unconstitutional, it noted that life without parole was still a viable sentence for a juvenile convicted of homicide. The Miller Court held that individualized sentencing requires "a judge or jury must have the opportunity to consider mitigating circumstances before imposing the harshest possible penalty for juveniles." Id. at 489, 132 S.Ct. 2455. The Court noted that mandatory life without parole fails to allow a sentencing court to consider a juvenile's "chronological age and its hallmark features - among them, immaturity, impetuosity, and failure to appreciate risks and consequences[;]" as well as the juvenile's "family and home environment ... from which he cannot usually extricate himself - no matter how brutal or dysfunctional[;]" and "the circumstances of the homicide offense, including the extent of [the juvenile's] participation in the conduct and the way familial and peer pressures may have affected him." Id. at 477, 132 S.Ct. 2455. The Court further noted a mandatory life without parole sentence fails to account for a juvenile's immaturity in dealing with the criminal justice system, and wholly "disregards the possibility of rehabilitation even when the circumstances most suggest it." Id. at 478, 132 S.Ct. 2455. Thus, the Court ultimately held that imposing mandatory sentences of life without parole on juveniles convicted of homicide violates "the Eighth Amendment's ban on cruel and unusual punishment." Id. at 489, 132 S.Ct. 2455.

Following Miller , the States were left to determine a sentencing scheme to replace mandatory life without parole sentences for juveniles convicted of homicide. In Pennsylvania, Batts I presented this opportunity.² Batts asserted the sentencing scheme of Section 1102(a), imposing a mandatory sentence of life-without-parole for first-degree murder was unconstitutional in its entirety in light of Miller . Thus, Batts argued he was entitled to a remand for resentencing at which the judge would consider the Miller factors, prior to imposing an appropriate sentence for third-degree murder, the most severe lesser included offense. Id. at 294. The Commonwealth argued the sentencing statute was not constitutionally infirm, and that as a result of Miller , the judge now had discretion to impose a sentence of life-without-parole, or a sentence with the possibility of parole after a specified term of years. Id. at 295.

This Court held the entire statutory scheme for first-degree murder was not unconstitutional. Id. This Court further held that defendants whose judgment of sentence was not final at the time Miller was decided are "subject to a mandatory maximum sentence of life imprisonment as required by Section 1102(a), accompanied by a minimum sentence determined by the court of common pleas upon resentencing." Batts I , 66 A.3d at 297. Additionally, this Court recognized "the imposition of a minimum sentence taking [the Miller ] factors into account is the most appropriate remedy for the federal constitutional violation that occurred when a life-without-parole sentence was mandatorily applied." Id. Individuals convicted of first-degree murder after the date of the Miller decision, pursuant to Section 1102.1, are "subject to high mandatory minimum sentences and the possibility of life without parole, upon evaluation by the sentencing court of criteria along the lines of those identified in Miller ." Id. Accordingly, Batts' sentence was vacated and remanded for resentencing.³

In 2016, the United States Supreme Court decided Montgomery v. Louisiana , ––– U.S. ––––, 136 S.Ct. 718, 193 L.Ed.2d 599 (2016), in which it held Miller announced a new substantive rule of constitutional law that applies retroactively. The States retained discretion to decide whether to resentence juveniles serving mandatory life without parole sentences, or whether to permit the offenders to be considered for parole. Montgomery , 136 S.Ct. at 736. The Court noted, "[e]xtending parole eligibility to juvenile offenders does not impose an onerous burden on the States, nor does it disturb the finality of state convictions. Those prisoners who have shown an inability to reform will continue to serve life sentences." Id. The Court concluded, "[i]n light of what this Court has said in Roper , Graham , and Miller about how children are constitutionally different from adults in their level of culpability, however, prisoners like Montgomery must be given the opportunity to show their crime did not reflect irreparable corruption; and, if it did not, their hope for some years of life outside of prison walls must be restored." Id. at 736-37.

Following Montgomery , Batts returned to this Court again in Batts II . In Batts II , this Court clarified that there is "a presumption against the imposition of a sentence of life without parole for a juvenile offender[,]" and to rebut the presumption the Commonwealth "bears the burden of proving, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the juvenile offender is incapable of rehabilitation." Id. at 411. Further, we held "the sentencing court's decision must take into account the factors announced in Miller and Section 1102.1 of the Crimes Code." Id. at 484, 132 S.Ct. 2455.

With the evolution of the law in mind, we return to the procedural history of the instant case. On August 22, 2012, Appellant filed a second, counseled, PCRA petition seeking resentencing pursuant to Miller . A conference was scheduled at which the PCRA court and the parties agreed to hold the petition pending guidance from the appellate courts on the applicability of Miller . After several continuances the PCRA court determined it was necessary to proceed on the petition, and on August 24, 2013, a hearing was held. Thereafter, on September 30, 2013, the PCRA court vacated Appellant's sentence, determining the sentence was illegal pursuant to Miller . Appellant was resentenced on June 24, 2014, to a term of life with...