Commonwealth v. McGee

302 A.3d 659

COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Appellee v. Rodney Sterling MCGEE, Appellant

No. 17 WAP 2022

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.

Argued: April 19, 2023

Decided: September 28, 2023

Hugh J. Burns Jr., Esq., Pennsylvania Office of Attorney General, Harrisburg, PA, for Amicus Curiae Office of the Attorney General, 16th Floor, Strawberry Square Harrisburg, PA 17120.

Aaron Joshua Marcus, Esq., Peter Rosalsky, Esq., Defender Association of Philadelphia, for Amicus Curiae Defender Association of Philadelphia.

Maureen Flannery Spang, Esq., Kevin R. Steele, Esq., for Amicus Curiae Pennsylvania District Attorneys Association.

Corrie Allen Woods, Esq., Woods Law Offices PLLC, for Appellant.

Danielle M. Deklewa, Esq., Marshall Dennehey Warner Coleman & Goggin, Cassidy Miller Gerstner, Esq., Washington County District Attorney's Office, for Appellee.

TODD, C.J., DONOHUE, DOUGHERTY, WECHT, MUNDY, BROBSON, JJ.

OPINION

CHIEF JUSTICE TODD

We granted appeal in this matter to consider whether the Superior Court erred in holding that a trial court lacks jurisdiction to correct a patent and obvious error in a sentencing order when the defendant's request for correction is filed outside the time limitations of the Post Conviction Relief Act ("PCRA"). ¹ For the following reasons, we affirm.

On November 5, 1994, Appellant Rodney Sterling McGee ² fatally assaulted Barry Williams. Appellant also assaulted the victim's daughter, Donna Lee Williams (hereinafter, "Donna"), who suffered numerous skull fractures. Following the assaults, Appellant kidnapped the victim's wife, Patricia Williams (hereinafter, "Patricia"), forcing her into a police vehicle. After driving a brief distance, Appellant stopped the vehicle in the parking lot of a nearby bar and dragged Patricia inside, at which time she escaped. Appellant returned to the parking lot and kidnapped two other women, Twyla Chambers and Beth Ann Ross, fleeing in Ross's vehicle. After driving approximately two miles, Appellant stopped the vehicle and the women escaped. Appellant, still in Ross's vehicle, fled the scene, and eventually was apprehended.

On March 27, 1996, Appellant entered into a negotiated guilty plea to one count of criminal homicide ³ ; one count of attempted homicide (Donna) ⁴ ; two counts of aggravated assault (one each against Donna and Patricia) ⁵ ; four counts of kidnapping (two against Patricia, one each against Chambers and Ross) ⁶ ; and two counts of theft by unlawful taking. ⁷ Following Appellant's plea, the trial court, the Honorable Thomas D. Gladden, orally imposed the following sentence: 10 to 20 years for criminal homicide; a consecutive term of 10 to 20 years for the aggravated assault of Donna; a concurrent term of 5 to 10 years for the attempted homicide of Donna; a consecutive term of 10 to 20 years for the aggravated assault of Patricia; a consecutive term of 2½ to 5 years for the kidnapping of Patricia; and five concurrent sentences of 2½ to 5 years on the remaining three kidnappings and two theft offenses. N.T. Hearing, 3/27/1996, at 31-32. The court stated that Appellant's aggregate sentence for all of the offenses was 32½ to 65 years.

On the same day that Appellant entered his plea and the trial court orally imposed the above sentence, the trial court issued a three-page typed document titled "Order" ("typed sentencing order"). The typed sentencing order, dated March 27, 1996, indicated that the trial court "will accept" Appellant's guilty plea and imposed, inter alia , a sentence of 10 to 20 years for criminal homicide, two consecutive sentences of 10 to 20 years for the aggravated assaults of Patricia and Donna, a concurrent term of 5 to 10 years on the charge of attempted murder of Donna; a consecutive term of 2½ to 5 years for the kidnapping of Patricia; and five concurrent sentences of 2½ to 5 years each for the kidnappings of Patricia (second offense), Twyla, and Beth, and the two theft offenses. Order, 3/27/1996, at 1. The typed sentencing order also specified that Appellant's aggregate term of imprisonment was 32 ½ to 65 years. In short, it was wholly consistent with the sentence the trial court orally imposed on the record. The official date stamp on the typed sentencing order indicates that it was filed on March 28, 1996.

Finally, we note that the original record in this case contains a one-page, pre-printed form titled "Sentence," also dated March 27, 1996, that contains handwritten notations by the trial court imposing, inter alia , a sentence of 10 to 20 years for criminal homicide; two consecutive terms of 10 to 20 years for aggravated assault; and a consecutive term of 2½ to 5 years for kidnapping. Notably, this order ("handwritten sentencing order") did not provide for a concurrent sentence of 5 to 10 years for the attempted murder of Donna, nor did it provide for additional concurrent sentences of 2½ to 5 years for the kidnappings of Twyla Chambers and Beth Ross, or Patricia (second offense), or the two theft offenses. The handwritten sentencing order does indicate, however, that Appellant's aggregate sentence was 32½ to 65 years. There is no date stamp on the handwritten sentencing order to indicate when it was filed. Appellant did not appeal his judgment of sentence.

Decades later, on June 3, 2020, Appellant filed a pro se PCRA petition, and counsel was appointed. On August 5, 2020, Appellant, through his counsel, filed in the court of common pleas a "Motion to Correct Illegal Sentence" ("Motion"), asserting that, in the course of counsel's representation, counsel discovered the handwritten and typed sentencing orders, and arguing that there is an obvious incompatibility between the two orders because the typed sentencing order imposed a concurrent sentence of 5 to 10 year for the attempted murder of Donna, whereas the handwritten sentencing order did not, and, further, that the offenses of attempted murder and aggravated assault of Donna should have merged for sentencing purposes.

Following a hearing, the trial court, the Honorable Gary Gilman, granted Appellant's motion, and vacated the concurrent 5-to-10-year sentence imposed for the attempted murder of Donna, as set forth in the typed sentencing order. In its opinion pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a), the trial court reasoned that courts have the inherent authority to correct orders that are "patently erroneous" and "contrary to common sense." Trial Court Opinion, 10/13/2020, at 2. The court further opined that its "inherent jurisdiction ... to correct patent and obvious mistakes" is "not barred by traditional time limits," such as those applicable to PCRA petitions. Id. at 3. Finally, the court explained that "challenges to an illegal sentence can never be waived and may be raised sua sponte " by the court. Id.

Finding that the orders in question were "patently erroneous" and "contrary to common sense," the trial court concluded that amendment of the orders was proper, as the time limits of the PCRA did not apply. The trial court further determined that, because the crimes of aggravated assault and attempted homicide merge for purposes of sentencing, the trial court's imposition, in the typed sentencing order, of a sentence on both crimes was illegal, and, therefore, Appellant's sentence for the attempted murder of Donna must be vacated, as both Appellant and the Commonwealth understood the primary offense to be aggravated assault. The Commonwealth appealed the trial court's decision to the Superior Court, asserting that the trial court did not have jurisdiction to entertain Appellant's Motion because the underlying claim was cognizable under the PCRA, and had been filed outside the PCRA's jurisdictional time constraints.

In a unanimous memorandum opinion, the Superior Court reversed. See Commonwealth v. McGee , 1032 WDA 2020, 2021 WL 2826693 (Pa. Super. filed July 7, 2021). In doing so, the court first observed that the PCRA allows criminal offenders to seek collateral relief when convicted of crimes they did not commit, or when serving illegal sentences, and, further, that when an action is cognizable under the PCRA, the PCRA is the "sole means of obtaining collateral relief and encompasses all other common law and statutory remedies for the same purpose." Id. at 4 (quoting 42 Pa.C.S. § 9542 ) (emphasis omitted). ⁸ Accordingly, the court held that the trial court was required to treat Appellant's Motion as a petition under the PCRA. Id. at 7 (citing Commonwealth v. Guthrie , 749 A.2d 502 (Pa. Super. 2000) ). Finding that Appellant's Motion was filed outside the PCRA's one-year deadline, and that Appellant failed to plead and prove any exceptions to the PCRA's time requirements, the Superior Court held the trial court did not have jurisdiction to grant relief. ⁹

The Superior Court acknowledged that this Court, in Commonwealth v. Holmes , 593 Pa. 601, 933 A.2d 57 (2007), recognized a trial court's "inherent power to correct patent errors despite the absence of traditional jurisdiction" when we "created a narrow exception" to the 30-day time limitation for modifying or rescinding court orders prescribed by 42 Pa.C.S. § 5505. ¹⁰ McGee , 1032 WDA 2020 at 4 (quoting Holmes , 933 A.2d at 65 ). However, the Superior Court noted that, in Commonwealth v. Jackson , 30 A.3d 516 (Pa. Super. 2011), it interpreted Holmes in the specific context of an untimely PCRA petition, and found that, while " Holmes ... recognized the limited authority of a trial court to correct patent errors in sentences absent statutory jurisdiction under section 5505 [,] it did not establish an alternate remedy for collateral relief that sidesteps the jurisdictional requirements of the PCRA." McGee , 1032 WDA 2020 at 5 (quoting Jackson , 30 A.3d at 521 ). Thus, in the instant case, the Superior Court reversed the trial court's order vacating Appellant's sentence for attempted murder, and remanded for reinstatement of that portion of Appellant's sentence.

Appellant filed a petition for...