Commonwealth v. Presher

179 A.3d 90

COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Appellee

v.Michael Allen PRESHER, Appellant

No. 97 WDA 2017

Superior Court of Pennsylvania.

Argued October 24, 2017

Filed February 2, 2018

David J. Russo, Waynesburg, for appellant.

Andrew Lock, Assistant District Attorney, Waynesburg, for Commonwealth, appellee.

BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., SHOGAN, J., and MUSMANNO, J.

OPINION BY BENDER, P.J.E.:

Appellant, Michael Allen Presher, appeals from the trial court's December 19, 2016 order directing authorities to fingerprint Appellant pursuant to 18 Pa.C.S. § 9112, after a jury acquitted him of the criminal conduct that triggered the statute's fingerprinting mandate. Appellant contends that the trial court erred in applying Section 9112, and/or that the statute violated his constitutional rights. After careful review, we reverse.

The facts underlying Appellant's alleged criminal conduct are not germane to this appeal. The Commonwealth charged him with theft and receiving stolen property by criminal complaint dated March 22, 2016, and then proceeded against Appellant by summons. Appellant failed to appear for his April 19, 2016 preliminary hearing before the district magistrate. Consequently, the magistrate bound the charges over to the Court of Common Pleas. Trial Court Order and Opinion (hereinafter "TCO"), 1/31/17, at 8. Ultimately, a jury acquitted Appellant of all charges following a one-day trial held on December 7, 2016. However, on December 9, 2016, pursuant to the Commonwealth's request, the trial court issued an order for Appellant to be processed and fingerprinted pursuant to 18 Pa.C.S. § 9112(b)(2) (mandatory fingerprinting for defendants "proceeded against by summons").

Appellant objected to the order by filing a motion for reconsideration on December 19, 2016. The next day, the trial court issued an order denying Appellant's motion for reconsideration. Appellant then filed a timely notice of appeal, and a timely, court-ordered Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement.¹ The trial court filed its Rule 1925(a) opinion on January 31, 2017.

Appellant now presents the following questions for our review:

I. [Does] Pennsylvania's mandatory fingerprinting statute violate the Due Process Clause of the U.S. and P[ennsylvania] constitutions?

II. Did the [trial] court err in finding the fingerprint statute[ ] provides constitutional equal protection[ ] for persons acquitted of crimes?

III. Does Pennsylvania's fingerprinting statute violate the P[ennsylvania] and U.S. constitutions by allowing for unlawful search and seizure of United States citizens?

IV. Does the Pennsylvania fingerprinting statute violate the Eighth Amendment by allowing innocent persons to be subject to punitive orders?

V. Did the [trial] court ... abuse its discretion in ordering [A]ppellant to post acquittal punitive orders after a jury had rendered a verdict of not guilty?

VI. Has the [trial] court misinterpreted the scope of the Pennsylvania fingerprinting statute to unlawfully include "processing" as part of its application?

Appellant's Brief at 13–14.

We begin with our standard of review.

When interpreting a statute, the court must ascertain and effectuate the intent of the legislature and give full effect to each provision of the statute if at all possible. 1 Pa.C.S.A. § 1921(a) ; Commonwealth v. Brown , 423 Pa. Super. 264, 266, 620 A.2d 1213, 1214 (1993) ; Commonwealth v. Edwards , 384 Pa. Super. 454, 460, 559 A.2d 63, 66 (1989), appeal denied , 523 Pa. 640, 565 A.2d 1165 (1989). In construing a statute to determine its meaning, courts must first determine whether the issue may be resolved by reference to the express language of the statute, which is to be read according to the plain meaning of the words. 1 Pa.C.S.A. § 1903(a). SeeCommonwealth v. Berryman , 437 Pa. Super. 258, 649 A.2d 961 (1994) (en banc ).

When construing one section of a statute, courts must read that section not by itself, but with reference to, and in light of, the other sections because there is a presumption that in drafting the statute, the General Assembly intended the entire statute to be effective. 1 Pa.C.S.A. § 1922. SeeCommonwealth v. Mayhue , 536 Pa. 271, 307, 639 A.2d 421, 439 (1994) ; Commonwealth v. Berryman , supra at 268, 649 A.2d at 965. Statute headings may be considered in construing a statute. 1 Pa.C.S.A. § 1924. However, the letter of the statute is not to be disregarded under the pretext of pursuing its spirit. 1 Pa.C.S.A. § 1921(b) ; Commonwealth v. Reeb , 406 Pa. Super. 28, 34, 593 A.2d 853, 856 (1991), appeal denied , 530 Pa. 665, 610 A.2d 45 (1992).

Commonwealth v. Lopez , 444 Pa.Super. 206, 663 A.2d 746, 748 (1995).

It is axiomatic that: "[A]ny party challenging the constitutionality of a statute must meet a heavy burden, for we presume legislation to be constitutional absent a demonstration that the statute ‘clearly, palpably, and plainly’ violates the Constitution." Konidaris v. Portnoff Law Associates, Ltd. , 598 Pa. 55, 953 A.2d 1231, 1239 (2008) (citation omitted). The presumption that legislative enactments are constitutional is strong. Commonwealth v. McMullen , 599 Pa. 435, 961 A.2d 842, 846 (2008) ; see also 1 Pa.C.S. § 1922(3) (in ascertaining intent of General Assembly in enactment of statute, presumption exists that General Assembly did not intend to violate federal and state constitutions). All doubts are to be resolved in favor of finding that the legislative enactment passes constitutional muster. Pennsylvanians Against Gambling Expansion Fund, Inc. v. Commonwealth , 583 Pa. 275, 877 A.2d 383, 393 (2005). Moreover, "statutes are to be construed whenever possible to uphold their constitutionality." In re William L. , 477 Pa. 322, 383 A.2d 1228, 1231 (1978).

DePaul v. Commonwealth , 600 Pa. 573, 969 A.2d 536, 545–46 (2009).

Given the strong presumption of the fingerprinting statute's constitutionality under our standard of review, we will begin by addressing Appellant's fifth claim, which simply asserts that the trial court abused its discretion by ordering him to submit to fingerprinting pursuant to 18 Pa.C.S. § 9112. That is, before considering whether the statute is unconstitutional, we are obliged to address first whether its text requires or permits its post-acquittal application. See Commonwealth v. Ludwig , 583 Pa. 6, 874 A.2d 623, 628 (2005) (recognizing that "courts have the duty to avoid constitutional difficulties, if possible, by construing statutes in a constitutional manner"). If the statute does not apply post-acquittal, then we should conclude that the trial court abused its discretion by applying it to Appellant, thereby avoiding the constitutional questions that arise if it does.

Section 9112, the mandatory fingerprinting statute, is part of the Criminal History Record Information Act. See 18 Pa.C.S. § 9101. It provides as follows:

(a) General rule.— Fingerprints of all persons arrested for a felony, misdemeanor or summary offense which becomes a misdemeanor on a second arrest after conviction of that summary offense, shall be taken by the arresting authority, and within 48 hours of the arrest, shall be forwarded to, and in a manner and such a form as provided by, the central repository.

(b) Other cases.—

(1) Where private complaints for a felony or misdemeanor result in a conviction, the court of proper jurisdiction shall order the defendant to submit for fingerprinting by the municipal police of the jurisdiction in which the offense was allegedly committed or in the absence of a police department, the State Police. Fingerprints so obtained shall, within 48 hours, be forwarded to the central repository in a manner and in such form as may be provided by the central repository.

(2) Where defendants named in police complaints are proceeded against by summons, or for offenses under section 3929 (relating to retail theft), the court of proper jurisdiction shall order the defendant to submit within five days of such order for fingerprinting by the municipal police of the jurisdiction in which the offense allegedly was committed or, in the absence of a police department, the State Police. Fingerprints so obtained shall, within 48 hours, be forwarded to the central repository in a manner and in such form as may be provided by the central repository.

(c) Transmittal of information.— The central repository shall transmit the criminal history record information to the criminal justice agency which submitted a complete, accurate and classifiable fingerprint card.

18 Pa.C.S. § 9112. Applicable in this instance is Section 9112(b)(2), which requires the trial court to order the fingerprinting of "defendants named in police complaints [who] are proceeded against by summons." 18 Pa.C.S. § 9112(b)(2) (emphasis added).

Without providing citation to any relevant authority apart from the statute itself, the trial court declared that this mandate "cannot be circumvented by delay and later by acquittal." TCO at 9. The court provides virtually no analysis to support its assertion. However, we may assume that the trial court believes it is strictly interpreting the text of Section 9112(b)(2), which appears, at least at first glance, to provide no end-date for the mandate imposed on the court to order fingerprinting following the filing of a criminal complaint and summons. The Commonwealth takes a more measured approach, arguing that "[s]uch post-acquittal fingerprinting does not appear to be contemplated by [ Section 9112(b)(2) ], however had Appellant wished to avoid being subject to such an order, post-acquittal expungement would have been the most efficient remedy." Commonwealth's Brief at 4. Thus, the Commonwealth seems reluctant to argue that the statute plainly requires the fingerprinting of acquitted persons, but instead argues that Appellant has chosen an inappropriate remedial path.

We reject both the trial court's and the Commonwealth's interpretation of Section 9112(b)(2). An acquittal constitutes "the strongest vindication possible under our criminal tradition, laws and...