Commonwealth v. Pryor

1

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA Appellee v. PETER FRANCIS PRYOR, JR. Appellant

No. 914 WDA 2022

No. J-A22036-23

Superior Court of Pennsylvania

December 21, 2023

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered June 8, 2022 In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County Criminal Division at No(s): CP-02-CR-0001261-2021

Benjamin D. Kohler, Esq.

BEFORE: BOWES, J., OLSON, J., and KING, J.

MEMORANDUM

KING J.

Appellant Peter Francis Pryor, Jr., appeals from the judgment of sentence entered in the Allegheny County Court of Common Pleas, following his bench trial conviction for persons not to possess firearms and firearms not to be carried without a license.^[1] We affirm.

The trial court set forth the relevant facts of this case as follows:

At 2:53 a.m. on February 26, 2021, police officers responded to a report of a domestic incident at 417 Kingsboro Street in the City of Pittsburgh. Upon arrival, officers interviewed Kimberly Lee, who reported that she and [Appellant] had an argument about money and she wanted him to be removed from the residence. [Appellant], however, had fled the scene prior to the arrival of the police officers. Ms. Lee was advised to obtain a Protection From Abuse Order if [Appellant] returned.

At 3:44 a.m. on that same day, police officers responded to a shotspotter alert at 417 Kingsboro Street for one shot fired. Upon arriving at the residence, Ms. Lee advised officers that [Appellant] had returned to the residence where she argued with [Appellant]. Ms. Lee provided officers with a physical description of [Appellant] and [Appellant] was located nearby at approximately 4:00 am. [Appellant] was asked if he had a weapon on him and he responded that he did possess a firearm. [Appellant] appeared nervous. He was rocking back and forth and he turned away from officers as they approached. The officers detained [Appellant] and conducted a pat-down of [Appellant]. A firearm was recovered from his person and there was a round in the chamber. [Appellant] did not possess a license to carry a firearm and he was prohibited from possessing a firearm due to a prior felony conviction for Aggravated Assault.

(Trial Court Opinion, filed 12/1/22, at 2). The Commonwealth charged Appellant with persons not to possess firearms, carrying a firearm without a license, and possession of drug paraphernalia, in connection with these events.

On January 31, 2022, Appellant filed a motion to suppress evidence, arguing that officers did not have reasonable suspicion to support his seizure, search, and subsequent arrest. The court conducted a hearing on the motion on March 10, 2022. The parties stipulated to the facts in the record, and after argument the court denied the motion. Appellant then proceeded to a stipulated bench trial, wherein the defense conceded that the Commonwealth met its burden for both firearm violations. (See N.T. Trial, 3/10/22, at 30). The court convicted Appellant of persons not to possess firearms and carrying a firearm without a license; it found Appellant not guilty of possession of drug paraphernalia.

On June 8, 2022, the court sentenced Appellant to 36 to 72 months' imprisonment for persons not to possess a firearm and imposed no further penalty for carrying a firearm without a license. On June 16, 2022, Appellant filed a timely post-sentence motion. The court denied the motion on July 11, 2022. Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal. The court subsequently ordered Appellant to file a concise statement of errors complained of on appeal per Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b), and Appellant filed his statement on August 24, 2022.

Appellant raises the following issue on appeal:

Did the trial court err in denying suppression as police did not have reasonable suspicion of criminal activity and/or probable cause when they illegally seized and searched [Appellant]?

(Appellant's Brief at 4).

"Our standard of review in addressing a challenge to a trial court's denial of a suppression motion is limited to determining whether the factual findings are supported by the record and whether the legal conclusions drawn from those facts are correct." Commonwealth v. Williams, 941 A.2d 14, 26-27 (Pa.Super. 2008) (en banc) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).

[W]e may consider only the evidence of the prosecution and so much of the evidence for the defense as remains uncontradicted when read in the context of the record as a whole. Where the record supports the findings of the suppression court, we are bound by those facts and may reverse only if the court erred in reaching its legal conclusions based upon the facts.

Id. at 27 (citation omitted). If appellate review of the suppression court's decision "turns on allegations of legal error," then the trial court's legal conclusions are nonbinding on appeal and subject to plenary review. Commonwealth v. Smith, 164 A.3d 1255, 1257 (Pa.Super. 2017) (citation omitted).

Appellant argues that police did not have reasonable suspicion to conduct an investigative detention in this case. Appellant contends the suppression record contains no information about how many people were present when the shot was allegedly fired. Appellant suggests that someone else could have fired the gunshot. Appellant emphasizes that Ms. Lee and Appellant had only a verbal dispute, and Ms. Lee told police that Appellant did not have a gun. Appellant claims there was no evidence that Appellant was even at the location where the shot was allegedly fired. Appellant submits that vehicular noises, fireworks, or other sounds could have prompted the ShotSpotter notification. Appellant avers the record is also silent concerning how much time elapsed between when police received the ShotSpotter notification and when they located Appellant, and where he was in relation to where the shots had been fired. Appellant highlights that there was no evidence of him acting nervous when the police approached, or of the area being a high-crime area.

Appellant claims the police stopped him based solely on his possession of a concealed firearm. Appellant contends that the only evidence of record was that, at the officer's prompting, Appellant gave his name and confirmed he had a firearm. Appellant maintains the officer then patted him down for officer safety and recovered a gun in Appellant's coat pocket. Relying on Commonwealth v. Hicks, 652 Pa. 353, 208 A.3d 916 (2019), cert. denied, __ U.S. __, 140 S.Ct. 645, 205 L.Ed.2d 410 (2019), Appellant argues that mere possession of a concealed firearm in public does not provide reasonable suspicion for police to conduct an investigative detention. Appellant concludes police conducted an illegal investigative detention in the absence of reasonable suspicion that Appellant was engaged in criminal activity, and this Court must grant relief. We disagree.

This Court has explained:

The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution protect citizens from "unreasonable searches and seizures, including those entailing only a brief detention." Commonwealth v. Strickler, 563 Pa. 47, 56, 757 A.2d 884, 888 (2000). Specifically, police officers may not conduct a warrantless search or seizure unless one of several recognized exceptions applies. Commonwealth v. Blair, [575 A.2d 593, 596 (Pa. Super. 1990)]. If a defendant's detention violates the Fourth Amendment, then any evidence seized during that stop must be excluded as fruit of an unlawful detention. Id.

Commonwealth v. Mattis, 252 A.3d 650, 654 (Pa.Super. 2021).

Contacts between the police and citizenry fall within three general classifications:

The first [level of interaction] is a "mere encounter" (or request for information) which need not be supported by any level of suspicion, but carries no official compulsion to stop or to respond. The second, an "investigative detention" must be supported by a reasonable suspicion; it subjects a suspect to a stop and a period of detention, but does not involve such coercive conditions as to constitute the functional equivalent of an arrest. Finally an arrest or "custodial detention" must be supported by probable cause.

Commonwealth v. Bryant, 866 A.2d 1143, 1146 (Pa.Super. 2005), appeal denied, 583 Pa. 668, 876 A.2d 392 (2005) (quoting Commonwealth v. Phinn, 761 A.2d 176, 181 (Pa.Super. 2000), appeal denied, 567 Pa. 712, 785 A.2d 89 (2001)).

An "investigative detention" is interchangeably labeled as a "stop and frisk" or a "Terry^[2] stop." Commonwealth v. Brame, 239 A.3d 1119 (Pa.Super. 2020), appeal denied, __ Pa. __, 251 A.3d 771 (2021).

An investigative detention, unlike a mere encounter, constitutes a seizure of a person and thus activates the protections of Article 1, Section 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution. To institute an investigative detention, an officer must have at least a reasonable suspicion that criminal activity is afoot. Reasonable suspicion requires a finding that based on the available facts, a person of reasonable caution would believe the intrusion was appropriate.

* * *

Reasonable suspicion exists only where the officer is able to articulate specific observations which, in conjunction with reasonable inferences derived from those observations, led him reasonably to conclude, in light of his experience, that criminal activity was afoot and that the person he stopped was involved in that activity.

Commonwealth v. Jones, 874 A.2d 108, 116 (Pa.Super. 2005) (internal citations omitted). "In determining whether police had reasonable suspicion to initiate an investigative detention, 'the fundamental inquiry is an objective one, namely, whether the facts available to police at the moment of the intrusion warrant a [person] of reasonable...