Commonwealth v. Rascoe

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, Appellant v. AARON DELMAR RASCOE, Appellee

J-S04038-15

No. 751 MDA 2014

SUPERIOR COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

APRIL 6, 2015

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

Appeal from the Suppression Order Entered April 21, 2014, in the Court of Common Pleas of York County, Criminal Division, at No(s): CP-67-CR-0004515-2013

BEFORE: BOWES, ALLEN, and STRASSBURGER,^* JJ.

MEMORANDUM BY STRASSBURGER, J.:

The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania (Commonwealth) appeals from the April 21, 2014 order which granted the motion to suppress filed by Aaron Delmar Rascoe (Rascoe). We affirm.

The suppression court summarized the underlying facts of this case as follows.

[On February 21, 2013, at about 2:30 a.m., Pennsylvania State Troopers Bernam and Bennett] pulled over a Chevy Suburban because it had a headlight out. This traffic stop occurred near the 600 block of West Princess Street, and [Trooper Bernam] explained from his experience as a state trooper that this was a high crime area in York city. Both officers approached the vehicle and identified [Rascoe] as the passenger of the vehicle. The driver provided Trooper Bennett with documentation confirming that the headlight was damaged in an accident that occurred earlier that day.

While running a warrant check on both the driver and [Rascoe], Trooper Bennett testified that he told Trooper Bernam he detected an odor of marijuana in the vehicle. Trooper Bennett started with the Pennsylvania State Police on January 2, 2013. Both officers re-approached the vehicle and the driver was ordered to step outside. When Trooper Bernam opened the passenger door, he testified that he too smelled the odor of marijuana. The driver denied smoking marijuana and further denied the presence of any marijuana in the car. Trooper Bennett briefly patted down the driver and found no weapons or contraband. The officers asked the driver if he would consent to a search of the vehicle. The driver refused, explaining that he was not the vehicle's owner. He was then advised that the vehicle would be impounded and towed. While this was taking place, [Rascoe] remained in the front passenger seat of the vehicle and stayed there as the driver made a phone call to tell someone the car would be impounded.

Eventually, Trooper Bernam asked [Rascoe] to exit the vehicle. Before exiting the vehicle, [Rascoe] reached over and turned off the vehicle's ignition and removed the keys. The trooper immediately took the keys from [Rascoe]. Significantly, Trooper Bernam did not pat down or search [Rascoe] for weapons when he exited the vehicle's passenger side door. After the trooper took the keys from [Rascoe], he informed [Rascoe] and the driver that they were both free to leave. They also informed the driver that they were going to impound the car and get a warrant to search it because they smelled marijuana and because the driver would not consent to a vehicle search.

While [Rascoe] was still standing on the sidewalk, the vehicle's driver quickly grabbed the car keys out of Trooper Bernam's hands and ran from the scene. Trooper Bernam testified that he was shocked. Since York City Police had arrived on the scene, they pursued the fleeing driver. Trooper Bernam stayed with [Rascoe], who had not moved since the keys were taken from him. At this point, Trooper Bernam explained that he wanted to detain [Rascoe] for safety reasons so he ordered [Rascoe] to get on the ground. When [Rascoe] did not comply, both Trooper Bernam and Trooper Bennett forced [Rascoe] to the ground and placed him in handcuffs. While on the ground, Trooper Bernam testified that he patted down [Rascoe] and felt a bulge that he believed to be drug packaging inside [Rascoe's] coat pocket. When [Trooper Bernam] reached into [Rascoe's]pocket, he found a glove and a container with crack cocaine. Trooper Bernam eventually found marijuana and more cocaine on [Rascoe] after a further search of his person.

Suppression Court Opinion, 4/21/2014, at 1-3.

Rascoe filed a motion to suppress. Following a hearing, the suppression court granted the motion. In so doing, the suppression court concluded that the above encounter amounted to an arrest of Rascoe which was not supported by probable cause and, thus, the search of Rascoe was illegal. The suppression court further reasoned that, even if it viewed the incident as a less-intrusive Terry¹-type stop and frisk, the troopers lacked the requisite reasonable suspicion. The Commonwealth timely filed a notice of appeal.² Both the suppression court and the Commonwealth have complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.³

The Commonwealth presents one issue for this Court's review: whether "the suppression court erred when it suppressed the fruits of a search on the basis that the officers lacked reasonable suspicion to perform a frisk of [Rascoe]." Commonwealth's Brief at 4.

We consider the Commonwealth's issue mindful of the following.

When the Commonwealth appeals from a suppression order, this Court follows a clearly defined scope and standard of review. We consider only the evidence from the defendant's witnesses together with the evidence of the prosecution that, when read in the context of the entire record, remains uncontradicted. This Court must first determine whether the record supports the factual findings of the suppression court and then determine the reasonableness of the inferences and legal conclusions drawn from those findings. In appeals where there is no meaningful dispute of fact, as in the case sub judice, our duty is to determine whether the suppression court properly applied the law to the facts of the case.

Commonwealth v. Gorbea-Lespier, 66 A.3d 382, 385-86 (Pa. Super. 2013) (quotation marks and citations omitted) (quoting Commonwealth v. Arthur, 62 A.3d 424, 427 (Pa. Super. 2013)).

Initially, we note that the Commonwealth dedicates its entire argument to a discussion of why the troopers had reasonable suspicion to stop and frisk Rascoe pursuant to the "automatic companion rule." In so doing, the Commonwealth fails to address the reasoning by the suppression court that the troopers' detention of Rascoe amounted to an arrest that was not supported by probable cause and, thus, the subsequent search of Rascoe was illegal. Suppression Court Opinion, 4/21/2014, at 5-8. Upon review, we agree with the suppression court's sound reasoning and conclusion in this regard. Moreover, even assuming ...