Commonwealth v. Reddicks

99 Mass.App.Ct. 1118

167 N.E.3d 895 (Table)

COMMONWEALTH

v.Charles REDDICKS.

19-P-71

Appeals Court of Massachusetts.

Entered: April 8, 2021.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0

Following a jury trial, the defendant, Charles Reddicks, was convicted of murder in the second degree, carrying a firearm without a license, and carrying a loaded firearm without a license.² On appeal, the defendant argues that permitting the Commonwealth to conduct an inquiry into the criminal offender record information (CORI) of prospective jurors violated the equal protection clause of the United States Constitution. He further argues that the Commonwealth improperly exercised peremptory challenges based on the results of the CORI inquiry, and that the trial judge erred in failing to conduct an analysis pursuant to Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 95 (1986), and Commonwealth v. Soares, 377 Mass. 461, 486, cert. denied, 444 U.S. 881 (1979). In addition, the defendant claims error in the admission of certain firearm evidence, purported identification testimony by Sergeant Detective Richard Daley, and statements made by the defendant during an interview with Detective John Callahan and Sergeant Detective Daley. Finally, the defendant contends that his ability to cross-examine a witness for the Commonwealth was impermissibly restricted. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.

Background. We briefly summarize the facts underlying the defendant's convictions, reserving certain details for our discussion. The defendant and the victim, Mariano Malave, did not know each other but both sold marijuana. In April of 2012, the defendant asked Ian Follette, who had previously purchased marijuana from both the defendant and the victim, if he knew "any connects that sold large quantities of marijuana." In response, Follette provided the defendant with the victim's name and contact information.

On the morning of April 27, 2012, the defendant sent a text message to the victim, identifying himself as "Jonathan," and inquired about purchasing a pound of marijuana. The purchase was arranged via text messages, and that evening, the defendant drove to the victim's home located in the Jamaica Plain section of Boston. At 6:20 P.M. , a call from the defendant's cell phone was placed to the victim's cell phone. Around the same time, the victim's girlfriend overheard the victim providing directions to the victim's apartment to an individual over the phone.³ Upon ending the call, the victim "grabbed a sample of the marijuana," and exited his kitchen into the back hallway of his apartment building. After a brief period of time, the victim returned inside the apartment to retrieve additional marijuana, and then went back to the back hallway area. At this point, three shots were fired at the victim, one of which struck the victim in the head, and another of which struck the victim in the back.

A 911 call was placed, and police reported to the scene shortly thereafter. That same evening, police conducted interviews of nearby witnesses, and obtained a partial license plate number of a blue vehicle that was parked outside the victim's home at the time of the homicide. One witness, Leanne Parker, informed police that shortly before the homicide, while sitting in her vehicle, she observed a black man, with "long dreads" or curls, exit a blue vehicle while talking on the phone and walking toward the victim's home. After a few moments, the witness heard the sound of gunshots and observed the same man run from the house, get into the driver's seat of the blue car, and drive away.

The police traced the partial license plate number that Parker had provided to a 1992 blue Ford Escort registered to the defendant's grandmother, Catherine Reddicks, at 116 Millet Street. There were six registered drivers who lived at that residence, and of those six individuals, police determined that the defendant was the only one to fit the description given by Parker. The defendant was interviewed by Detective Callahan and Sergeant Detective Daley, and admitted to driving the Ford Escort on April 27, 2012. In his interview, the defendant admitted to sending text messages to the victim to purchase marijuana, but stated that he had never met the victim in person, and denied involvement in the homicide. The defendant was ultimately indicted by a grand jury for murder, armed robbery, carrying a firearm without a license, carrying a loaded firearm without a license, and possession of ammunition without a license.

Discussion. 1. Inquiry into jurors’ criminal records. Prior to trial, the Commonwealth filed a motion in limine seeking to conduct a CORI inquiry of the prospective jurors, pursuant to Commonwealth v. Cousin, 449 Mass. 809, 815-820 (2007). The defendant filed a corresponding motion to preclude the Commonwealth from accessing such information, but requested in the alternative that the Commonwealth also run the prospective jurors’ information through the victim/witness database.⁴ The judge allowed the Commonwealth's motion, and as requested by the defendant, ordered the Commonwealth to check the prospective jurors’ information in both the CORI database and the victim/witness database.

During jury empanelment, a CORI inquiry was conducted of each prospective juror, and the inquiry revealed that six jurors failed to disclose all or part of their criminal record on the juror questionnaire. Of those six jurors, one had a restraining order against her and three had relatively minor offenses on their record.⁵ Both defense counsel and the prosecutor agreed that there was no need to inquire further of those four jurors and they were seated in the jury box.

However, although juror no. 47 indicated on the questionnaire that she had no prior record, her CORI revealed a number of "innocuous motor vehicle offenses," as well as a dismissed charge for possession of a Class B substance sixteen years earlier. The Commonwealth then requested that the judge conduct a voir dire of juror no. 47. During the voir dire, juror no. 47 informed the judge that all of her charges had been dismissed, and that she did not recognize that she was required to disclose dismissed charges when filling out her questionnaire. The judge credited the juror's explanation and informed counsel that she encountered this scenario "quite often" and "[saw] no reason to excuse [juror no. 47] for cause." The Commonwealth then exercised a peremptory challenge, and defense counsel objected stating, "I objected to the Commonwealth's ability to run the records, and I just want to preserve that objection." Over that objection, the judge excused juror no. 47.

Later during empanelment, it was discovered that juror no. 122, who had disclosed on his questionnaire that he had been convicted of assault and battery, had not disclosed a number of additional charges and convictions that occurred over a fourteen-year period, including violation of an abuse prevention order, resisting arrest, malicious destruction of property, possession of marijuana, forgery, trespassing, disorderly conduct, and multiple assault and battery charges. Sua sponte, the judge conducted a voir dire of juror no. 122, and the juror explained that all of his charges, except the one that he disclosed on his questionnaire, had been sealed. The juror expressed that he was not aware that he had to disclose sealed charges and convictions. The judge credited the juror's explanation, stating that she had "heard this before," and believed it to be "absolutely reasonable" for the juror to think that he was not required to disclose charges and convictions that had been sealed. The judge declined to excuse the juror for cause, and the Commonwealth again exercised a peremptory challenge.

At this point, the defendant objected and raised for the first time that the Suffolk County District Attorney's office's practice of conducting an inquiry into the prospective jurors’ criminal records resulted in the systematic exclusion of prospective African-American jurors from the jury. Specifically, defense counsel stated,

"Just so the record is clear, Judge, everyone so far that [the prosecutor] has run, and I'm not blaming him, that's come back with a record has been African-American, and so it appears to me that the running of records of potential jurors, in Suffolk County, anyhow, leads to the disclosure of criminal records and exclusion of African-American individuals or potential jurors. My client is an African-American. I would object at this point, Judge."

The judge noted defense counsel's objection but responded that "in the two instances that [the prosecutor] has done that, I've accepted the jurors’ explanations, but that doesn't excuse them from fully revealing their criminal history, and in both of those situations, neither juror faithfully disclosed their criminal history." The judge then excused juror no. 122. When jury empanelment concluded, the judge commented on the record that the jury "consist[ed] of at least five African-Americans."

a. Constitutionality of CORI inquiry of prospective jurors. The defendant argues that allowing the Commonwealth to conduct a CORI inquiry of prospective jurors was itself a violation of the equal protection clause and the defendant's right to a jury of his peers. The crux of the defendant's argument is that such a practice disproportionately impacts African-American jurors who are "more likely to face discrimination during every single phase of our criminal justice system."⁶ The argument is unavailing.

In Cousin, 449 Mass. at 817-819, the Supreme Judicial Court (SJC) held that the CORI statute, G. L. c. 6, § 172, permits prosecutors to access prospective jurors’ CORI as part of their "criminal justice duties." In so holding, the court recognized that a criminal justice function of prosecutors is "the selection of a qualified and impartial jury," and that "[i]nquiring into the criminal records of jurors in a criminal case" assists in serving that function. Id....