Commonwealth v. Reid

287 A.3d 893 (Table)

COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Appellant

v.Antwyne REID

No. 1940 EDA 2021

Superior Court of Pennsylvania.

Filed October 25, 2022

MEMORANDUM BY PANELLA, P.J.:

The Commonwealth brings this appeal seeking to overturn the trial court's decision to quash, due to failure to establish a prima facie case, all criminal charges filed against Antwyne Reid. We affirm.

On March 8, 2019, Philadelphia Police executed a search warrant at 105 North Edgewood Street as part of an investigation of Tyriq Goodwin ("Tyriq"). Tyriq lived at the residence with his mother, Keoshia Goodwin ("Goodwin"), and his sister. During the search, authorities recovered crack cocaine, drug paraphernalia and a firearm. Detectives also found items belonging to Reid, including an expired and a current identification card, a debit card, mail, and a 2018 auto service receipt for a vehicle that Reid had previously owned. However, the items belonging to Reid indicated addresses at another street in Philadelphia, Callowhill Street.

On March 16, 2019, Reid was arrested and charged with possession with intent to deliver ("PWID"), conspiracy, possession of firearm by a prohibited person, and intentional possession of a controlled substance by a person not registered. At the conclusion of a preliminary hearing on August 8, 2019, all charges were dismissed.

The Commonwealth then filed a notice of intent to refile the charges. At the conclusion of a hearing on January 23, 2020, the municipal court granted the Commonwealth's motion to refile all charges. Thereafter, Reid filed, in the Court of Common Pleas, an omnibus pretrial motion to quash, claiming the Commonwealth failed to establish a prima facie case. After a hearing on August 26, 2021, the trial court granted the motion to quash all charges. The Commonwealth filed this timely appeal.¹

The Commonwealth first argues that the trial court erred in quashing the charges. See Commonwealth's Brief at 13-23. The Commonwealth asserts that it presented sufficient evidence to establish that Reid constructively possessed the firearm and drugs, thereby presenting a prima facie case sufficient to hold the charges for trial. The Commonwealth contends that the trial court failed to view the evidence in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth. Further, the Commonwealth suggests the trial court utilized an improper standard in considering whether the Commonwealth established a prima facie case. Upon careful review, we conclude the trial court properly quashed the charges.

"It is well-settled that the evidentiary sufficiency, or lack thereof, of the Commonwealth's prima facie case for a charged crime is a question of law as to which an appellate court's review is plenary." Commonwealth v. Hilliard , 172 A.3d 5, 12 (Pa. Super. 2017) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). "[T]he trial court is afforded no discretion in ascertaining whether, as a matter of law and in light of the facts presented to it, the Commonwealth has carried its pre-trial, prima facie burden to make out the elements of a charged crime." Commonwealth v. Karetny , 880 A.2d 505, 513 (Pa. 2005). Therefore, we are not bound by the legal determinations of the trial court and our standard of review is de novo. Id .

Our Supreme Court described the Commonwealth's burden as follows:

At the preliminary hearing stage of a criminal prosecution, the Commonwealth need not prove the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, but rather, must merely put forth sufficient evidence to establish a prima facie case of guilt. A prima facie case exists when the Commonwealth produces evidence of each of the material elements of the crime charged and establishes probable cause to warrant the belief that the accused committed the offense . Furthermore, the evidence need only be such that, if presented at trial and accepted as true, the judge would be warranted in permitting the case to be decided by the jury.

Karetny , 880 A.2d at 513-14 (citations omitted) (emphasis added). However, "suspicion and conjecture are not evidence and are unacceptable as such." Commonwealth v. Holston , 211 A.3d 1264, 1269 (Pa. Super. 2019) (en banc ).

Here, the Commonwealth charged Reid with the crimes of intentional possession of a controlled substance, PWID, and possession of a firearm by a prohibited person. To find a defendant guilty of PWID, 35 P.S. § 780-113(a)(30), the Commonwealth must prove that the defendant possessed a controlled substance and did so with the intent to deliver it. See Commonwealth v. Perez , 931 A.2d 703, 707 (Pa. Super. 2007). Similarly, to sustain a conviction for intentional possession of a controlled substance, 35 P.S. § 780-113(a)(16), the Commonwealth must prove that the defendant knowingly and intentionally possessed the controlled substance. And possession of a firearm is likewise an essential element of the offense of possession of a firearm by a prohibited person. See 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 6105(a)(1) ; Commonwealth v. Antidormi , 84 A.3d 736, 757 (Pa. Super. 2014).

All three crimes require the Commonwealth to establish probable cause that Reid "possessed" the contraband. The Crimes Code defines the term "possession" as "an act, within the meaning of this section, if the possessor knowingly procured or received the thing possessed or was aware of his control thereof for a sufficient period to have been able to terminate his possession." 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 301(c).

To establish the element of possession, this Court has explained that "[p]ossession can be found by proving actual possession, constructive possession, or joint constructive possession." Commonwealth v. Parrish , 191 A.3d 31, 36 (Pa. Super. 2018) (citation omitted). It is undisputed that Reid was not in actual possession of the drugs or the firearm. Rather, the contraband was discovered during the execution of a search warrant in a home that was not Reid's residence. It is further undisputed that Reid was not present during the execution of the search warrant.

We previously have determined:

Where a defendant is not in actual possession of the prohibited items, the Commonwealth must establish that the defendant had constructive possession to support the conviction. Constructive possession is a legal fiction, a pragmatic construct to deal with the realities of criminal law enforcement. We have defined constructive possession as conscious dominion, meaning that the defendant has the power to control the contraband and the intent to exercise that control . To aid application, we have held that constructive possession may be established by the totality of the circumstances.

It is well established that, as with any other element of a crime, constructive possession may be proven by circumstantial evidence. In other words, the Commonwealth must establish facts from which the trier of fact can reasonably infer that the defendant exercised dominion and control over the contraband at issue.

Parrish , 191 A.3d at 36–37 (internal citations and quotations omitted) (emphasis added).

In addition, the power and intent to control contraband does not need to be exclusive to a defendant to find constructive possession. Our Supreme Court has recognized that "constructive possession may be found in one or more actors where the item in issue is in an area of joint control and equal access." Commonwealth v. Johnson , 26 A.3d 1078, 1094 (Pa. 2011) (citation and brackets omitted).

We first consider whether the trial court properly quashed both drug charges. The trial court addressed the evidence that the Commonwealth contends established Reid's possession of the drugs as follows:

[T]here is no evidence that was brought forth that [Reid] had constructive possession over the drugs that were found ... in the front room of Ms. Goodwin's residence. [The] Commonwealth tries to prove constructive possession by arguing that the IDs, an old auto service receipt, and mail is enough to suggest that [Reid] has had constructive possession of the drugs that were found. N.T. 08/26/2021 at 56-61. However, there are inconsistencies as to where the drugs are actually located. N.T. 08/26/2021 at 22-26. Detective Opalski claimed that the items were recovered in a Sterlite drawer; however, Detective Wyche claimed the items that were recovered from the property were found under the bed in a gray safe box.

Furthermore, just because [Reid's] expired IDs and mail may have been present with the drug ... it is not enough to suggest that he has possession over the drugs because mere association is not enough. ... Additionally, ... the lack of nexus to [Reid], and the drugs found at [Goodwin's] residence would force the jury to speculate because (1) Commonwealth did not provide any evidence of [Reid] living at the residence where the items were found; (2) there is no evidence pointing to [Reid's] whereabouts in 2019, the year of the search warrant; and (3) the initial warrant was for [Tyriq]. ... [The] Commonwealth cannot prove a prima facie case against [Reid] for possession of a controlled substance nor PWID because [it] cannot prove possession through the "mere ‘association,’ ‘suspicion’ or ‘conjecture’ " of [Reid's] items being found at a residence that is not his.

Trial Court Opinion, 11/19/21, at 9-10.

We agree with the trial court's reasoning. Upon review, we conclude there was no evidence to suggest that Reid had the requisite power to control the drugs and the intent to exercise that control. Of particular concern is the dearth of evidence indicating that Reid was ever present in the residence while the narcotics were present. Rather than present such evidence, the Commonwealth relies upon the presence of random items belonging to Reid being at the residence. Importantly, none of the items containing Reid's name reflect a connection to the residence in question.² Moreover, there was no evidence to suggest that Reid had joint control and equal access to the drugs. Accordingly, the lack of evidence to establish a nexus between Reid and the...