Commonwealth v. Renchenski, J-75-2012

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, Appellee

v.CHARLES S. RENCHENSKI, Appellant

J-75-2012

No. 34 WAP 2010

SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA WESTERN DISTRICT

SUBMITTED: April 13, 2012

DECIDED: SEPTEMBER 28, 2012

CASTILLE, C.J., SAYLOR, EAKIN, BAER, TODD, McCAFFERY, JJ.

Appeal from the Order of the Superior Court entered December 7, 2009 at No.

214 WDA 2009, affirming the Order of the Court of Common Pleas of Clearfield

County entered January 30, 2009 at No. CP-17-CR-0000481-1982.

OPINION

MR. JUSTICE SAYLOR

Allowance of appeal in this matter was granted to address the applicability of Section 9543(b) of the Post Conviction Relief Act ("PCRA"), see 42 Pa.C.S. § 9543(b), to delays in filing amended post-conviction petitions and the related issue of what obligation, if any, a petitioner has to move the litigation of his petition forward.

Following a jury trial, on July 12, 1984, Appellant was convicted of first-degree murder, and later sentenced to life imprisonment, in connection with the strangulation death of Rosemarie Foley. The Superior Court upheld the sentence on direct appeal, and this Court denied review.

On May 5, 1988, Appellant filed a timely pro se petition for post-conviction relief,¹ which the PCRA court denied without appointing counsel, finding that all claims had been previously litigated on direct appeal. The Superior Court vacated the order denying relief and remanded the matter for the appointment of counsel on April 12, 1989. On February 10, 1992, the PCRA court appointed the public defender to serve as Appellant's counsel, but, due to the public defender's conflict of interest, appointed John Ryan, Esquire, to represent Appellant approximately one month later. Mr. Ryan, however, was permitted to withdraw from the case more than one year thereafter, with Appellant's consent.² No reason appears as of record for the almost three years that elapsed before the PCRA court complied with the Superior Court's mandate and appointed counsel.

No further docket entries appear until June 2, 2003, when Appellant, acting pro se, filed a document entitled "Extension of Post-Conviction Relief Petition" (the "extension petition"), seeking to amend his original petition. The PCRA court denied relief in an order dated August 11, 2003, but not filed until January 7, 2004, treating the "extension petition" as an untimely filed second PCRA petition. The Superior Court erroneously quashed Appellant's subsequent appeal as untimely, but this Court vacatedthat order and remanded the matter for a disposition on the merits of the appeal. See Commonwealth v. Renchenski, 581 Pa. 614, 615, 866 A.2d 368 (2005). The Superior Court, in turn, remanded the matter to the PCRA court, concluding that the "extension petition" was not a second PCRA petition, but rather was Appellant's attempt to amend his timely filed original petition. See Renchenski v. Commonwealth, 909 A.2d 898 (Pa. Super. 2006) (table), No. 332 WDA 2004, slip op, at 5 ("Renchenski I") (citing Commonwealth v. Flanagan, 578 Pa. 587, 604-05, 854 A.2d 489, 499 (2004), for the proposition that "since original petition never was withdrawn or dismissed, amended petition for post-conviction relief was not subject to PCRA's one-year time limitation, even though amendment was filed ten years after original petition").

On remand, the PCRA court appointed new counsel, Gary A. Knaresboro, Esquire, while Appellant filed a request for an extension of time to file an amended PCRA petition, indicating that Mr. Knaresboro had been unresponsive to attempts to contact him and therefore Appellant intended to find new counsel of his own accord. The PCRA court granted an extension, and Mr. Knaresboro was permitted to withdraw from the case upon the entry of appearance of private counsel, George H. Newman, Esquire. Ultimately, on October 4, 2007, Mr. Newman filed an amended PCRA petition on Appellant's behalf, raising numerous claims regarding trial counsel's ineffective assistance.

The Commonwealth filed a motion to dismiss and, following Appellant's response, a supplemental motion to dismiss, arguing that giving effect to the "extension petition" and proceeding based upon the amended petition would prejudice the Commonwealth's ability to retry the case, in light of the death, poor health or relocation of most of its trial witnesses, and therefore the matter should be dismissed pursuant to Section 9543(b) of the PCRA, which states:

(b) Exception.-- Even if the petitioner has met the requirements of subsection (a) [concerning eligibility for relief], the petition shall be dismissed if it appears at any time that, because of delay in filing the petition, the Commonwealth has been prejudiced either in its ability to respond to the petition or in its ability to re-try the petitioner. A petition may be dismissed due to delay in the filing by the petitioner only after a hearing upon a motion to dismiss. This subsection does not apply if the petitioner shows that the petition is based on grounds of which the petitioner could not have discovered by the exercise of reasonable diligence before the delay became prejudicial to the Commonwealth.

42 Pa.C.S. § 9543(b) (emphasis added). Although the Commonwealth acknowledged that the language of this provision appeared applicable to delays in filing an original PCRA petition, it argued that dismissal under Section 9543(b) was nonetheless appropriate because of the prejudice resulting from the lengthy delay in the filing of the amended petition. Oral arguments on the motion to dismiss were conducted, and, on January 30, 2009, the PCRA court dismissed the matter with prejudice.

In its opinion, the PCRA court listed fifteen individuals who were no longer available to testify and explained their involvement in the case, including: (1) the lead investigator on the murder, who was present at the crime scene, interviewed numerous witnesses, took Appellant's statement at the police station, and conducted a search of Appellant's person, residence and vehicle; (2) a forensics investigator for the State Police, who took crime scene photographs and examined various bites, cuts and other marks on the victim's body; and (3) five individuals who had each observed the interactions between Appellant and the victim at one or more bars on the night of the murder. The court further noted that, although Appellant claimed that counsel was ineffective for failing to present the expert testimony of Dr. Walter S. Finken, a psychiatrist who opined at a deposition that Appellant did not possess the requisite specific intent to kill, Dr. Finken had since died. The PCRA court also noted that itwould be "extremely difficult if not impossible for the original defense attorneys to recall why they did or did not take any particular action and whether there existed at the time any reasonable basis for not objecting, not calling any particular witness(es), not filing a particular motion or otherwise." Commonwealth v. Renchenski, No. CP-17-CR-481-1982, slip op, at 12 (C.P. Clearfield, Jan. 30, 2009) ("Renchenski II"). The absence of witnesses as well as the likelihood that memories would be poor twenty-four years after trial, the court continued, would severely prejudice the Commonwealth's ability to retry Appellant.

In addition, the PCRA court rejected Appellant's argument that the recorded testimony from his first trial would mitigate the prejudice suffered by the Commonwealth by referring to Commonwealth v. Bell, 706 A.2d 855 (Pa. Super. 1998), in which the unavailability of an eyewitness was deemed sufficient prejudice to dismiss a PCRA petition under Section 9543(b) despite the availability of recorded testimony, as the issues the petitioner sought to raise in the PCRA proceeding were "untested at the original trial." Id. at 860. The court also rejected Appellant's argument that it is the Commonwealth's burden -- and not a petitioner's -- to move a PCRA matter forward, finding an analogy to the law concerning the Commonwealth's burden to provide a prompt trial inapposite. See generally Pa.R.Crim.P. 600. In the present matter, the PCRA court explained, "the Commonwealth is not responsible for the delay in this case which logically can only be placed on [Appellant] and the Judge who originally handled the matter." Renchenski II, slip op. at 13. The court chastised Appellant for his inaction, noting that he "sat idly for many years and did absolutely nothing to advance his claims following his agreement that Attorney Ryan withdraw." Id. at 14. Accordingly, thePCRA court granted the Commonwealth's motion and dismissed the matter pursuant to Section 9543(b).³

The Superior Court affirmed, finding that application of Section 9543(b) under these circumstances was proper. See Commonwealth v. Renchenski, 988 A.2d 699, 700 (Pa. Super. 2010) ("Renchenski III").⁴ Addressing the applicability of Section 9543(b), the Superior Court explained:

While the express terms of this section refer to a "delay in filing," we conclude that under the unusual circumstances present in this case, this provision should be subordinated to the dominant purpose of this section, which is to ensure that the Commonwealth is not prejudiced by a defendant's delay in pursuing his post-conviction rights. While the underlying PCRA petition here was timely, Appellant essentially abandoned it for several years. Appellant's failure to pursue his PCRA petition has now created a situation where the Commonwealth would be severely prejudiced were it required to retry the case. Consequently, we conclude that the PCRA court did not err in relying upon Section 9543(b) in dismissing Appellant's PCRA petition.

Id. at 703. In addition, like the PCRA court, the Superior Court found Appellant's reliance on cases discussing the Commonwealth's obligation to try a defendant in a timely fashion misplaced, as the court could find "no precedent extending this duty to the collateral stage of criminal proceedings." Id. at 702. Concluding that "it is beyond...