Commonwealth v. Rezac

236 N.E.3d 1193

COMMONWEALTH

v.Jean REZAC.

SJC-13445

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Plymouth.

Argued December 4, 2023

Decided July 22, 2024

Reckless Endangerment of a Child. Intimidation of Witness. Criminal Responsibility. Practice, Criminal, Indictment, Probation. Constitutional Law, Grand jury, Indictment, Privacy. Grand Jury. Global Positioning System Device. Privacy.

Indictments found and returned in the Superior Court Department on June 27, 2018.

The cases were heard by William F. Sullivan, J.

The Supreme Judicial Court granted an application for direct appellate review.

John P. Warren for the defendant.

Arne Hantson, Assistant District Attorney, for the Commonwealth.

Haylie Jacobson, Committee for Public Counsel Services, for Committee for Public Counsel Services, amicus curiae, submitted a brief.

Present: Budd, C.J., Gaziano, Kafker, Wendlandt, & Georges, JJ.

BUDD, C.J.

After a bench trial, a Superior Court judge found the defendant, Jean Rezac, guilty of reckless endangerment of a child and witness intimidation in connection with the defendant’s attack on her minor son. The defendant raises several arguments on appeal, which, for the reasons discussed infra, we reject.¹

Background. 1. Facts. We recount the relevant facts as presented to the trial judge, reserving some details for later discussion.² On the evening of April 24, 2018, after arguing with her then-twelve year old son (victim) about the need for him to use elastics on his dental braces, the defendant said, "What’s the point of living if we are fighting all the time[?]" The next morning, after the defendant believed that a voice told her that she should end her life, she retrieved kitchen knives and attempted to commit suicide in the bathroom but did not follow through. She then contemplated the hopelessness of both her and the victim’s lives and decided to end the victim’s life to prevent him from experiencing "misery and frustration" due to. his medical conditions.

The defendant entered the victim’s bedroom, asked how he was feeling, and then covered his head with a blanket and left the room. When she returned shortly thereafter, the victim felt a sharp pain in his neck, observed blood, and realized the defendant had stabbed him. The defendant then brought the victim to the bathroom, placed him in the tub and forced his head under water. The pair struggled, and the victim eventually was able to break free and ran away screaming, "[D]on’t kill me, don’t kill me."

The victim attempted to dial 911 on his cell phone, but the defendant took the cell phone from him before the call was answered. When the 911 dispatch operator called back, the defendant answered, said everything was "okay," and hung up. The victim eventually managed to barricade himself in another bedroom and call the police.

When police responded to the scene, they observed the victim with a cut on his neck and smeared blood on the bathroom door. The defendant, who had locked herself in the bathroom, was unresponsive. One officer forced his way into the bathroom and found the defendant sitting in a partially filled bathtub, fully clothed, with a blank stare on her face. After she attempted to stab herself with knives she had in her possession, the officer took the weapons and began to render first aid. As he did so, the defendant stated, "I don’t want to live anymore, leave me alone, just let me die."

2. Procedural history. The defendant was indicted on (1) assault and battery by means of a dangerous weapon, G. L. c. 265, § 15A; (2) attempted murder, G. L. c. 265, § 16; (3) reckless endangerment of a child, G. L. c. 265, § 13L; and (4) intimidation of a witness, G. L. c. 268, § 13B. Shortly after her arraignment, the defendant moved for a criminal responsibility evaluation, which was completed by Dr. Ashley Murray while the defendant was committed at the Worcester Recovery Center and Hospital. After the defendant provided notice that she intended to raise a lack of criminal responsibility defense, the Commonwealth moved for a second evaluation, which was completed by Dr. Fabian Saleh, The defendant called both experts as witnesses at her jury-waived trial.

After the trial, the judge issued his verdict in a memorandum of decision. On the assault and battery by means of a dangerous weapon and attempted murder charges, the judge found the defendant not guilty by reason of mental illness or mental defect (major depressive disorder with depression and psychotic features). However, the judge found the defendant guilty of endangerment of a child and intimidation of a witness. The defendant was sentenced to a five-year term of probation on each of the convictions to run concurrently. The conditions included no unsupervised contact with her two children and global positioning system (GPS) monitoring for two years. The defendant appealed, and this court granted the defendant’s application for direct appellate review.

Discussion. The defendant appeals from her convictions, arguing that she was not criminally responsible for any of her actions, and that, in any case, there was insufficient evidence to support the convictions. She also argues that the indictment charging her with reckless endangerment impermissibly was ambiguous. Finally, she challenges the probation condition of GPS monitoring as presumptively unreasonable.

[1, 2] 1. Criminal responsibility. a. Standard. When a defendant raises a defense of a lack of criminal responsibility, the Commonwealth is required to demonstrate that the defendant was criminally responsible at the time of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. See Commonwealth v. Dunphe, 485 Mass. 871, 878, 153 N.E.3d 1254 (2020). The Commonwealth may do so by, among other things, establishing that the defendant did not suffer from a mental disease or defect. See id. at 879, 153 N.E.3d 1254.

[3] If the defendant suffered from a mental disease or defect when she committed the crime, the Commonwealth must demonstrate that the defendant (1) did not lack the substantial capacity to appreciate the criminality or wrongfulness of her conduct, and (2) did not lack the substantial capacity to conform her conduct to the requirements of the law. See Commonwealth v. McHoul, 352 Mass. 544, 546, 226 N.E.2d 556 (1967). See also Commonwealth v. Goudreau, 422 Mass. 731, 737, 666 N.E.2d 112 (1996) (Appendix) (provid- ing model jury instruction on criminal responsibility).

[4–8] The first prong requires proof that the defendant understood the difference between right and wrong, i.e., cognition. See McHoul, 352 Mass. at 546, 226 N.E.2d 556. As used in this context, "criminality" refers to the "legal import" of the conduct at issue and "wrongfulness" refers to the "moral import."³ Goudreau, 422 Mass. at 738, 666 N.E.2d 112 (Appendix). That is, the Commonwealth must prove that at the time of the offense, the defendant understood either that her actions were illegal (criminal) or that they were immoral (wrongful). See id. The second prong requires proof that the defendant had the ability to control her actions, i.e., volition. The Commonwealth must prove both prongs for the defendant to be held criminally responsible for her actions. See McHoul, supra at 546-547, 226 N.E.2d 556.

[9] The defendant contends that the judge used the wrong standard to determine that she was criminally responsible for the actions she took after the attack on her son. Pointing to cases from outside of this jurisdiction, the defendant argues that the standard to establish criminal responsibility is (or should be) that the Commonwealth prove the defendant was able to appreciate both the criminality and the wrongfulness of her conduct rather than one or the other. Otherwise, she contends, a defendant could be convicted even if she believed her actions were morally, but not legally, justified or vice versa. We are not persuaded by this argument.

To begin, we note that our standard is based on the Model Penal Code formulation, which presents the option of using either or both terms.⁴ See McHoul, 352 Mass. at 546-547, 226 N.E.2d 556 (adopting § 4.01 of Model Penal Code). See also Model Penal Code § 4.01 & comment, at 178 nn.43-44 (Official Draft and Revised Comments 1985). When the drafters of the Model Penal Code considered which of the two terms to use, they concluded that "few cases are likely to arise in which the variation will be determinative." Model Penal Code § 4.01 explanatory note, at 164. This is because "a defendant who appreciates society’s moral disapproval of his conduct will almost always assume that the conduct is criminal, and vice versa." Model Penal Code § 4.01 comment 2, at 169. See Kahler v. Kansas, 589 U.S. 271, 312, 140 S.Ct. 1021, 206 L.Ed.2d 312 (2020) (Breyer, J., dissenting) ("The two inquiries are closely related and excuse roughly the same universe of defendants"); People v. Schmidt, 216 N.Y. 324, 340, 110 N.E. 945 (1915) (Cardozo, J.) ("Knowledge that an act is forbidden by law will in most cases permit the inference of knowledge that, according to the accepted standards of mankind, it is also condemned as an offense against good morals"). This court has used one term or the other when referencing prong one,⁵ but we never have limited our inquiry to one or the other. See Goudreau, 422 Mass. at 738, 666 N.E.2d 112 (Appendix). We decline to do so today for the same reasons.

Moreover, our two-pronged legal standard imposes a higher burden of proof on the Commonwealth than jurisdictions that require proof of an appreciation of both legal and moral wrongfulness, because it includes both cognitive and volitional prongs.⁶ In contrast, the jurisdictions that require the government to prove that a defendant understands both the legal and moral wrongfulness of her actions do not address cases where a mental disease or defect "destroys or overrides the defendant’s power of self-control."⁷ Model Penal Code § 4.01 comment 2, at 167. Our standard therefore protects the defendant who loses the...