Commonwealth v. Robinson

224 N.E.3d 391

COMMONWEALTH

v.Jason ROBINSON.

SJC-09265

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Suffolk.

Argued February 6, 2023.

Decided January 11, 2024.

Homicide. Felony-Murder Rule. Joint Enterprise. Robbery. Evidence, Joint enterprise, Statement of codefendant, Hearsay, Third-party culprit, Expert Opinion. Practice, Criminal, Capital case, New trial, Hearsay, Trial of defendants together, Instructions to jury, Argument by prosecutor, Sentence. Constitutional Law, Sentence.

Indictments found and returned in the Superior Court Department on September 27, 2000.

Following review by this court, 480 Mass. 146 (2018), a motion for a new trial was heard by Robert L. Ullmann, J., and a motion for reconsideration was also heard by him.

Rosemary Curran Scapicchio (Jillise McDonough also present), Boston, for the defendant.

Paul B. Linn, Assistant District Attorney, & Cailin M. Campbell, Special Assistant District Attorney (John C. Verner, Assistant District Attorney, also present) for the Commonwealth.

The following submitted briefs for amici curiae: Darina Shtrakham, of California, Matt K. Nguyen, of the District of Columbia, & Adam Gershenson for Jeffrey Aaron & others.

Jasmine Gonzales Rose, of Oregon, Duke K. McCall, III, & Douglas A. Hastings, of the District of Columbia, Robert S. Chang, of Washington, Caitlin Glass, Neda Khoshkoo, & Katharine Naples-Mitchell, for Boston University Center for Antiracist Research & others.

Kenneth J. Parsigian, Avery E. Borreliz, Erin M. Haley, & Martin W. Healy, Boston, for Carol S. Ball & others.

Benjamin H. Keehn, Committee for Public Counsel Services, & John J. Barter, Boston, for Committee for Public Counsel Services.

Present: Budd, C.J., Gariano, Lowy, Cypher, Kafker, Wendlandt, & Georges, JJ.

BUDD, C.J.

[1] Following a joint jury trial with his codefendant, the defendant, Jason Robinson, was convicted of murder in the first degree on a joint venture theory of felonymurder, with armed robbery as the predicate offense, in connection with the shooting death of Inaam Yazbek (victim).¹ The defendant appeals from his convictions and from the denial of his motion for a new trial, claiming that there was insufficient evidence to convict him as well as reversible error on the part of the Commonwealth and the judge. In the alternative, he asks us to declare his life sentence without parole to be unconstitutional because he was nineteen years old at the time of the crime, based on Diatehenko v. District Attorney for the Suffolk Dist., 466 Mass. 655, 1 N.E.3d 270 (2013), and sentence him to life with parole after fifteen years.

[2] We affirm the defendant’s conviction of murder in the first degree, as well as the order denying his motion for a new trial. After full consideration of the, record, we further conclude that extraordinary relief under G. L. c. 278, § 33E, is not warranted. However, pursuant to our decision in Commonwealth v. Mattis, 493 Mass. (2023), the defendant’s sentence of life without the possibility of parole is unconstitutional where he was nineteen years old at the time of the offense of murder in the first degree.² We therefore remand this matter to the Superior Court for resentencing on the charge of murder in the first degree in accordance with that decision.³

Background. We summarize the facts as the jury could have found them, reserving certain details for later discussion. On March 27, 2000, the defendant was with codefendant Tanzerius Anderson, Joleena Tate (Anderson’s girlfriend), Heather Coady, and Edward Gauthier at Gauthier’s home. While there, Tate asked Anderson if he wanted to rob someone. She told Anderson that she knew someone named "Yaz," who always carried a large amount of cash and was a "passive" person who would not "put up a fight if ever approached." After indicating that he was interested in committing the robbery, Anderson called the defendant into the room to ask him whether he was "down for a robbery." The defendant agreed.

The trio planned that Tate would meet the victim and then lead him to an apartment building in Brighton, where Anderson and the defendant would ambush him. After having dinner with the victim at a restaurant in Watertown, Tate asked him to drive her to the designated location and, using the victim’s cell phone, sent "1145" to the defendant’s pager to signal when she would be at the appointed meeting place.

When Tate and the victim arrived, she led him into a hallway of the building and then back out again, where they encountered Anderson and the defendant. Tate said to the victim, "[W]e’re being robbed," and walked away. Anderson and the defendant led the victim by his arms back into the building.

Once inside, Anderson told the victim to keep his hands up and hot to turn around to look at them. Anderson further told the victim that he was going to be frisked for his belongings. At that point, the victim began to plead with them and to reach for a doorknob. Anderson told the victim to stop reaching. The victim continued to plead and said that he was not a police officer. Anderson then became "nervous" and shot the victim in the back of the head. Anderson and the. defendant ran out of the building, got into Anderson’s car with Tate, and drove away. The defendant, who was seated in the back, was holding a cell phone and wallet and began to count the cash inside the wallet. When Tate asked Anderson what happened, Anderson replied, "[H]e’s murked," which Tate understood to mean dead. Anderson also said, "I got my body for the summer." Anderson then removed a gun from his right vest pocket and passed it to the defendant. Anderson parked the car in a vacant lot, took the gun from the defendant, hid it under a piece of construction equipment, and drove away. Anderson returned to the lot later that evening with Tate and the defendant, retrieved the gun, and passed it to the defendant again. The Commonwealth did not present evidence of a recovered gun to the jury.⁴

Hours later, a resident of the apartment building found the victim outside the building lying in a pool of blood. The medical examiner later determined that the cause of death was a single gunshot wound to the head, fired within one-half inch, or closer, from the side of the victim’s face.

We stayed the defendant’s direct appeal in order for a Superior Court judge to hear his motion for a new trial. After the defendant’s motion for a new trial was allowed, we reversed that order on appeal and remanded for additional findings. Commonwealth v. Robinson, 480 Mass. 146, 155, 102 N.E.3d 357 (2018). The motion for a new trial ultimately was denied on all but one issue, sufficiency of the evidence for the felony-murder conviction, which was reserved for this court.

[3–5] Discussion. 1. Sufficiency of the evidence. In order for a jury to convict a defendant of joint venture felony-murder with armed robbery as the predicate offense, the Commonwealth must establish beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant participated in committing the armed robbery as a joint venturer with the intent to commit that offense and that the victim was killed in furtherance of that armed robbery. Commonwealth v. Gallett, 481 Mass. 662, 673, 119 N.E.3d 646 (2019). To prove armed robbery, the Commonwealth must prove that a defendant (1) was armed with a dangerous weapon; (2) either applied actual force or violence to the victim, or by words or gestures put the victim in fear; (3) took the money or the property of the victim; and (4) did so with the intent to steal it. Commonwealth v. Chesko, 486 Mass. 314, 320, 158 N.E.3d 441 (2020). Thus, to convict the defendant of armed robbery by joint venture, the Commonwealth was required to show that the defendant knew that Anderson was armed and that the defendant assisted Anderson in committing the armed robbery while sharing the intent to steal the property of the victim. See Commonwealth v. Semedo, 456 Mass. 1, 11, 921 N.E.2d 57 (2010).

[6] The defendant argues that the Commonwealth failed to prove that he committed joint venture armed robbery (and consequently failed to prove joint venture felony-murder) because there was insufficient evidence that he knew Anderson was armed. For the reasons discussed infra, we disagree.

[7, 8] In reviewing claims of insufficient evidence, we assess the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution to determine whether any rational trier of fact could have found each element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Commonwealth v. Latimore, 378 Mass. 671, 677-678, 393 N.E.2d 370 (1979). In so doing, we keep in mind that "[p]roof of the essential elements of the crime may be based on reasonable inferences drawn from the evidence, … and the inferences a jury may draw need only be reasonable and possible and need not be necessary or inescapable." Commonwealth v. Kapaia, 490 Mass. 787, 791, 197 N.E.3d 867 (2022), quoting Commonwealth v. West, 487 Mass. 794, 800, 169 N.E.3d 1183 (2021).

[9] We conclude that, taken together, the evidence was sufficient to permit an inference that the defendant knew that Anderson would be armed when they committed the robbery. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Phap Buth, 480 Mass. 113, 118, 101 N.E.3d 925, cert. denied, — U.S. —, 139 S. Ct. 607, 202 L.Ed.2d 439 (2018); Commonwealth v. Rakes, 478 Mass. 22, 32-33, 82 N.E.3d 403 (2017). First, prior to the robbery, Anderson, the defendant, and Tate planned that it would take place in the hallway of an apartment building. The defendant’s knowledge that Anderson was armed therefore could be inferred, where a weapon was likely to be of particular use to "persuade the victim to surrender his property quickly and without resistance" to avoid being seen by potential witnesses.⁵ Commonwealth v. Colon, 52 Mass. App. Ct. 725, 728, 756 N.E.2d 615 (2001). See Commonwealth v. Quinones, 78 Mass. App. Ct. 215, 220, 936 N.E.2d 436 (2010) (knowledge that codefendant was armed inferred where robbery needed to be effectuated quickly). In addition, neither...