Commonwealth v. Sajid S.

236 N.E.3d 798

COMMONWEALTH

v.SAJID S., a juvenile.

SJC-13505

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Suffolk.

Argued March 4, 2024

Decided July 9, 2024

Constitutional Law, Sentence, Cruel and unusual punishment. Practice, Criminal, Sentence, Probation. Juvenile Court, Probation.

Indictments found and returned in the Suffolk County Division of the Juvenile Court Department on December 30, 2004.

A motion for relief from unlawful restraint, filed on March 21, 2023, was heard by Peter M. Coyne, J.

The Supreme Judicial Court granted an application for direct appellate review.

Matthew J. Koes for the juvenile.

Kenneth E. Steinfield, Assistant District Attorney, for the Commonwealth.

Eva G. Jellison & Danya F. Fullerton, for youth advocacy division of the Committee for Public Counsel Services, amicus curiae, submitted a brief.

Present: Budd, C.J., Kafker, Wendlandt, Georges, & Dewar, JJ.

WENDLANDT, J.

When it comes to sentencing, as we have repeatedly and recently stated, young persons are constitutionally different. See Commonwealth v. Mattis, 493 Mass. 216, 238, 224 N.E.3d 410 (2024). In this case, we consider whether the proscription against "cruel or unusual" punishments embodied in art. 26 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights prohibits the sentence imposed on the juvenile,¹ who in November 2004, as a sixteen year old, stalked and robbed one victim at gunpoint before repeatedly raping her in her home, and then bound, gagged, and robbed a second victim -- the first victim’s roommate -- when she arrived home. He was sentenced to a period of incarceration in State prison for his convictions of, inter alia, aggravated rape -- a period compliant with art. 26’s requirement that, in the absence of extraordinary circumstances, the period of parole ineligible incarceration for a juvenile convicted of nonhomicide offenses not exceed that of a juvenile convicted of murder. See Commonwealth v. Perez, 477 Mass. 677, 686, 80 N.E.3d 967 (2017) (Perez I), S.C., 480 Mass. 562, 106 N.E.3d 620 (2018) (Perez II). He was further given a five-year period of straight probation for the remaining nonhomicide offenses to commence from and after his release.

Because, as an adult of more than thirty years of age, he allegedly violated the conditions of probation, and because, as a result of the violation, he both was held on a probation detainer and faces a potential sentence that might include a period of incarceration on the remaining nonhomicide offenses he committed as a juvenile, the now-grown juvenile contends that art. 26’s proscription of cruel or unusual punishments was violated. We conclude that imposing probation as part of such an integrated sentencing structure does not ran afoul of art. 26’s safeguards peculiar to juveniles. Further concluding that suffering the consequences of a violation of probation also is constitutional, we affirm the order of the Juvenile Court judge denying the juvenile’s second motion for relief from unlawful restraint.²

1. Background. a. Facts.³ On an evening in November 2004, the juvenile, then sixteen years old, followed the victim home, ambushed her outside of her apartment, and, at gunpoint, demanded that she give him money. The juvenile then forced the victim into her apartment and repeatedly raped her. He also bound and gagged her.

The second victim, the victim’s roommate, came home, and the juvenile bound and gagged her as well. The juvenile stole property from both victims and fled.

b. Prior proceedings. In March 2007, the juvenile tendered a plea admitting to sufficient facts and was adjudicated as a youthful offender on one count of home invasion, G. L. c. 265, § 18C; three counts of aggravated rape, G. L. c. 265, § 22 (a); two counts of armed robbery, G. L. c. 265, § 17; two counts of kidnapping, G. L. c. 265, § 26; two counts of assault and battery by means of a dangerous weapon, G. L. c. 265, § 15A (b); one count of using a firearm in a felony, G. L. c. 265, § 18B; and one count of carrying a firearm without a license, G. L. c. 269, § 10 (a). He was sentenced to from sixteen to twenty years in State prison for the aggravated rape charges;⁴ two and one-half to three years in State prison for carrying a firearm without a license, to be served concurrently with the aggravated rape sentence; and ten years of probation for the remaining charges, to be served from and after his release from State prison.

In November 2020, after sixteen years of incarceration, the juvenile became eligible for parole. However, the parole board denied each of his two applications for parole.

i. First Perez I motion. In July 2021, following this court’s decision in Perez I, the juvenile filed a motion for release from unlawful restraint pursuant to Mass. R. Crim. P. 30 (a), as appearing in 435 Mass. 1107, 761 N.E.2d 963 (2001), contending that his original sentence violated art. 26 because it required him to serve a period of incarceration during which he was not eligible for parole (sixteen years) that exceeded the then-applicable fifteen-year parole ineligibility period of a juvenile convicted of murder.⁵ The Commonwealth did not dispute the juvenile’s contention and chose to forgo a Miller healing,⁶ discussed infra, to attempt to show that extraordinary circumstances warranted treating the juvenile more harshly for parole purposes than a juvenile convicted of murder. The motion was allowed, and the original sentence was vacated.

Finding that the juvenile’s behavior had improved over time, that he accepted responsibility for his crimes, and that he "availed himself [of the] social and educational opportunities" provided to him while incarcerated, the motion judge rejected the Commonwealth’s proposal re- garding resentencing.⁷ Instead, he adopted the juvenile’s proposal regarding resentencing. Specifically, the judge resentenced the juvenile to from fifteen years to fifteen years and one day for the aggravated rape offenses; two and one-half to three years for the offense of carrying a firearm without a license, to be served concurrently with the sentence for the aggravated rape offenses; and five years of probation for the remaining offenses, to be served from and after the commitment to State prison, beginning on the date of the juvenile’s release (restructured sentence).

As discussed infra, the restructured sentence thus conformed to the constitutional requirement that, in the absence of extraordinary circumstances, the juvenile’s period of parole ineligibility not exceed that of a juvenile convicted of murder. See Perez I, 477 Mass. at 686, 80 N.E.3d 967. But it potentially exposed the juvenile to further incarceration should he violate the conditions of probation.

Because he had already served the incarcerated portion of the restructured sentence, one day after the resentencing, in January 2022, the juvenile was discharged from the Department of Correction. He returned to court the following day, had a colloquy with the judge about his probation conditions, and signed a conditions of probation form.

ii. Second Perez I motion. Less than seven months after his release, in August 2022, the juvenile, now a thirty-three year old adult, was charged with multiple firearm and drug offenses, resisting arrest, unarmed burglary, and unlicensed and uninsured operation of a motor vehicle. The juvenile was alleged to have violated his probation "as a result of [the] new arrest." A notice of violation of probation was issued, and the juvenile was arrested and held on a probation detainer.

The juvenile filed a second motion for relief from unlawful restraint pursuant to Mass. R. Crim. P. 30 (a), and a corresponding motion for release from the probation detainer pending a decision on the second motion for relief.⁸ Both motions were denied, and the juvenile appealed from the denial of his second motion for relief from unlawful restraint. We granted the juvenile’s application for direct appellate review.

[1] 2. Discussion. a. Standard of review. We review the juvenile’s constitutional challenge to his restructured sentence de novo, accepting the motion judge’s findings of fact absent a showing of clear error. See Commonwealth v. DiBenedetto, 491 Mass. 390, 396, 203 N.E.3d 579 (2023).

b. Constitutional framework. We need not belabor the constitutional framework that guides the punishments that may be imposed on young persons; these principles have been repeatedly and recently set forth. See, e.g., Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 469-470, 132 S.Ct. 2455, 183 L.Ed.2d 407 (2012) (Eighth Amendment to United States Constitution prohibits mandatory imposition of life without parole for juveniles who commit murder); Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 78-79, 130 S.Ct. 2011, 176 L.Ed.2d 825 (2010) (Eighth Amendment prohibits imposition of life without parole for juveniles who commit nonhomicide offenses); Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 568-570, 125 S.Ct. 1183, 161 L.Ed.2d 1 (2005) (Eighth Amendment prohibits imposition of death penalty for children);⁹ Mattis, 493 Mass. at 217-218, 224, 224 N.E.3d 410 (due to contemporary standards of decency, art. 26 prohibits imposition of life without parole for persons aged eighteen, nineteen, and twenty where they share same attributes of youth relevant to sentencing as juveniles); Diatchenko v. District Attorney for the Suffolk Dist., 466 Mass. 655, 668, 671, 1 N.E.3d 270 (2013) (Diatchenko I), S.C., 471 Mass. 12, 27 N.E.3d 349 (2015) (Diatchenko II) (art. 26 prohibits imposition of life without parole for juveniles who commit murder, even on discretionary basis).

[2] For present purposes it suffices briefly to recount the guiding principle underlying our jurisprudence -- namely, that, in light of the "evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society," Mattis, 493 Mass. at 224, 224 N.E.3d 410, quoting Commonwealth v. Okoro, 471 Mass. 51, 61, 26 N.E.3d 1092 (2015), sentencing of young persons must be informed by the attributes that define this early period of life....