Commonwealth v. Salter

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA Appellant v. STEPHANIE J. SALTER Appellee

J-A34032-14

No. 653 MDA 2014

SUPERIOR COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

APRIL 29, 2015

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

Appeal from the Order Entered March 17, 2014

In the Court of Common Pleas of York County

Criminal Division at No: CP-67-CR-0008129

BEFORE: FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E., SHOGAN, and STABILE, JJ.

MEMORANDUM BY STABILE, J.:

The Commonwealth appeals from the March 17, 2014 order of the Court of Common Pleas of York County granting Appellee Stephanie J. Salter's motion to suppress evidence obtained following a traffic stop. We reverse and remand for proceedings consistent with this memorandum.

In relevant part, the trial court summarized the facts and the procedural history of the case as follows:

In the early morning hours of September 21, 2013, Officer Corey Sheaffer was on routine patrol when he observed that the vehicle ahead of him did not have lights illuminating the license plate.[¹] To confirm his suspicion that the lights were in fact not working, Officer Sheaffer turned off his headlights, which "confirmed" his suspicion. At this point, Officer Sheaffer decided to conduct a traffic stop on the vehicle. After the vehicle pulled over, Officer Sheaffer approached the vehicle and spoke with the driver, who he identified as [Appellee]. [Appellee] provided the officer with all necessary documentation, and it was at this point that the officer . . . "noticed an odor of intoxicating beverage emanating from inside the vehicle." Along with the smell, Officer Sheaffer observed [Appellee]'s eyes were glassy and bloodshot, which prompted him to ask [Appellee] how much she had had to drink. [Appellee] admitted that she had two glasses of wine. . . . At this point, the officer asked [Appellee] to submit to four field tests[.²] . . . After [Appellee] performed all four tests, Officer Sheaffer placed [Appellee] under arrest for driving under the influence of alcohol.

Trial Court Opinion, 6/5/14, at 2-3(citations to the record omitted).

After the magisterial district court bound over all charges,³ the trial court conducted a hearing on Appellee's motion to suppress evidence. Following the hearing, the trial court found the officer had reasonable suspicion to conduct a traffic stop,⁴ but it suppressed the evidence of theBlood Alcohol Content (BAC) test because the officer did not have probable cause to arrest Appellee for driving under the influence (DUI). The Commonwealth timely appealed.⁵

In its Rule 1925(a) opinion, the trial court, in addition to reiterating the propriety of the suppression of the BAC test result, also added, for the first time, the officer lacked probable cause to conduct a traffic stop for the violation of failing to have a license plate illuminated.

On appeal, the Commonwealth raises the following issues:

1. Did the suppression court err in reversing its earlier order in its 1925(a) opinion?

2. Did the suppression court err in granting [Appellee]'s omnibus pre-trial motion by finding that the initial stop was not supported by probable cause?

Appellant's Supplemental Brief, at 4.⁶

We do not need to address the first issue because we conclude the trial court erred in finding the officer did not have probable cause to stop Appellee.

In its Rule 1925(a) opinion, the trial court, in concluding that the officer did not have probable cause to conduct a traffic stop, reasoned as follows:

In the present case, Officer Sheaffer testified that while he was behind [Appellee]'s vehicle he noticed that her license plate was not illuminated. To confirm that the lights were in fact not working, Officer Sheaffer turned off his headlights, which he testified, did "confirm" his suspicion. However on cross-examination, Officer Sheaffer testified that he was approximately 75 feet behind [Appellee] when he decided to pull her over for failing to have her license plate illuminated. This type of violation requires no further investigation after the stop.

Section 4303 of the Pennsylvania Motor Vehicle Code requires that license plate lamps be operational "in conformance with [] regulations of the [Department of Transportation]." 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 4303(b). The applicable regulation of the Department requires that if a vehicle is equipped with a license plate lamp, it "shall emit white light and make the registration plate visible from a distance of 50 feet to the rear of the vehicle." 65 Pa. Code § 175.66(k). . . .There is no requirement that the lamp itself be visible from a distance of 50 feet. As stated above, Officer Sheaffer estimated that he was 75 feet behind [Appellee] when he initiated his traffic stop. There is no testimony in the record that Officer Sheaffer verified that the license plate did not illuminate the license plate closer than 75 feet.

Accordingly, we conclude that the record does not contain testimony which would support a finding of probable cause to stop [Appellee]'s vehicle for the violation of failing to have a license plate illuminated.

Trial Court Opinion, 6/5/14, at 5-6 (citation to Notes of Testimony omitted) (emphasis in original). We disagree.⁷

Our standard of and scope of review in suppression matters is well-settled:

When reviewing the propriety of a suppression order, an appellate court is required to determine whether the record supports the suppression court's factual findings and whether the inferences and legal conclusions drawn by the suppression court from those findings are appropriate. Because Appellee prevailed in the suppression court, we may consider only the evidence of the defense and so much of the evidence for the Commonwealth as remains uncontradicted when read in the context of the record as a whole. Where the record supports the factual findings of the suppression court, we are bound by those facts and may reverse only if the legal conclusions drawn therefrom are in error. However, where the appeal of the determination of the suppression court turns on allegations of legal error, "[t]he suppression court's conclusions of law . . . are not binding on an appellate court, whose duty it is to determine if the suppression court properly applies the law to the facts." As a result, the conclusions of law of the suppression court are subject to plenary review.

Commonwealth v. Dean, 940 A.2d 514, 516 (Pa. Super. 2008) (citations omitted).

In relevant part, Section 4303 of the Vehicle Code states that "[e]very vehicle operated on a highway shall be equipped with a rear lighting system including, but not limited to, rear lamps, rear reflectors, stop lamps and a license plate light, in conformance with regulations of the department." 75Pa.C.S.A. § 4303(b). Section 4303(b) subjects the plate light to regulatory provisions of section 175.80(a)(9)(i), which states that a vehicle is not in compliance with the Vehicle Code if "[a]n exterior bulb or sealed beam, if originally equipped or installed, fails to light properly," 67 Pa. Code § 175.80(a)(9)(i) (emphasis added), and Section 175.66(k), which requires that "the registration plate lamp shall emit white light and make the registration plate visible from [a] distance of 50 feet to the rear of the vehicle." Id. § 175.66(k)

The license plate lamp was out, which means the plate was not illuminated, which in turn means that the registration plate could not have been visible from a distance of 50 feet to the rear of the vehicle at 3:00 a.m. This is a violation of the Vehicle Code sufficient to justify a traffic stop.

It is of no moment the officer was 75 feet away from the vehicle when he determined the plate was not illuminated, or that Officer Sheaffer did not verify the license plate light did not illuminate the license closer than 75 feet. If the license plate was not illuminated, this fact alone gave the officer sufficient grounds to stop the vehicle, regardless of where the officer was when he first witnessed the violation.

It is also worth mentioning that "probable cause does not require certainty, but rather exists when criminality is one reasonable inference, not necessarily even the most likely inference." See Commonwealth v. Spieler, 887 A.2d 1271, 1275 (Pa. Super. 2005) (citation omitted). Yet,while the officer originally merely suspected the traffic violation at issue here, he was later able to confirm the violation by driving right behind Appellee's vehicle and turning his headlights off. Once he turned his headlights off, the officer indeed confirmed the plate was not illuminated. Again, this is sufficient to trigger a legal traffic stop.

We next address whether the trial court erred in suppressing the BAC result.⁸ The trial court found Officer Sheaffer did not have probable cause to arrest Appellee for several reasons, which we have addressed below. The thrust of the trial court's decision, however, can be summarized in the following statement: "The totality of circumstances including the officer's observations of lack of impairment, and the lack of meaningful field sobriety test results, compelled us to conclude that probable cause was lacking to arrest [Appellee] and request a chemical test." Trial Court Opinion, 6/5/14, at 11. We disagree.

The trial court found the officer did not have probable cause to arrest Appellee because he did not observe erratic driving and slurred speech. These circumstances, along with the "irrelevan[ce]" of the field sobriety tests for purposes of establishing probable cause,⁹ led the trial court to concludethat the officer did not observe signs of intoxication to warrant Appellee's arrest.

In its opinion, the trial court places significant weight on erratic driving in determining probable cause to arrest for DUI. Trial Court Opinion, 6/5/14, at 10. Erratic driving is not a super-factor, much less one determinative of DUI. "Evidence of erratic driving is not a necessary precursor to a finding of guilt for driving under influence (DUI)-general impairment[.]" Commonwealth v. Mobley, 14 A.3d 887, 890 (Pa. Super. 20...