Commonwealth v. Sanchez-Frometa

1

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA v. ADIEL SANCHEZ-FROMETA Appellant

No. 1573 MDA 2023

Superior Court of Pennsylvania

September 10, 2024

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered October 14, 2021 In the Court of Common Pleas of Franklin County Criminal Division at No: CP-28-CR-0002072-2016.

Benjamin D. Kohler, Esq.

BEFORE: BOWES, J., STABILE, J., and MURRAY, J.

MEMORANDUM

STABILE, J.:

Appellant Adiel Sanchez-Frometa, appeals from the judgment of sentence the Court of Common Pleas of Franklin County imposed on October 13, 2021. On appeal, Appellant challenges the discretionary aspects of his sentence. Upon review, we affirm.

The trial court summarized the relevant background as follows.

On October 10, 2019, following a four-day jury trial, [Appellant] was found guilty of second-degree murder, robbery of a motor vehicle, and theft in connection to the carjacking and stabbing death of a fellow teenager. On December 13, 2019, [the trial court] held a sentencing hearing where both parties presented expert testimony and oral argument on the issue of whether a sentence of life imprisonment without parole was authorized and warranted. At the conclusion of the hearing, [the trial court] sentenced [Appellant] on the count of second-degree murder to life imprisonment in a State Correctional Institution without the possibility of parole.

On December 23, 2019, [Appellant] filed optional post-sentence motions pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P. 720(B), arguing that the trial court erred in sentencing [Appellant] to a life sentence without parole. A hearing was held on [Appellant]'s post-sentence motions on March 9, 2020. On April 20, 2020, [the trial court] denied [Appellant]'s post-sentence motions.

[Appellant] filed a timely notice of appeal from the order of court denying his post-sentence motions on May 15, 2020. The Superior Court of Pennsylvania issued a decision on May 25, 2021 vacating [Appellant]'s sentence of life without parole and remanding the case back to the trial court for resentencing in accordance with the Superior Court's decision. [See

Commonwealth v. Sanchez-Frometa, 256 A.3d 440 (Pa. Super. May 25, 2021)].

[The trial court]'s held a resentencing hearing on October 14, 2021. At the conclusion of the hearing, [the trial court] resentenced [Appellant] to a term of 40 years to life on the count of second-degree murder, and 7 to 14 years on the count of robbery of a motor vehicle, to be served concurrently. [Appellant] did not file timely post-sentence motions or direct appeal, but did file a Post-Conviction Relief Act petition on November 3, 2022, claiming ineffective assistance of counsel.

[The trial court] granted [Appellant]'s petition for post-conviction relief on June 20, 2023, reinstating [Appellant]'s direct and post-sentence motion rights and allowing [Appellant] to file a counseled post-sentence motion nunc pro tunc within 10 days. [Appellant] timely filed post-sentence motions on June 27, 2023.^[1] Following multiple continuances, and the [trial] court granting a 30-day extension of the 120-day disposition period for adjudicating an optional post-sentence motion, a hearing on [Appellant]'s post-sentence motions was finally held on October 24, 2023. On October 27, 2023, [the trial court] filed an order denying [Appellant]'s post-sentence motions.

Trial Court Opinion, 12/18/23, at 1-3 (cleaned up).

This appeal followed. Both Appellant and the trial court complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.

On appeal, Appellant essentially argues that the sentencing court abused its discretion in applying 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9721(b)^[2] by: (i) focusing exclusively on the seriousness of the offense, and (ii) failing to adequately consider the other sentencing factors set forth in 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9721(b). See Appellant's Brief at 16. As presented, therefore, Appellant's claim challenges the discretionary aspects of his sentence. See Commonwealth v. Cartrette, 83 A.3d 1030, 1041 (Pa. Super. 2013) ("A sentencing court's failure to follow the pertinent aspects of § 9721(b) do not result in an illegal sentence, but pertain to discretionary sentencing matters.")^[3] Challenges to the discretionary aspects of sentencing are not entitled to appellate review as a matter of right. Commonwealth v. Clemat, 218 A.3d 944, 959 (Pa. Super. 2019). Rather, such challenges are considered petitions for allowance of appeal. Id. Thus, an appellant must invoke our jurisdiction by satisfying a four-part test: (1) whether appellant has filed a timely notice of appeal; (2) whether the issue was properly preserved at sentencing or in a motion to reconsider and modify sentence; (3) whether appellant's brief has a fatal defect pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f); and (4) whether there is a substantial question that the sentence appealed from is not appropriate under the Sentencing Code. Id.

Here, Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal, properly preserved the issue in a motion for reconsideration/modify sentence and his appellate brief included a Rule 2119(f) statement. Finally, Appellant raised a substantial question for our review. See Commonwealth v. Macias, 968 A.2d 773, 776 (Pa. Super. 2009) (internal citations omitted) ("[A]n averment that the court sentenced based solely on the seriousness of the offense and failed to consider all relevant factors raises a substantial question"); Commonwealth v. Riggs, 63 A.3d 780, 786 (Pa. Super. 2012) (An averment that "the trial court failed to consider relevant sentencing criteria, including the protection of the public, the gravity of the underlying offense and the rehabilitative needs of Appellant, as 42 PA.C.S.A. § 9721(b) requires[,]" presents a substantial question for our review in typical cases). Accordingly, we can proceed to reviewing the merits of his claim.

As noted above, the gravamen of Appellant's sentencing argument is that the trial court weighed the seriousness of the crimes "to an extent that it entirely excluded meaningful consideration of the other statutory sentencing factors." Appellant's Brief at 16. Appellant concludes that we should vacate the current sentence (40 years to life) and remand to the trial court for the imposition of the statutory minimum sentence (30 years). As noted above, the claim involves the discretionary aspects of his sentence.

Our standard of review regarding challenges to the discretionary aspects of sentencing is well-settled:

Sentencing is a matter vested in the sound discretion of the sentencing judge, and a sentence will not be disturbed on appeal absent a manifest abuse of discretion. In this context, an abuse of discretion is not shown merely by an error in judgment. Rather, the appellant must establish, by reference to the record, that the sentencing court ignored or misapplied the law, exercised its judgment for reasons of partiality, prejudice, bias or ill[-]will, or arrived at a manifestly unreasonable decision.

Commonwealth v. Gonzalez, 109 A.3d 711, 731 (Pa. Super. 2015) (citation omitted).

[A] sentencing court abuses its discretion when it considers the criminal act, but not the criminal himself. The Sentencing Code prescribes individualized sentencing by requiring the sentencing court to consider the protection of the public, the gravity of the offense in relation to its impact on the victim and the community, and the rehabilitative needs of the defendant, [ ] and prohibiting a sentence of total confinement without consideration of "the nature and circumstances of the crime[,] and the history, character, and condition of the defendant[.]" 42 Pa.C.S.[A.] § 9725. Commonwealth v. Luketic, 162 A.3d 1149, 1160-61 (Pa. Super. 2017) (some internal citations and quotation marks omitted).

Subsection 9721(b) of the Sentencing Code provides that the court shall fashion a sentence "that is consistent with the protection of the public, the gravity of the offense as it relates to the impact on the life of the victim and on the community, and the rehabilitative needs of the defendant." 42 Pa.C.S. § 9721(b). On appeal, a sentence that is within the sentencing guidelines will not be vacated unless it is "clearly unreasonable." 42 Pa.C.S. § 9781(c). We consider (1) the nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and characteristics of the defendant; (2) the opportunity of the sentencing court to observe the defendant, including any presentence investigation; (3) the findings upon which the sentence was based; and (4) the sentencing guidelines. 42 Pa.C.S. § 9781(d).

Shabazz-Davis, 2022 WL 17175, at *6.^[4]

The balancing of the sentencing factors is the sole province of the sentencing court. Commonwealth v. Bricker, 41 A.3d 872, 876 (Pa. Super. 2012). Further, we recognize that the sentencing court, which is present at the hearing and observes all witnesses and the defendant firsthand, "is in a superior position to review the defendant's character, defiance or indifference, and the overall effect and nature of the crime." Commonwealth v. Lekka, 210 A.3d 343, 353 (Pa. Super. 2019). Notably, where a sentencing court is informed by a PSI, "it is presumed that the court is aware of all appropriate sentencing factors and considerations, and that where the court has been so informed, its discretion should not be disturbed." Commonwealth v. Ventura, 975 A.2d 1128, 1135 (Pa. Super. 2009).

Miller, 275 A.3d at 535.

On appeal, a sentence that is within the sentencing guidelines will not be vacated unless it is clearly unreasonable. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9781(c). We consider: (1) the nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and characteristics of the defendant; (2) the opportunity of the sentencing court to observe the defendant, including any presentence investigation; (3) the findings upon which...