Commonwealth v. Santiago

270 A.3d 512

COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania

v.Joel Martinez SANTIAGO, Appellant

No. 1523 MDA 2020

Superior Court of Pennsylvania.

Submitted: October 13, 2021

Filed: January 20, 2022

Robert M. Buttner, Public Defender, Wilkes-Barre, for appellant.

Samual M. Sanguedolce, Assistant District Attorney, Wilkes-Barre, for Commonwealth, appellee.

James L. McMonagle, Assistant District Attorney, Wilkes-Barre, for Commonwealth, appellee.

BEFORE: BOWES, J., OLSON, J., and KING, J.

OPINION BY BOWES, J.:

Joel Martinez Santiago appeals from the November 9, 2020 order denying his motion to dismiss two counts of aggravated assault graded as first-degree felonies, one count of resisting arrest graded as a second-degree misdemeanor, two counts of simple assault and one count of disorderly conduct graded as third-degree misdemeanors, and one summary count of retail theft on grounds related to double jeopardy and compulsory joinder. After careful review, we affirm.

On the evening of December 27, 2019, Appellant was arrested by Officer Arnulfo Rivera and another member of the Pittston Township Police Department after he allegedly stole a pack of cigarettes from a gas station and physically assaulted the responding officers when confronted. Appellant was first charged with the above-noted charges on December 28, 2019. See N.T. Hearing, 9/10/20, at 2-5. On January 28, 2020, Appellant appeared before Magisterial District Judge Alexandra Kokura Kravitz ("MDJ Kravitz") for a preliminary hearing. Appellant was represented by the Luzerne County Public Defender's Office. No attorney for the Commonwealth participated in the hearing, although Officer Rivera was present. During the proceedings, Officer Rivera negotiated a plea agreement with Appellant in the above-captioned case. Specifically, Officer Rivera purported to withdraw all the above-noted charges except for the summary charge of retail theft and add two summary counts of disorderly conduct. Appellant immediately entered a guilty plea to these reconstituted charges and was sentenced.¹ This withdrawal of the initial charges and addition of the new charges was not reduced to, or evidenced by, any writing that appears in the certified record.

On March 12, 2020, the Commonwealth re-filed the original charges against Appellant with MDJ Kravitz by submitting a written criminal complaint that was approved by an assistant district attorney. See Criminal Complaint, 3/12/20, at 1. MDJ Kravitz held the charges and the case was transferred to the Court of Common Pleas of Luzerne County ("trial court"). In the trial court, Appellant filed a motion to dismiss the re-filed charges, raising several grounds for relief, including: (1) lack of compulsory joinder pursuant to 18 Pa.C.S. § 110(a)(1) ; (2) violation of the double jeopardy clauses of the United States and Pennsylvania Constitutions; and (3) the Commonwealth's alleged failure to timely appeal Appellant's guilty plea before MDJ Kravitz. See Motion to Dismiss, 6/16/20, at ¶¶ 1-67. The trial court denied Appellant's motion to dismiss and advised Appellant that his motion was "not frivolous" and, thus, the order was collateral and immediately appealable. See Order, 11/6/20, at 1 (citing Pa.R.Crim.P. 587(B)(6) ). On December 1, 2020, Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal to this Court. Both Appellant and the trial court have complied with their respective obligations under Pa.R.A.P. 1925.

Appellant has raised the following issues for our consideration:

A. Did the trial court err or abuse its discretion in failing to dismiss all charges where the re-filing of the same charges, based upon the same set of facts and circumstances upon which [Appellant] had earlier pled guilty [to] before a magisterial district judge, violates the Double Jeopardy Clause[s] of the United States and Pennsylvania Constitutions, U.S. CONST ., Amend. V & XIV ; PA. CONST .[,] Art. 1, § 10 and 18 Pa.C.S. §[§] 109 & 110(1)(ii)?

1. Did the trial court err or abuse its discretion in concluding that the Commonwealth was the only entity which could authorize the withdrawal of felony and/or misdemeanor charges and substitute those offense[s] with summary offenses, before a magisterial district judge, to which [Appellant] pled, where an officer acted as a "designee" of the Commonwealth?

2. Did the trial court err or abuse its discretion in concluding that the magisterial district judge did not possess subject matter jurisdiction to allow charges to be withdraw[n] and, then, accept a plea to a summary offense?

3. Did the trial court err or abuse its discretion in concluding that it was proper for the Commonwealth to re-file charges upon the same set of facts and circumstances and was not required to either appeal to the Superior Court or petition for writ of certiorari to the trial court from the magisterial district judge where a valid guilty plea and sentence had been entered?

4. Was [Appellant] deprived of his right to avoid being placed twice in jeopardy and the protections afforded by the principles of compulsory joinder?

Appellant's brief at 4 (cleaned up).

As an initial matter, we note that this Court has held that an interlocutory appeal filed from the denial of a motion to dismiss on compulsory joinder and double jeopardy grounds following the re-filing of claims by the Commonwealth satisfies the collateral order doctrine pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 313(b) ("A collateral order is ... separable from and collateral to the main cause of action where the right involved is too important to be denied review and the question presented is such that if review is postponed until final judgment ... , the claim will be irreparably lost.").² See Commonwealth v. Davis , 242 A.3d 923, 928-29 (Pa.Super. 2020). Thus, we have jurisdiction to consider Appellant's claims for relief and will address each seriatim .

The instant dispute centers upon issues of statutory interpretation pursuant to the Pennsylvania Rules of Criminal Procedure, which present a pure question of law and, thus, our standard of review is de novo and our scope of review is plenary. Commonwealth v. Rushing , 627 Pa. 59, 99 A.3d 416, 420 (2014). The following legal principles will guide our review:

We begin by observing that we apply the Statutory Construction Act, 1 Pa.C.S. §§ 1501 - 1991, when interpreting the Rules of Criminal Procedure. ...

[T]he principal objective of statutory interpretation and construction is to ascertain and effectuate the intention of the rule-making body. 1 Pa.C.S. § 1921(a). The plain language of a statute or rule is the best indication of this intent. The basic tenet of statutory construction requires a court to construe words of the statute according to their plain meaning. "When the words of a statute are clear and free from all ambiguity, the letter of it is not to be disregarded under the pretext of pursuing its spirit." 1 Pa.C.S. § 1921(b). Furthermore, the Statutory Construction Act requires penal provisions of statutes to be strictly construed, 1 Pa.C.S. § 1928(b)(1) ; thus, where an ambiguity is found in the language of a penal statute, such language should be interpreted in the light most favorable to the accused. Finally, courts must give effect to every provision of the statute, as the legislature is presumed not to intend any statutory language to exist as mere surplusage.

Davis , supra at 931 (cleaned up).

Appellant's first claim for relief concerns the authority of Officer Rivera to effectuate the withdrawal and replacement of the criminal charges initially filed against Appellant. See Appellant's brief at 13 ("Officer Rivera was authorized to withdraw felony and misdemeanor charges and, then, charge [Appellant] with summary charges without obtaining the approval of the District Attorney's [o]ffice."). This particular issue squarely implicates Pennsylvania Rule of Criminal Procedure 551, which provides that "[i]n any court case pending before an issuing authority, the attorney for the Commonwealth, or his or her designee, may withdraw one or more of the charges." Pa.R.Crim.P. 551. Appellant argues that Officer Rivera was the Commonwealth's "designee" pursuant to Rule 551 and, therefore, was acting under color of its authority when he sua sponte negotiated and implemented the plea agreement described above. We disagree.

Our Supreme Court has previously discussed the significant remit of district attorneys in determining the charges brought against a defendant:

It is well established that district attorneys, in their investigative and prosecutorial roles, have broad discretion over whether charges should be brought in any given case. A district attorney has a general and widely recognized power to conduct criminal litigation and prosecutions on behalf of the Commonwealth, and to decide whether and when to prosecute, and whether and when to continue or discontinue a case[.]

The district attorney's power to prosecute cannot be restricted by the actions of municipal police officers who might, in any given case, deem it worthless or ill-advised to prosecute. While the police exercise, as a practical matter, a certain discretion in deciding whether to make an arrest, issue a citation, or seek a warrant, the ultimate discretion to file criminal charges lies in the district attorney. Police officers have no authority to enter agreements limiting the power of the district attorney in this regard.

[A]ffording police officers authority to enter agreements that prevent the district attorney from carrying out his duties would present a clear infringement of powers which the constitution and the legislature, as well as our case law, have reposed in the district attorney. Not only would it shift power from an elected and publicly accountable official to appointed public servants, but it would create havoc in the administration of justice by creating unbridled and decentralized decisions about which cases will be prosecuted.

Commonwealth v. Stipetich , 539 Pa. 428, 652 A.2d 1294, 1295 (1995).

While Pennsylvania law...