Commonwealth v. Schley, 124 WDA 2015

136 A.3d 511

2016 PA Super 46

COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania

v.Susan SCHLEY, Appellant.

No. 124 WDA 2015

Superior Court of Pennsylvania.

Argued Dec. 2, 2015.

Filed Feb. 19, 2016.

Stephanie M. Noel, Public Defender, Pittsburgh, for appellant.

Francesco L. Nepa, Assistant District Attorney, Pittsburgh, for Commonwealth, appellee.

BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., SHOGAN and MUSMANNO, JJ.

OPINION BY MUSMANNO, J.:

Susan Schley (“Schley”) appeals from the judgment of sentence imposed following her conviction of endangering the welfare of children (“EWOC”).¹ We vacate the judgment of sentence and remand for further proceedings.

Schley and her husband, Charles Schley (“Charles”), are the adoptive parents (and aunt and uncle) of the complainant, L.S. (“the complainant”). When the complainant was five years old, she moved into the house of Schley and Charles (hereinafter “the Schley residence”), located in the Northside section of the City of Pittsburgh. The complainant resided in the Schley residence with several of her siblings and cousins, as well as the two biological children of Schley and Charles.

The complainant testified that, on a few occasions, while she was a minor² and residing at the Schley residence, Charles made her touch his penis with her hand. According to the complainant, she informed Schley of these assaults on more than one occasion. The complainant stated that on each occasion, Schley would then ask Charles if the complainant was telling the truth about the assaults. Charles denied all of the accusations, after which Schley did nothing, and never called the police. Additionally, the complainant testified that Schley had said to her that “what happens at the house doesn't leave the house.” N.T. (trial), 12/18/14, at 22.

In October 2013, the Commonwealth charged Schley with EWOC, graded as a first-degree misdemeanor. Prior to trial, Schley filed a Motion in limine, seeking to introduce at trial evidence of the complainant's having previously made three false sexual assault allegations against non-family members (hereinafter “the false sexual assault allegations”). The trial court summarized the false sexual assault allegations as follows:

[T]he [complainant's] first [allegation] alleged [that] she had been assaulted in a restroom at Oliver High School, which was later disproved with the school surveillance videos[,] and [was] then recanted by [the complainant]; the second alleged [that the complainant] had been dragged into an abandoned home on her way home from school and sexually assaulted, which [the complainant] later recanted to her counselor and [Schley] during a counseling [session]; and the third alleged [that the complainant] was assaulted by her roommate at the Circle C facility[,] after she had been removed from the [Schley residence], which was disproved by the testimony of a third roommate[,] and later recanted by [the complainant]. In each instance [,] the allegations were made against a non- family member and did not relate to the abuse which gave rise to the instant charges.

Trial Court Opinion, 5/20/15, at 2–3; see also N.T., 12/18/14, at 4 (wherein the prosecutor stated that “[the complainant] reported [the first alleged sexual assault at her high school] to [Schley]. [Schley] then went to the school and met with authorities and [the complainant]. It was disproved by their investigation[,] and then[,] as a result[, the complainant] refuted the allegation”).

Shortly before Schley's trial, Charles pled guilty to felony EWOC concerning his sexual assaults of the complainant. See N.T., 12/18/14, at 50.

On December 18, 2014, Schley's case proceeded to a non-jury trial. Before trial commenced, the trial court denied Schley's Motion in limine, ruling that the defense could not introduce into evidence the false sexual assault allegations, pursuant to Pennsylvania's Rape Shield Law (“RSL”).³

The complainant was Commonwealth's sole witness at trial.⁴ Schley testified in her own defense, maintaining that that complainant never informed her that Charles had sexually assaulted the complainant. At the close of trial, the trial court found Schley guilty of EWOC, and immediately sentenced her to serve three years of probation.

Schley timely filed a Notice of Appeal. In response, the trial court ordered her to file a Pa.R.A.P.1925(b) concise statement of errors complained of on appeal. Schley timely filed a Concise Statement. The trial court then issued a Pa.R.A.P.1925(a) Opinion.

Schley presents the following questions for our review:

I. Did the trial court commit reversible error by excluding from trial evidence of the [false sexual assault allegations] on the basis that such evidence was barred by the R[SL]?

II. Did the trial court commit reversible error by excluding from trial evidence of the [false sexual assault allegations] when this information was probative of a number of material issues in the case?

III. Was the evidence insufficient as a matter of law to convict [Schley] of endangering the welfare of children when the Commonwealth failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that [ ] Schley actually was aware that the complainant was in circumstances that threatened her physical or psychological welfare?

Brief for Appellant at 5 (capitalization omitted).

We will address Schley's first two issues simultaneously, as they both concern the trial court's denial of her Motion in limine, and its ruling that the false sexual assault allegations are inadmissible under the RSL.

When reviewing a trial court's denial of a motion in limine, this Court applies an evidentiary abuse of discretion standard of review. Commonwealth v. Orie, 88 A.3d 983, 1022 (Pa.Super.2014). “An abuse of discretion will not be found based on a mere error of judgment, but rather exists where the court has reached a conclusion which overrides or misapplies the law, or where the judgment exercised is manifestly unreasonable, or the result of partiality, prejudice, bias or ill-will.” Commonwealth v. Alicia,

625 Pa. 429, 92 A.3d 753, 760 (2014).

This Court has stated the well-established standard of review for admission of evidence claims as follows: “[I]n reviewing a challenge to the admissibility of evidence, we will only reverse a ruling by the trial court upon a showing that it abused its discretion or committed an error of law.... To constitute reversible error, an evidentiary ruling must not only be erroneous, but also harmful or prejudicial to the complaining party.” Commonwealth v. Lopez, 57 A.3d 74, 81 (Pa.Super.2012) (citation omitted); see also Commonwealth v. K.S.F., 102 A.3d 480, 483 (Pa.Super.2014) (stating that a trial court's ruling on the admissibility of evidence of the sexual history of a sexual abuse complainant will be reversed only where there has been a clear abuse of discretion).

The RSL, codified at 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3104, provides as follows:

Evidence of specific instances of the alleged victim's past sexual conduct, opinion evidence of the alleged victim's past sexual conduct, and reputation evidence of the alleged victim's past sexual conduct shall not be admissible in prosecutions under this chapter[,] except evidence of the alleged victim's past sexual conduct with the defendant where consent of the alleged victim is at issue and such evidence is otherwise admissible pursuant to the rules of evidence.

Id. § 3104(a). The RSL was enacted to “prevent a trial from shifting its focus from the culpability of the accused toward the virtue and chastity of the victim ... [and] to exclude irrelevant and abusive inquiries regarding prior sexual conduct of sexual assault complainants.” K.S.F., 102 A.3d at 484 (citations omitted); see also id. at 483–84 (stating that “[e]vidence that tends to impeach a witness' credibility is not necessarily inadmissible because of the R[SL].”).

Schley first argues that “the R[SL], by its plain language, does not apply in a prosecution for endangering the welfare of children[,] and therefore could not operate to exclude evidence within its purview.” Brief for Appellant at 16 (citing In re M.K., 431 Pa.Super. 198, 636 A.2d 198, 203 (1994) (stating that “[t]he scope of the RSL's application is limited to criminal prosecutions relating to sexual offenses.”)). Schley points out that the RSL, which is contained in Chapter 31 of the Crimes Code,⁵ expressly provides that it applies only to “prosecutions under this chapter [.]”⁶ Brief for Appellant at 15 (quoting 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3104(a) ) (emphasis added). According to Schley, the plain meaning of “prosecutions under this chapter” is clear and unambiguous. See Reply Brief for Appellant at 3 (asserting that “there is no interpretation of the phrase ‘prosecutions under this chapter’ that would permit this Honorable Court to conclude that it means anything other than ‘prosecutions under Chapter 31.’ ”); see also id. (arguing that “if the legislature did not intend for the R[SL] to be limited to offenses arising out of Chapter 31, it would have said so in the statute. The salient fact remains that the legislature did not.”).

In response, the Commonwealth protests that to interpret the RSL in the manner that Schley proposes would yield an absurd result. Brief for the Commonwealth at 11 (citing 1 Pa.C.S.A. § 1922(1) (provision of the Statutory Construction Act (“SCA”), 1 Pa.C.S.A. § 1901 et seq., providing that, in ascertaining the intention of the legislature in interpreting a statute, it is presumed that the legislature did not intend a result that is absurd)); see also Brief for the Commonwealth at 12 (stating that “[t]he absurdity of the position championed by [Schley] is illustrated best by the example of an individual alleging that she had been the victim of an attempted rape. A defendant charged with attempted rape is prosecuted under 18 Pa.C.S.[A.] § 901, which, obviously, is not an offense under Chapter 31. Thus, if [Schley's] argument is accepted, the victim in such a case would not be protected by the R [SL,]” i.e., if attempted rape was the sole charge against the...