Commonwealth v. Shaw

1

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA v. WILLIAM SHAW Appellant COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA v. WILLIAM EDWARD SHAW Appellant COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA v. WILLIAM EDWARD SHAW Appellant COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA v. WILLIAM EDWARD SHAW Appellant

Nos. 518 WDA 2023, 519 WDA 2023, 520 WDA 2023, 521 WDA 2023

Superior Court of Pennsylvania

October 29, 2024

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered April 11, 2023 In the Court of Common Pleas of Washington County Criminal Division at No(s) CP-63-CR-0000939-2018, CP-63-CR-0002460-2018 CP-63-CR-0002284-2018

CP-63-CR-0002274-2018.

Benjamin D. Kohler, Esq.

BEFORE: DUBOW, J., KING, J., and BENDER, P.J.E.

MEMORANDUM

KING, J.:

Appellant, William Edward Shaw, appeals from the order entered in the Washington County Court of Common Pleas, which denied his first petition filed under the Post Conviction Relief Act ("PCRA").^[1] We affirm.

The relevant facts and procedural history of this appeal are as follows. On July 10, 2019, Appellant pled guilty at docket number 939-2018 to terroristic threats; at docket number 2460-2018 to possession with intent to deliver ("PWID") heroin; at docket number 2274-2018 to PWID heroin; and at docket number 2284-2018 to PWID heroin, PWID cocaine, and PWID marijuana. He entered his pleas open as to sentencing after rejecting the Commonwealth's global plea offer of an aggregate 101-202 months' imprisonment.

On July 18, 2019, Appellant filed a pre-sentence motion to withdraw his guilty plea at all dockets, arguing that he was pressured into pleading guilty because he was intimidated by the assistant district attorney. That same day, the trial court denied Appellant's motion. The court later granted Appellant's motion for reconsideration and scheduled a hearing on Appellant's motion to withdraw his plea. On August 19, 2019, the court conducted a hearing. At the hearing, the assistant district attorney testified that she spoke with Appellant, who had his attorney present, and explained the strength of the Commonwealth's case and that she believed that the Commonwealth would win at trial. The assistant district attorney testified that she also explained that if Appellant did not accept the Commonwealth's plea offer, the matter would just proceed to trial as scheduled. (N.T. Hearing, 8/19/19, at 34). Defense counsel agreed with the assistant district attorney's description of plea negotiations. (Id. at 37). At the close of the hearing, the trial court denied Appellant's motion to withdraw his guilty plea, finding that "Appellant entered into an open plea of guilty voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently, without being threatened [by] the Commonwealth." (Id. at 39; see also Trial Court Order, 8/21/19). On October 17, 2019, the trial court sentenced

Appellant to an aggregate term of 15 to 30 years' incarceration.

Appellant filed a timely direct appeal, arguing that the trial court erred when it denied his request to withdraw his guilty plea. This Court affirmed Appellant's judgment of sentence on December 18, 2022, holding that Appellant's claim that he was pressured into pleading guilty was belied by the record. Our Supreme Court denied allowance of appeal on September 14, 2021. See Commonwealth v. Shaw, 245 A.3d 1084 (Pa.Super. 2020) (unpublished memorandum), appeal denied, 263 A.3d 242 (2021).

Appellant filed the instant timely pro se PCRA petition on December 6, 2022. The PCRA court appointed counsel, who filed a Turner/Finley^[2] no merit letter on February 6, 2023. On March 20, 2023, the PCRA court issued notice of its intent to dismiss Appellant's petition without an evidentiary hearing per Pa.R.Crim.P. 907. On April 11, 2023, the court denied PCRA relief and granted counsel's petition to withdraw. The PCRA court appointed appellate counsel on May 4, 2023.^[3] Appellant timely filed separate notices of appeal at each underlying docket.^[4] Pursuant to the court's order, Appellant filed his concise statements of errors complained of on appeal on June 8, 2023.

Appellant raises the following issue on appeal:

Whether the [PCRA c]ourt committed an error of law or abuse of discretion in denying Appellant's PCRA without a hearing.

(Appellant's Brief at 7).^[5]

Our standard of review of the denial of a PCRA petition is limited to examining whether the record evidence supports the court's determination and whether the court's decision is free of legal error. Commonwealth v. Ford, 947 A.2d 1251 (Pa.Super. 2008), appeal denied, 598 Pa. 779, 959 A.2d 319 (2008). This Court grants great deference to the findings of the PCRA court if the record contains any support for those findings. Commonwealth v. Boyd, 923 A.2d 513 (Pa.Super. 2007), appeal denied, 593 Pa. 754, 932 A.2d 74 (2007). If the record supports a post-conviction court's credibility determination, it is binding on the appellate court. Commonwealth v. Dennis, 609 Pa. 442, 17 A.3d 297 (2011). Finally, a petitioner is not entitled to a PCRA hearing as a matter of right; the PCRA court can decline to hold a hearing if there is no genuine issue concerning any material fact, the petitioner is not entitled to relief, and no purpose would be served by any further proceedings. Commonwealth v. Wah, 42 A.3d 335 (Pa.Super. 2012).

In his first claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, Appellant argues that plea counsel was ineffective for failing to object to a statement made in court that Appellant was entering an open guilty plea. Appellant insists that he did not understand the ramifications of an open plea and was pressured into agreeing to the open plea. Appellant maintains that after he expressed uncertainty with the concept of an open plea at the plea hearing, the trial court should have provided him with an opportunity to consult with counsel. Appellant asserts that counsel neglected to protect his rights by failing to object to Appellant's entry of an open plea when it was clear that Appellant did not wish to do so. Appellant concludes plea counsel was ineffective on this ground, and this Court must grant relief. We disagree.

Pennsylvania law presumes counsel has rendered effective assistance. Commonwealth v. Williams, 597 Pa. 109, 950 A.2d 294 (2008). When asserting a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, the petitioner is required to demonstrate: (1) the underlying claim is of arguable merit; (2) counsel had no reasonable strategic basis for his action or inaction; and, (3) but for the errors and omissions of counsel, there is a reasonable probability that the outcome of the proceedings would have been different. Commonwealth v. Kimball, 555 Pa. 299, 724 A.2d 326 (1999). See also Commonwealth v. Pierce, 515 Pa. 153, 158-60, 527 A.2d 973, 975-76 (1987). The failure to satisfy any prong of the test for ineffectiveness will cause the claim to fail. Williams, supra.

"Allegations of ineffectiveness in connection with the entry of a guilty plea will serve as a basis for relief only if the ineffectiveness caused the defendant to enter an involuntary or unknowing plea." Commonwealth v. Moser, 921 A.2d 526, 531 (Pa.Super. 2007) (internal citation omitted).

"Where the defendant enters his plea on the advice of counsel, the voluntariness of the plea depends on whether counsel's advice was within the range of competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases." Id. A guilty plea will be deemed valid if the totality of the circumstances surrounding the plea shows that the defendant had a full understanding of the nature and consequences of his plea such that he knowingly and intelligently entered the plea of his own accord. Commonwealth v. Fluharty, 632 A.2d 312, 314 (Pa.Super. 1993). Further, a defendant who decides to plead guilty is bound by the statements he makes while under oath and may not later assert grounds for withdrawing his plea that contradict statements he made during the plea colloquy. Commonwealth v. Pollard, 832 A.2d 517, 523 (Pa.Super. 2003).

Instantly, at the plea hearing, Appellant stated that he was "just really confused with everything right now." (N.T. Plea Hearing, 7/10/19, at 6). The court asked him to elaborate, and Appellant explained that he "wanted to do this non-jury trial…and was told that…if [he did not] take a plea on everything [under the Commonwealth's global plea offer] that [he would] get the maximum on everything." (Id.) Thereafter, the court explained that

Appellant could enter an open plea, at which point it would not matter what the plea offer was because the court would then determine an appropriate sentence based in part on a presentence investigation. (Id. at 7). In response to Appellant's comment about wanting to proceed to a non-jury trial at one of the dockets, the court told Appellant that he could enter an open plea to three cases today, and then the court would defer sentencing on the fourth case so that, if Appellant were convicted in the fourth case, the court could impose a sentence on all cases together. (Id. at 8). After the explanation, Appellant stated "I understand. Okay. I'll do an open plea on all of them … even the [non-jury] trial, on all four charges I'll do the open plea to save time." (Id. at 9). After confirming that was Appellant's intention, the court took a break so that defense counsel could update the colloquy and confer with Appellant about his choice.

The PCRA court addressed Appellant's first claim of ineffectiveness as follows:

From the outset, [Appellant's] claim that [plea counsel's] failure to object to the statement made at the plea hearing that [Appellant] was going to proceed via an open plea, rather than a negotiated plea, fails, as [Appellant] is unable to satisfy the first prong of the Pierce test. Principally, [Appellant's] first claim lacks

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