Commonwealth v. Sheffer

240 A.3d 968 (Table)

COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania

v.Matthew John SHEFFER, Appellant

No. 1501 MDA 2019

Superior Court of Pennsylvania.

Filed September 25, 2020

MEMORANDUM BY PANELLA, P.J.:

The Court of Common Pleas of Centre County sentenced Appellant Matthew John Sheffer to an aggregate term of 20 to 40 years’ imprisonment after a jury convicted him of sexually abusing his former girlfriend's 11-year-old daughter, D.N. In this appeal, Sheffer takes issue with the testimony offered by several witnesses at his trial. Those witnesses include D.N.’s grandparents, D.N.’s school guidance counselor, and Dr. Veronique Valliere, the Commonwealth's expert on sexual violence. Sheffer also alleges the verdict was against the weight of the evidence. After careful review, we conclude that Sheffer's arguments do not offer him any basis for relief and we therefore affirm his judgment of sentence.

In February 2013, after meeting A.S., D.N.’s mother, online, Sheffer moved to Maine to live with A.S. and D.N. D.N. was A.S.’s daughter from a previous relationship with B.N., who also lived in Maine. Approximately one year after Sheffer moved to Maine, around February 2014, he, A.S. and D.N. moved to Pennsylvania. Sheffer and A.S.’s relationship ended around March 2016, and Sheffer moved out of their house about one month later.

In June 2016, D.N. went to visit her father, B.N., in Maine. During that visit, D.N. confided to her half-brother, M.F., that Sheffer had sexually abused her. M.F. told their grandparents about the abuse who, in turn, told B.N.’s fiance´ about the abuse. B.N.’s fiance´ told B.N. B.N. called D.N., who had returned to Pennsylvania, and persuaded her to tell A.S. A.S. reported the abuse, and Sheffer was arrested and charged with, inter alia , ten counts of rape of a child. Sheffer's first two trials ended in a mistrial.

The Commonwealth and Sheffer both filed pre-trial motions in limine . The Commonwealth filed a motion to allow the testimony of D.N.'s guidance counselor, R.M., and the trial court ultimately allowed this testimony. Meanwhile, Sheffer filed a motion to preclude the testimony of Dr. Valliere, which the trial court ultimately denied.

Sheffer's trial began on February 13, 2019, and the Commonwealth's first witness at the trial was D.N. D.N. testified that when she first moved to Pennsylvania she attended an after-school care program. However, she stopped attending that program sometime around December 2015, when she was 11 years old. Once she stopped going to the after-school program, D.N. was often alone with Sheffer in the afternoon while A.S. was at work. D.N. testified that the two would talk and play video games.

At some point, D.N. testified, Sheffer began asking her to try on her bathing suits and her mother's clothing for him. One day, Sheffer sat down next to D.N. on her bed and touched her vagina. D.N. then described various forms of sexual abuse that Sheffer inflicted on her, including Sheffer penetrating her vagina with his penis. The abuse took place over the course of approximately four months, from some time after D.N. stopped going to the after-school care program to when Sheffer left the house in April 2016.

A.S. also testified at the trial. She testified that she met Sheffer after leaving a physically abusive relationship with D.N.’s father, B.N., and that she had sought and obtained full custody of D.N. so that she and D.N. could move to Pennsylvania with Sheffer. She stated that after she moved to Pennsylvania, she worked as an insurance auditor from nine to five on weekdays. Meanwhile, A.S. testified, Sheffer worked part-time as a server at a country club. A.S. recounted how, in late July 2016, D.N. disclosed to her that Sheffer had sexually abused her and that A.S. reported that abuse to the authorities the next day. A.S. told the jury that she and D.N. moved back to Maine in August 2016.

The Commonwealth also called D.N.'s grandparents, B.N., M.F., as well as R.M., D.N.’s guidance counselor, to the stand. Two experts also testified for the Commonwealth. Pediatrician Dr. Kristie Kaufman testified about the results of the physical exam she performed on D.N. after A.S. reported the abuse. Dr. Valliere testified generally about the dynamics of sexual abuse, victim responses to sexual abuse and the impact of sexual abuse on victims.

The defense called M.L., Sheffer's brother-in-law, to testify. M.L. testified that he and Sheffer were trying to start a business together and he was therefore often in the garage at Sheffer's house during the period of time D.N. testified the abuse occurred. According to M.L., he never heard or saw anything inappropriate between Sheffer and D.N. Sheffer testified on his own behalf, denying that he had sexually assaulted D.N.

Following the three-day trial, the jury convicted Sheffer on all counts, which included ten counts of rape of a child, one count of involuntary deviate sexual intercourse, three counts of aggravated indecent assault of a child and fourteen counts of indecent assault of a child. The court sentenced Sheffer to an aggregate term of 20 to 40 years’ imprisonment.

Sheffer filed a post-sentence motion, which the trial court denied. Sheffer filed a notice of appeal¹ and complied with the trial court's directive to file a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement of errors complained of on appeal. The court issued a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) opinion responding to Sheffer's statement, and we now consider the issues Sheffer raises in his appeal to this Court.

At their core, Sheffer's first three claims challenge the trial court's rulings on the admissibility of evidence at his trial. A trial court's decision to admit or exclude evidence will only be reversed on appeal if the trial court abused its discretion in making that decision. See Commonwealth v. Yockey , 158 A.3d 1246, 1254 (Pa. Super. 2017). An abuse of discretion is not merely an error of judgment. See id . Rather, an abuse of discretion only occurs when the trial court overrides or misapplies the law, or exercises judgment that is manifestly unreasonable or the result of partiality, prejudice, ill-will or bias. See id .

Evidence is only admissible if it is relevant, see Pa.R.E. 402, meaning that it logically tends to establish a material fact or tends to support a reasonable inference regarding a material fact. See Commonwealth v. Reid , 811 A.2d 530, 550 (Pa. 2002). However, a trial court may exclude evidence even if it is relevant when it determines, in its discretion, that the probative value of the evidence is outweighed by the danger that the evidence may, inter alia , cause unfair prejudice, confuse the issues, mislead the jury, or needlessly present cumulative evidence. See Pa.R.E. 403 (" Rule 403").

Grandparents’ Testimony

Sheffer first alleges that the trial court abused its discretion by allowing D.N.'s grandparents to testify because he believes their testimony amounted to double hearsay. He further asserts that even if the testimony did not constitute hearsay, the trial court should have precluded it pursuant to Rule 403 for multiple reasons. None of these claims have merit.

On the second day of Sheffer's trial, the Commonwealth made an oral motion requesting that the trial court allow D.N.’s grandparents to testify. The grandparents would testify that M.F. told them about D.N.’s disclosure that Sheffer had abused her. In support of its motion, the Commonwealth explained that it wanted to present the grandparents’ testimony to rebut the defense's theory that B.N. had prompted D.N. to falsely accuse Sheffer of the sexual abuse. The Commonwealth wanted to show that the grandparents were part of the chain of D.N.’s disclosure, and that the chain did not originate with B.N. The court granted the motion and in doing so, rejected Sheffer's argument that this testimony was inadmissible hearsay. However, the court specifically limited the grandparents’ testimony to the fact that "they were in the chain and passed [D.N.’s disclosure of abuse] on." N.T. Trial, 2/14/19, at 9.

Sheffer first claims that the trial court abused its discretion by allowing this testimony because it was double hearsay. However, as the trial court found, the grandparents’ testimony was not hearsay at all as it was not offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted, i.e . that Sheffer, in fact, abused D.N. See Pa.R.E. 801(c) (defining hearsay as a statement, other than the one made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted).

Instead, the testimony was offered to demonstrate that the grandparents were part of the chain of disclosure, i.e . D.N. told M.F. who told the grandparents, and to show what the grandparents did with that information, i.e . the grandparents told B.N.’s fiance´ who then told B.N. As such, we see no abuse of discretion in the trial court's conclusion that the grandparents’ testimony did not constitute hearsay. See Commonwealth v. Wade , 226 A.3d 1023, 1033 (Pa. Super. 2020) (stating that a statement introduced to explain a witness's course of conduct is not hearsay); Commonwealth v. Busanet , 54 A.3d 35, 68 (Pa. 2012) (holding that a witness's testimony that another individual told him and the defendant that the victim had robbed the individual was not hearsay when it was not offered to show that the robbery occurred but to show only that the statement had been made to the defendant and motivated the defendant to act).²

Sheffer further alleges that, even if the testimony was not hearsay, it should not have been admitted pursuant to Rule 403 because it was cumulative, distracted the jury, and was unduly prejudicial. In the first instance, it is questionable whether any of these claims were properly preserved as Sheffer only asserted in his 1925(b) statement that the grandparents’ testimony, if not hearsay, was irrelevant and improperly bolstered the credibility of the witnesses. See Commonwealth v. Lord , 719 A.2d 306, 309 (Pa. 1998) (holding...