Commonwealth v. Smith

298 A.3d 1140

COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania

v.Vincent SMITH, Appellant

No. 1256 WDA 2021

Superior Court of Pennsylvania.

Argued May 3, 2023

Filed: June 30, 2023

Corrie A. Woods, Moon Township, for appellant.

Francesco L. Nepa, Assistant District Attorney, Pittsburgh, for Commonwealth, appellee.

BEFORE: PANELLA, P.J., BENDER, P.J.E., LAZARUS, J., OLSON, J., STABILE, J., DUBOW, J., NICHOLS, J., McLAUGHLIN, J., and McCAFFERY, J.

OPINION BY McCAFFERY, J.:

Vincent Smith (Appellant) appeals from the judgment of sentence entered in the Allegheny County Court of Common Pleas, following his open guilty pleas to two counts of voluntary manslaughter and four counts of arson endangering persons.¹ The four counts of arson endangering persons relate to the presence of four police officers when Appellant started the fire. As an issue of first impression, Appellant argues the trial court's imposition of multiple sentences for these counts was illegal, as the arson endangering persons statute — Subsection 3301(a)(1)(i) of the Crimes Code — provides for a single sentence regardless of the number of victims. We hold: (1) the unit of prosecution for this offense is not merely the starting of a fire, but the intentional starting of a fire that recklessly places another in danger of death or bodily injury; (2) Subsection 3301(a)(1)(i) was written with regard to an individual person being placed in danger of death or serious bodily injury;² and (3) a defendant may be convicted of and sentenced on separate counts when there is one arson but more than one victim. We thus affirm.

I. Facts & Procedural History

At the plea hearing, Appellant generally agreed with the facts set forth in the affidavit of probable cause,³ which stated the following: On February 26, 2018, four police officers went to the rowhome at 103 Penfield Place, Pittsburgh, attempting to locate a missing person, John Van Dyke. See Affidavit of Probable Cause, 2/28/18, at 3. The officers forcibly entered the home and repeatedly announced their presence. Id. Once inside they heard someone on the second floor say, "Steve's not here[,]" and the officers again announced their presence and purpose. Id. The officers then

observed [Appellant] striking matches and tossing them on the floor. The matches started an instant fire[, which] began traveling down the stairs toward the officers. The officers immediately exited the residence and took positions ... outside[. Appellant] was eventually rescued by firemen and ... treated for smoke inhalation. ...

Trial Ct. Op., 4/6/22, at 2.

The bodies of John Van Dyke and Steven Pariser were recovered from the residence. Both "had obvious trauma to the back of their heads and their deaths were ruled as homicides." Trial Ct. Op. at 2. Appellant told detectives:

[H]e was attacked by the men and he fought back. He ... admitted that he [threw] them down a flight of steps[.] He covered them with blankets and bags. He further told the detectives that he wanted to kill himself so he took some pills and spread lighter fluid all over the residence.^{[4 ]}

Id.

Appellant was charged with homicide, various counts of arson, and related offenses. On April 5, 2021, he entered open guilty pleas, all graded as felonies of the first degree, to: (1) two counts of voluntary manslaughter, representing the two victims killed; and (2) four counts of arson endangering persons, for the four police officers present when Appellant started the fire.

On June 30, 2021, the trial court imposed the following sentences, all to run consecutively: (1) for the two voluntary manslaughter counts, two terms of five to 10 years’ imprisonment; and (2) for the four arson endangering persons count, four terms of four to eight years. Therefore, the aggregate sentence was 26 to 52 years’ imprisonment.⁵

Appellant filed a timely counseled post-sentence motion, challenging the discretionary aspects of his sentence and the voluntariness of his guilty plea. The trial court conducted a hearing on August 23, 2021. Based on Appellant's arguments, the court considered an additional question, whether the commission of arson endangering persons was "a one-act event," regardless of the number of potential victims — in other words, whether an individual could be sentenced on multiple counts of this offense, based on a single act of arson that placed more than one person at risk. See N.T., 8/23/21, at 26-27. The court directed the parties to file supplemental briefs addressing this issue, and they complied.

The trial court then conducted a second post-sentence hearing on September 20, 2021. Both parties addressed: (1) the recent decision in Commonwealth v. Satterfield , ––– Pa. ––––, 255 A.3d 438 (2021) (discussed infra ), which held the "unit of prosecution" of leaving the scene of an accident involving death or personal injury⁶ was the defendant's single act of leaving, regardless of the number of victims, and thus only one conviction of this offense and one sentence were proper; and (2) Commonwealth v. Frisbie , 506 Pa. 461, 485 A.2d 1098 (1984) (discussed infra ), which permitted separate sentences for recklessly endangering another person⁷ (REAP), where there was one act by the defendant that endangered multiple victims. N.T. Post[-] sentencing Mot., 9/20/21, at 4-10, 12-17. The trial court ruled it was proper to impose separate sentences on Appellant's arson endangering persons convictions, and thus denied his request for relief. Id. at 24.

Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal and complied with the trial court's order to file a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement of errors complained of on appeal.

II. Question Presented, Standards of Review & Arson Endangering Persons Statute

Appellant presents the following issue for our review:

Did the trial court err in imposing multiple sentences for [Appellant's] convictions for arson pertaining to multiple endangered persons where the statute providing for the offense, properly construed according to the rules of statutory interpretation, provide for a single sentence regardless of the number of victims?

Appellant's Brief at 8.

We note Appellant's claim implicates the legality of his sentence, which presents a pure question of law; thus our scope of review is plenary, and our standard of review, de novo . See Satterfield , 255 A.3d at 442 (citation omitted). Resolution of Appellant's issue also involves interpretation of a statute, namely 18 Pa.C.S. § 3301(a)(1)(i), which likewise "presents a pure question of law; again, our scope of review is plenary, and our standard of review, de novo ." See id.

At this juncture, we set forth the pertinent statutory definition of arson endangering persons:

§ 3301. Arson and related offenses.

(a) Arson endangering persons .

(1) A person commits a felony of the first degree if he intentionally starts a fire ... and if:

(i) he thereby recklessly places another person in danger of death or bodily injury, including but not limited to a firefighter, police officer or other person actively engaged in fighting the fire ....

18 Pa.C.S. § 3301(a)(1)(i) (some emphasis added).

III. Parties’ Arguments

Appellant argues the trial court erred in imposing multiple sentences for his arson endangering persons convictions, as the unit of prosecution is one arson, and not the endangerment to others.⁸ In support, he first contends the arson endangering persons statute is ambiguous. Appellant's Brief at 16-17. He proposes two possible interpretations of the statute: (1) first, that the statute primarily prosecutes arson, not endangerment of persons; and (2) on the other hand, that it prosecutes "arsons as ersatz crimes against persons." Id.

In support of his contention that the former interpretation should control, Appellant presents the following arguments.⁹ First, where there are "two reasonable interpretations of a statute's unit of prosecution[, the courts] should adopt the more lenient one." Appellant's Brief at 19, citing Commonwealth v. Davidson , 595 Pa. 1, 938 A.2d 198, 221 (2007) ("[The United States] Supreme Court has explained that ‘[w]hen Congress leaves to the Judiciary the task of imputing to Congress an undeclared will, the ambiguity should be resolved in favor of lenity.’ ") (citation omitted). Second, the titles of both Section 3301 ("Arson and related offenses") and Subsection 3301(a) ("Arson endangering persons") suggest their primary focus, or key element, is arson — and not endangerment. Appellant's Brief at 17. Meanwhile, "[c]rimes primarily focused on injury or danger to persons are defined elsewhere" in the Crimes Code. Id. at 18, citing " 18 Pa.C.S. §§ 2501 et seq ." Finally, although the arson endangering persons statute contains an element of endangerment to "another" person, in the singular, "our legislature has provided that singular words ... subsume their plural coordinate terms[.]" Appellant's Brief at 16-17, citing 1 Pa.C.S. § 1902 ("The singular shall include the plural, and the plural, the singular.").

Furthermore, Appellant asserts the trial court failed to conduct any "textual or other statutory analysis[,] but instead rejected [his] claim ... on the ground" that the arson endangering persons statute is unlike the statute addressed in Satterfield — leaving the scene of an accident involving death or personal injury. Appellant's Brief at 19. While Appellant agrees the Satterfield statute is distinguishable, he maintains that "it does not follow that Section 3301 ’s unit of prosecution is [an] endangerment." Id. at 20. Appellant contends that in Satterfield , the Pennsylvania Supreme Court concluded that a vehicle "accident was [the] key element, and [it was] immaterial that additional elements gave rise to [higher] penalties." Id.

Finally, Appellant challenges the trial court's reasoning, that it would be absurd for a person to be charged with only one arson causing murder, under 18 Pa.C.S. § 3301(a)(2),¹⁰ if more than one person died from an act of arson. Appellant's Brief at 21, citing Trial Ct. Op. at 7. Appellant reasons that...