Commonwealth v. Smith

177 A.3d 915

COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania

v.Brittany Nora SMITH, Appellant

No. 877 WDA 2017

Superior Court of Pennsylvania.

Submitted October 20, 2017

Filed December 28, 2017

Jack W. Cline, Mercer, for appellant.

Shane T. Crevar, Assistant District Attorney, Mercer, for Commonwealth, appellee.

BEFORE: BOWES, J., RANSOM, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.^*

OPINION BY STEVENS, P.J.E.:

Appellant Brittany Nora Smith appeals from the judgment of sentence entered by the Court of Common Pleas of Mercer County after the trial court convicted Appellant of Driving Under the Influence of a Controlled Substance (DUI) and related vehicle code violations. Appellant argues that the trial court erred in refusing to suppress the evidence obtained from the seizure of her vehicle and the warrantless testing of her blood. We affirm.

The trial court aptly summarized the factual background of this case as follows:

[O]n August 6, 2016, at approximately 1:28 a.m., Trooper Sherry L. Hogue was traveling east on Route 62 in Mercer County. She was in a marked cruiser in full uniform. Trooper Hogue observed a white truck pull onto Route 62 traveling in a westwardly direction. When the truck pulled out onto Route 62 (which is a lined, two-way road), it traveled in the center of the roadway for a sufficient period of time forcing Trooper Hogue to apply her brakes as to avoid a collision. The truck returned to the westbound lane and Trooper Hogue turned her vehicle around and followed the truck. The truck turned right onto Springfield Church Road and then left into what appeared to be a business driveway. The trooper pulled behind the truck, activated her lights, and exited the vehicle.

The Trooper approached the driver, whom the Trooper identified as [Appellant], and asked [Appellant] to exit her vehicle. [Appellant] screamed at the Trooper and the Trooper detected an odor of alcohol coming from [Appellant] and observed [Appellant's] blood shot eyes. Trooper Hogue also observed a drink with a straw in the center console of [Appellant's] vehicle. Upon request, [Appellant] handed the drink to the Trooper who smelled the drink and detected the smell of alcoholic beverages. [Appellant] was uncooperative with the Trooper's instructions relative to field sobriety tests.

[Appellant] was then placed under arrest and transported to the Grove City Medical Center. During the trip to the Grove City Medical Center, [Appellant] told the Trooper that the Trooper should arrest criminals and not "drunks." The Trooper asked [Appellant] what if [Appellant] hit a car with a family in it and [Appellant] replied "we all have to die sometime."

Upon arrival at the Grove City Medical Center, Trooper Hogue read the new DL–26 form which did not contain any information regarding enhanced criminal penalties. [Appellant] signed the form because she did not want a license suspension. Blood was drawn and it was subsequently determined that [Appellant's] blood alcohol content was .274.

Trial Court Opinion (T.C.O.), 7/17/17, at 3–4.

Appellant was charged with DUI and several motor vehicle code violations.¹ On January 3, 2017, Appellant filed a suppression motion, alleging she was subjected to an unlawful stop of her vehicle and illegal warrantless blood testing. After an evidentiary hearing, the trial court denied Appellant's suppression motion. On May 19, 2017, the trial court held a stipulated bench trial and convicted Appellant of the aforementioned offenses. The trial court imposed a sentence of ninety days to one year of imprisonment to be followed by four years' probation for the DUI conviction under Section 3802(c). No further penalty was imposed on the remaining charges. Appellant filed a timely appeal and complied with the trial court's direction to file a concise statement of errors complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b).

Appellant raises the following issues for our review:

1. The suppression court erred in refusing to declare the seizure of [Appellant] and her vehicle unlawful, as there was no probable cause for the traffic stop, as set more fully in [Appellant's] Omnibus Pre–Trial Motion, which is attached hereto and made a part hereof.

2. The suppression court erred in refusing to suppress evidence of the warrantless blood search conducted by the Pennsylvania State Police, as set forth in [Appellant's] Omnibus Pre–Trial Motion, which is attached hereto and made a part hereof.

1925(b) statement, 6/20/17, at 1 (reordered for ease of review).

In reviewing a challenge to the lower court's decision to deny a suppression motion, our standard of review is as follows:

Our standard of review in addressing a challenge to a trial court's denial of a suppression motion is limited to determining whether the factual findings are supported by the record and whether the legal conclusions drawn from those facts are correct. Commonwealth v. Woodard , 634 Pa. 162, 129 A.3d 480, 498 (2015). We are bound by the suppression court's factual findings so long as they are supported by the record; our standard of review on questions of law is de novo. Commonwealth v. Galvin , 603 Pa. 625, 985 A.2d 783, 795 (2009). Where, as here, the defendant is appealing the ruling of the suppression court, we may consider only the evidence of the Commonwealth and so much of the evidence for the defense as remains uncontradicted. Commonwealth v. Poplawski , 634 Pa. 517, 130 A.3d 697, 711 (2015). Our scope of review of suppression rulings includes only the suppression hearing record and excludes evidence elicited at trial. In the Interest of L.J. , 622 Pa. 126, 79 A.3d 1073, 1085 (2013).

Commonwealth v. Singleton , 169 A.3d 79, 82 (Pa.Super. 2017) (quoting Commonwealth v. Yandamuri , ––– Pa. ––––, 159 A.3d 503, 516 (2017) ).

First, we review Appellant's claim that she was subjected to an unlawful traffic stop that was not justified by the requisite suspicion. Our Legislature has specifically defined in statute the requisite cause for a traffic stop at 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 6308(b), which provides:

( b) Authority of police officer.— Whenever a police officer is engaged in a systematic program of checking vehicles or drivers or has reasonable suspicion that a violation of this title is occurring or has occurred, he may stop a vehicle, upon request or signal, for the purpose of checking the vehicle's registration, proof of financial responsibility, vehicle identification number or engine number or the driver's license, or to secure such other information as the officer may reasonably believe to be necessary to enforce the provisions of this title.

75 Pa.C.S.A. § 6308(b).

Further, this Court has clarified:

"Traffic stops based on a reasonable suspicion: either of criminal activity or a violation of the Motor Vehicle Code under the authority of Section 6308(b) must serve a stated investigatory purpose." Commonwealth v. Feczko , 10 A.3d 1285, 1291 (Pa.Super. 2010) (en banc) (citation omitted). For a stop based on the observed violation of the vehicle code or otherwise non-investigable offense, an officer must have probable cause to make a constitutional vehicle stop. Feczko , 10 A.3d at 1291 ("Mere reasonable suspicion will not justify a vehicle stop when the driver's detention cannot serve an investigatory purpose relevant to the suspected violation").

Commonwealth v. Bush , 166 A.3d 1278, 1282 (Pa.Super. 2017).

This Court has specifically discussed this distinction in the context of a suspected DUI violation:

[W]hen considering whether reasonable suspicion or probable cause is required constitutionally to make a vehicle stop, the nature of the violation has to be considered. If it is not necessary to stop the vehicle to establish that a violation of the Vehicle Code has occurred, an officer must possess probable cause to stop the vehicle. Where a violation is suspected, but a stop is necessary to further investigate whether a violation has occurred, an officer need only possess reasonable suspicion to make the stop. Illustrative of these two standards are stops for speeding and DUI. If a vehicle is stopped for speeding, the officer must possess probable cause to stop the vehicle. This is so because when a vehicle is stopped, nothing more can be determined as to the speed of the vehicle when it was observed while traveling upon a highway. On the other hand, if an officer possesses sufficient knowledge based upon behavior suggestive of DUI, the officer may stop the vehicle upon reasonable suspicion of a Vehicle Code violation, since a stop would provide the officer the needed opportunity to investigate further if the driver was operating under the influence of alcohol or a controlled substance.

Commonwealth v. Salter , 121 A.3d 987, 993 (Pa.Super. 2015). (emphasis added). Further, in order to further investigate a suspected DUI violation, an officer must conduct an investigatory stop, which "almost invariably leads to the most incriminating type of evidence, i.e., strong odor of alcohol, slurred speech, and blood shot eyes." Commonwealth v. Feczko , 10 A.3d 1285, 1289 (Pa.Super. 2010) (quoting Commonwealth v. Sands , 887 A.2d 261 (Pa.Super. 2005) ). In Sands , this Court concluded that the police officer was justified in stopping the appellant's vehicle based on his reasonable suspicion that appellant was drunk driving as the officer witnessed the appellant's vehicle drift across the fog line three times in the early morning hours.

In this case, the trial court found that Appellant made a "wide and dangerous turn" onto Route 62 and traveled a significant distance in the center of a lined, two-way road, forcing Trooper Hogue, who was approaching from the opposite direction, to apply her brakes to avoid a collision.

T.C.O. at 5. The trial court found that Trooper Hogue credibly testified that she stopped Appellant's vehicle as she believed that Appellant was intoxicated based on her driving at that time of the early morning. Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court did not err in finding that Trooper Hogue had reasonable...