Commonwealth v. Strowhouer

1

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA v. DAVID STROWHOUER Appellant

No. 2984 EDA 2022

No. J-S13040-23

Superior Court of Pennsylvania

May 18, 2023

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

Appeal from the Order Entered November 10, 2022 In the Court of Common Pleas of Delaware County Criminal Division at No(s) CP-23-CR-0002024-2019

BEFORE: NICHOLS, J., MURRAY, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E ^[*]

MEMORANDUM

STEVENS, P.J.E.

Appellant David Strowhouer appeals from the order of the Court of Common Pleas of Delaware County denying his petition pursuant to the Post-Conviction Relief Act (PCRA).^[1] Appellant contends he was improperly denied an evidentiary hearing on his petition which raises several claims of the ineffectiveness of his plea counsel. We affirm.

This petition stems from Appellant's decision to enter a guilty plea on August 15, 2019 to third-degree murder, homicide by vehicle while driving under the influence ("DUI"), aggravated assault by vehicle while DUI, aggravated assault by vehicle, accidents involving death or injury while not licensed, DUI, and driving while suspended for a DUI-related offense.^[2] Appellant was charged with the aforementioned offenses in connection with a motor vehicle accident that culminated in the death of Deana Eckman and severely injured her husband, Christian Eckman. The trial court summarized the tragic factual background of this case as follows:

On Saturday, February 16, 2019, [Appellant] attended the funeral of his mother. He had been drinking throughout the day and became highly intoxicated. After the funeral luncheon, [Appellant] continued drinking at his brother's residence in Willistown Township, Chester County. At approximately 9 p.m., [Appellant] decided he wanted to go to Chester, Delaware County to buy cocaine. Despite his brother and sister-in-law's impassioned attempt to stop him, [Appellant] abruptly left their residence in a black Dodge Ram pickup truck almost striking his brother. As [Appellant] approached the Rt. 452 bridge over the CSI railroad tracks in Upper Chichester Township, he illegally passed a vehicle at a high rate of speed. [Appellant] entered into the oncoming lane of traffic. While in the oncoming lane of traffic, [Appellant] crashed head on into the victims' vehicle as they proceeded lawfully in the correct lane of travel. The horrific impact killed the victim female passenger and caused serious bodily injury to her husband, the driver.

At the time of the crash, [Appellant] had alcohol and three controlled substances in his system. [Appellant] had a blood alcohol content of 0.199 percent and Cocaine, Valium, and Marijuana were all detected in his blood. [Appellant is] a repeat DUI offender. [Appellant] has five previous DUI convictions between 2010 and 2017. At the time [Appellant] committed the current offenses, he was on State parole on three of his DUI cases.

Trial Court Opinion (T.C.O.), 5/18/20, at 1-2.

On November 14, 2019, the trial court imposed an aggregate sentence of 25½ to 51 years' imprisonment, which included numerous individual sentences, including a term of 5-10 years' imprisonment for Aggravated Assault by Vehicle While DUI.

On direct appeal, this Court affirmed Appellant's convictions but vacated the sentence in part as the sentence for Aggravated Assault by Vehicle While DUI as the trial court did not set forth the permissible guideline ranges for this offense or acknowledge that it had sentenced Appellant beyond the aggravated range. As such, this Court vacated the entire sentence and remanded for resentencing. See Commonwealth v. Strowhouer, 98 EDA 2020 (Pa.Super. April 5, 2021) (unpublished memorandum).

Upon remand, on November 22, 2021, the trial court imposed the same sentence on all counts with the exception of the Aggravated Assault by Vehicle While DUI, which it reduced to 3½ to 10 years' imprisonment. Therefore, Appellant received an aggregate sentence of 24 to 51 years' imprisonment. Appellant did not appeal after he was resentenced.

On June 22, 2022, Appellant filed the instant PCRA petition raising several claims of ineffectiveness of his plea counsel, including that counsel was ineffective in advising him to plead guilty to third-degree murder and in failing to request that the trial court recuse itself as it had presided over Appellant's 2017 negotiated guilty plea to DUI.

On September 22, 2022, the PCRA court issued notice of its intent to dismiss the petition without an evidentiary hearing pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P. 907. On November 10, 2022, the PCRA court dismissed Appellant's petition. Appellant filed a timely appeal and complied with the PCRA court's direction to file a concise statement of errors complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b).

Appellant raises the following issues for our review on appeal:

1. Whether the lower court erred in denying [Appellant's PCRA petition] without affording him an evidentiary hearing since [Appellant's] conviction and sentence resulted from the ineffective assistance of counsel which, in the circumstances of the particular case, so undermined the truth-determining process that no reliable adjudication of guilt of innocence could have taken place?

2. Whether the lower court erred in denying [Appellant's PCRA petition] without affording him an evidentiary hearing since, under the totality of the circumstances, there are genuine issues concerning material facts and legitimate purposes would be served by such hearing?

3. Whether the lower court erred in denying [Appellant's PCRA petition] without affording him an evidentiary hearing since [Appellant's] petition makes out a prima facie case warranting such hearing where under the totality of the circumstances, trial counsel provided ineffective assistance that lacked reasonable basis which prejudiced [Appellant]?

Appellant's Brief, at 6.

Our standard of review is as follows:

Our review of a PCRA court's decision is limited to examining whether the PCRA court's findings of fact are supported by the record, and whether its conclusions of law are free from legal error. We view the findings of the PCRA court and the evidence of record in a light most favorable to the prevailing party. With respect to the PCRA court's decision to deny a request for an evidentiary hearing, or to hold a limited evidentiary hearing, such a decision is within the discretion of the PCRA court and will not be overturned absent an abuse of discretion.

Commonwealth v. Mason, 634 Pa. 359, 130 A.3d 601, 617 (2015) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).

Appellant raises several claims of the ineffective assistance of his plea counsel. We are guided by the following principles:

It is well-established that counsel is presumed to have provided effective representation unless the PCRA petitioner pleads and proves all of the following: (1) the underlying legal claim is of arguable merit; (2) counsel's action or inaction lacked any objectively reasonable basis designed to effectuate his client's interest; and (3) prejudice, to the effect that there was a reasonable probability of a different outcome if not for counsel's error. See Commonwealth v. Pierce, 515 Pa. 153, 527 A.2d 973, 975-76 (1987); Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). The PCRA court may deny an ineffectiveness claim if "the petitioner's evidence fails to meet a single one of these prongs." Commonwealth v. Basemore, 560 Pa. 258, 744 A.2d 717, 738 n.23 (2000).... Because courts must presume that counsel was effective, it is the petitioner's burden to prove otherwise. See Pierce, supra; Commonwealth v. Holloway, 559 Pa. 258, 739 A.2d 1039, 1044 (1999).

[Commonwealth v. Natividad, 595 Pa. 188, 207-208, 938 A.2d 310, 321 (2007);] see also Commonwealth v. Hall, 582 Pa. 526, 537, 872 A.2d 1177, 1184 (2005) (stating an appellant's failure to satisfy any prong of the Pierce ineffectiveness test results in a failure to establish the arguable merit prong of the claim of ineffectiveness).

Commonwealth v. Johnson, 179 A.3d 1105, 1114 (Pa.Super. 2018).

First, Appellant argues that his trial counsel was ineffective in advising him to plead guilty to third-degree murder. As Appellant alleges that there was insufficient evidence to show he acted with malice in causing the victim's death, he asserts that he would have been acquitted of third-degree murder had he chosen to go to trial.

We recognize that:

"[a] criminal defendant's right to effective counsel extends to the plea process, as well as during trial." [Commonwealth v.] Wah, 42 A.3d [335,] 338 [(Pa.Super. 2012]) (citations omitted). Under the PCRA, "[a]llegations of ineffectiveness in connection with the entry of a guilty plea will serve as a basis for relief only if the ineffectiveness caused [the petitioner] to enter an involuntary or unknowing plea." [Commonwealth v.] Fears, 86 A.3d [795,] 806-07 [(Pa. 2014)] (citation omitted). "Where the defendant enters his plea on the advice of counsel, the voluntariness of the plea depends on whether counsel's advice was within the range of competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases." Wah, 42 A.3d at 338-399 (citations omitted).

"[T]o establish prejudice, the defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial." Commonwealth v. Barndt, 74 A.3d 185, 192 (Pa. Super. 2013) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). This is not a stringent requirement. Id. The reasonable probability test refers to "a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome." Id. (citations omitted).

Commonwealth v. Brown, 235 A.3d 387, 391 (Pa.Super. 2020) (citing Commonwealth v. Velazquez, 216 A.3d 1146, 1149-50 (Pa.Super. ...