Commonwealth v. Taylor

309 A.3d 754

COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Appellant

v.Nazeer TAYLOR, Appellee

No. 40 MAP 2022

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.

Argued: November 30, 2022

Decided: January 29, 2024

Appeal from the Order of the Superior Court at No. 856 EDA 2017 dated July 29, 2021, reconsideration denied October 13, 2021, reversing the Judgment of Sentence of the Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas, Criminal Division, at No. CP-46-CR-0003166-2014 dated January 31, 2017 and remanding, William R. Carpenter, Judge.

Hugh J. Burns Jr., Esq., Michelle Ann Henry, Esq., Pennsylvania Office of Attorney General, for Amicus Curiae Office of Attorney General

James Patrick Davy, Esq., Marsha Levick, Esq., Riya Saha Shah, Esq., Juvenile Law Center, Emily Robb, Esq., Youth Sentencing & Reentry Project, for Amicus Curiae Juvenile Law Center, Youth Sentencing & Reentry Project, Youth Art & Self-Empowerment Project

Aaron Joshua Marcus, Esq., Defender Association of Philadelphia, Pro se

Michael F. J. Piecuch, Esq., PA District Attorneys Association, Pro se

Maureen Flannery Spang, Esq., for Amicus Curiae Pennsylvania District Attorneys Association

Todd N. Barnes, Esq., Robert Martin Falin, Esq., Adrienne D. Jappe, Esq., Montgomery County District Attorney’s Office, Kevin R. Steele, Esq., for Appellant Commonwealth of Pennsylvania

Katherine Elizabeth Ernst, Esq., Wiseman Schwartz, Rachel liana Silver, Esq., Palladino, Isbell & Casazza, for Appellee Taylor, Nazeer

TODD, C.J., DONOHUE, DOUGHERTY, WECHT, MUNDY, BROBSON, JJ.

OPINION

CHIEF JUSTICE TODD

In a previous appeal in this matter, we held that the juvenile court violated Appellee Nazeer Taylor’s Fifth Amendment¹ right to be free from compulsory self-incrimination by considering his refusal to admit guilt for the criminal offenses which he was alleged to have committed as a juvenile in granting the Commonwealth’s petition to transfer Taylor’s case to adult criminal court. See Commonwealth v. Taylor, 659 Pa. 88, 230 A.3d 1050 (2020) ("Taylor II"). We are now asked to decide whether this violation of Taylor’s constitutional right is subject to appellate review for harmless error. For the reasons that follow, we conclude that it is not – that, rather, it constitutes structural error.

Were Taylor still a juvenile, he would be entitled to a new certification hearing because of this violation of his Fifth Amendment right. However, as we further explain herein, because Taylor is now 27 years of age, and therefore no longer subject to the jurisdiction of the Juvenile Division of the Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas, neither that court nor, alternatively, the Criminal Division of the Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery County has the statutory authority to conduct such a hearing. We are therefore obliged to follow the law as presently written and, accordingly, affirm the order of the Superior Court which reversed Taylor’s conviction and discharge him.

I. Factual and Procedural History

From July 2012 through August 2013, Taylor, who was born on September 12, 1996, lived in a foster home in Montgom- ery County.² In March 2014, the Commonwealth filed a petition in the Juvenile Division of the Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas, alleging that Taylor, then 17 years old, was delinquent of the felony offenses of rape of a child, involuntary deviate sexual intercourse with a child, and sexual assault.³ Subsequently, the Commonwealth filed a petition with the juvenile court to have Taylor’s case transferred to adult criminal court.

The Honorable Joseph A. Smyth of the Juvenile Division of the Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas conducted a certification hearing on the petition which took place over the course of two separate days — April 2 and April 25, 2014. At this hearing, Judge Smyth heard testimony from the victim that Taylor had orally and anally sodomized him on several occasions, causing physical injury which affected his ability to control his bowels. N.T., 4/2/14, at 9, 11-30, 33. Taylor’s foster mother also offered testimony as to her observations of certain incidents which caused her to become suspicious that Taylor and the victim had engaged in sexual activity. Id. at 79-80, 84-85. Because of this testimony, the juvenile court found that the Commonwealth had established a prima facie case that Taylor committed the offenses alleged in the delinquency petition. Id. at 114-15.

Due to the fact that Taylor was 15 years old at the time he allegedly committed the offenses, and had been previously adjudicated delinquent of burglary — an offense graded as a felony for purposes of adult criminal prosecutions — the burden of proof shifted to Taylor under the Juvenile Act⁴ to prove by a preponderance of evidence that retention of the case by the juvenile court "serve[d] the public interest and that [he was] amenable to treatment, supervision or rehabilitation as a juvenile." 42 Pa.C.S. § 6355(g).

On these points, the Commonwealth presented testimony from a supervisor with the Montgomery County Juvenile Probation Department regarding Taylor’s amenability to treatment and available treatment options in the juvenile and adult systems. The probation supervisor expressed his belief that Taylor was not amenable to treatment in the juvenile system, noting that Taylor committed the assaults after receiving therapy as the result of the burglary conviction, as well as the fact that sex offender therapy usually took a minimum of two years, and the juvenile system would have jurisdiction over Taylor for only one year after he completed such a treatment program. N.T., 4/25/14, at 89-91.

Taylor presented the testimony of Dr. Nicole Machinski, a licensed clinical psychologist who specializes in the forensic assessment and treatment of juvenile sex offenders. Id. at 4, 9. Dr. Machinski had conducted her own in-person interview of Taylor, and she reviewed his extensive history of trauma and attendant psychological problems stemming from neglect and his own physical and sexual abuse at the hands of his uncle. Id. at 14-15. She observed, however, that as the result of receiving mental health treatment, he had made progress in dealing with these problems, and his behavior had improved. Id. at 16-20. Dr. Machinski opined that Taylor "could certainly be treated" within the juvenile justice system, either on an inpatient or outpatient basis, given that such treatment programs "are usually, on average, about 12 months," and that Taylor would be under the supervision of the juvenile system for the next 3 years. Id. at 22.

As our Court observed in Taylor II, the Commonwealth attempted to rebut Dr. Machinski’s conclusion that Taylor was amenable to treatment by relying on the fact that he did not admit to having committed the alleged assaults, nor did he otherwise take responsibility for his alleged actions. As we noted:

Specifically, the Commonwealth suggested that Taylor was "in denial" of his need for treatment, prompting a defense objection, which the court sustained. Id. at 44. The Commonwealth subsequently posited that "the first step in sex offender treatment [is] admitting guilt," id. at 58, and, after the close of evidence, reiterated its view that Taylor was "in denial" and that an "admission" would be necessary for treatment to work in this case. Id. at 109.

Taylor II, 230 A.3d at 1054.

At the conclusion of the hearing, Judge Smyth orally granted the transfer petition and certified the case to the Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas, Criminal Division, for trial. At that time, Judge Smyth explained why he did not consider Taylor to be amenable to treatment in the juvenile system. One of the principal reasons he cited was the fact that Taylor refused to admit to committing the sex offenses at issue:

And they won’t admit that he’s committed the sex offense, and that’s sort of their conundrum, because time is of the essence. He’s approaching 18 years old. The act -- you can argue degree of sophistication all you want, but it was a predatory damaging act that occurred repeatedly over a 1-year period of time.

If you’re going to go on the sex offenders’ treatment, it’s important that you admit, No. 1; examine your triggers, No. 2; talk about how you can avoid your triggers; and identify upfront the depth of the problem. And here, we can’t identify the depth of the problem largely because we’re not admitting yet that there is a problem.

What if he were to sit there for a year and a half before he finally admitted that he did something? I mean, I assume he’s still denying. Counsel’s arguments have been phrased "if this is true, it’s a horrendous act."

They made a distinction when he denied, when he said to Dr. Buxbaum -- I believe he was a psychiatrist -- "I didn’t do anything wrong." Counsel said now he wants to say he participates in treatment and defense counsel argued, well, maybe the treatment’s not talking about sex offenders’ treatment. And that’s the very issue, though, is he amenable to sex offenders’ treatment? And, in the juvenile system, time is running out. As I said, there is only a few years left, and the depth -- and if he doesn’t make sufficient progress, he’s 21, he’s back on the streets, and he’s released from the jurisdiction of the Court with no supervision at all. That’s the dilemma.

And when Dr. Machinski in her report indicates the issues that he needs treatment in and the Commonwealth argues, well, none of this has to do with amenability within the statute, well, it might, when you have four other categories. It would certainly refer to amenability for a crime that’s much less serious than this. But I don’t know that it means anything with regard to somebody who’s committed the type of act that he’s alleged to have committed.

So for all the reasons in the statute as enumerated by [the Commonwealth] andbecause it’s the defense burden of proof, I’m going to grant the Commonwealth’s motion to certify him to adult court.

N.T., 4/25/14, at 113-15.

The case was transferred, and in June 2016, after a...