Commonwealth v. Taylor

277 A.3d 577

COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania

v.Raymond TAYLOR, Appellant

No. 1167 MDA 2021

Superior Court of Pennsylvania.

Filed: June 3, 2022

Brett J. Riegel, Stroudsburg, for appellant.

Mark J. Powell, District Attorney, Scranton, for Commonwealth, appellee.

Lisa A. Swift, Assistant District Attorney, Scranton, for Commonwealth, appellee.

BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., STABILE, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.^*

OPINION BY STEVENS, P.J.E.:

Appellant, Raymond Taylor, appeals from the April 22, 2021, judgment of sentence entered in the Court of Common Pleas of Lackawanna County following his conviction by a jury on the charges of rape of a child, involuntary deviate sexual intercourse with a child, statutory sexual assault, unlawful contact with a minor, sexual assault, endangering the welfare of a child, and corruption of minors.¹ After a careful review, we affirm.

The trial court has aptly summarized the relevant facts and procedural history as follows:

In December [of] 2019, [Appellant] was babysitting C.R., who was his fiancé’s cousin's four-year-old daughter. N.T., 12/7/20, [at] 118. He babysat her in his home while her parents were at work. [Id. ] Soon thereafter, C.R. was sitting on her father's...lap, when she grabbed his genitals. [Id. ] at 119. He thought she was going to try and put her mouth on his penis. [Id. ] [He] told his wife about the incident. [Id. ] at 120. They had a conversation with [C.R.] during which C.R. stated, "Uncle Ray sticks his cock in my mouth." [Id. ]. [C.R.’s parents] were both shocked by the statement. [Id. ] [C.R.] subsequently made similar statements to her [paternal] grandfather.... [Id. ] at 136. At that point, [C.R.] was taken to the Children's Advocacy Center ("CAC") where she made a similar disclosure. [Id. ] at 121.

Due to the above allegations, on December 18, 2019, [Appellant] appeared at the Carbondale Police Department at the request of Detective Timothy Mackrell. N.T., 12/9/20, at 15. Detective Mackrell began the interview by advising [Appellant] of his Miranda rights. [Id. ] at 12. The first part of the videotaped interview lasted approximately one hour and nine minutes. N.T., 12/8/20, at 40. In the first part of the interview, [Appellant] denied the allegations. N.T., 12/9/20, at 19. He agreed to take a Computer Voice Stress Analysis test ("CVSA"). The pre-CVSA interview, the CVSA, and the post-CVSA interviews were conducted by Detective Jess Van Deusen of the Carbondale Police Department. [Id. ] at 121-22. This portion was not videotaped and lasted approximately one hour and ten minutes. N.T., 12/8/20, at 6. The detectives then informed [Appellant] that he failed the exam. [Id. ] at 4. Detective Mackrell resumed questioning [Appellant] for approximately thirty minutes. N.T., 12/9/20, at 33. During this portion of the unrecorded interview, [Appellant] confessed. Detective Mackrell requested that [Appellant] repeat his admission statement on videotape. [Id. ] at 27. The detective had trouble turning the recorder back on, so he enlisted the help of two other Carbondale Police Officers, along with [Appellant] himself. N.T., 12/8/20, at 32. [Appellant] then repeated his admission on tape in a recording that lasted one minute and eighteen seconds long.

On or about December 18, 2019, [Appellant] was arrested for rape and related offenses. On the eve of trial, the Commonwealth filed an amended information, which listed the [charges indicated supra ]. On December 9, 2020, after a three-day jury trial, the jury returned a verdict of guilty on all counts.

On April 22, 2021, the trial court imposed the following sentence: On count I, rape of a child, ten (10) to twenty (20) years in a state correctional institution[;] count II merged with count I, [so] no further penalty was imposed[;] count III, statutory sexual assault, three (3) to six (6) years [in prison] consecutive to count I[;] count IV, unlawful contact with a minor, three (3) to six (6) years [in prison], also consecutive to counts I and III[;] count V merged with count III, [so] no further penalty was imposed[;] count VI, endangering the welfare of a child, one (1) to two (2) years [in prison] consecutive to counts I, III, and IV[;] count VII, corruption of minors, one (1) to two (2) years [in prison] consecutive to counts I, III, IV, and VI[.]

The aggregate sentence imposed [was] 18-36 years to be served in a state correctional facility. Additionally, [Appellant was ordered to] register as a Tier III lifetime registrant pursuant to the Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9799.10 et seq. [On May 14, 2021, Appellant filed a counseled motion seeking an application for extension of time to file post-sentence motions.] On May 19, 2021, the [trial] court [expressly] granted [Appellant's] request for additional time to file post-sentence motions. [On June 1, 2021, Appellant filed a counseled post-sentence motion, and the trial court denied the motion on August 10, 2021.] Appellant filed a [notice of] appeal on August 31, 2021.^{[2 ]} [On that same date, the trial court ordered Appellant to file a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement, and Appellant timely complied. The trial court filed a responsive Rule 1925(a) opinion on October 26, 2021.]

Trial Court Opinion, filed 10/26/21, at 1-4 (unnecessary parenthesis omitted) (footnote added).

On appeal, Appellant sets forth the following issues in his "Statement of the Questions Involved" (verbatim):

1. Did the trial court commit reversible error when it violated the coordinate jurisdiction rule?

2. Did the trial court commit reversible error when it denied a trial continuance to the defense?

3. Did the trial court commit reversible error when it found C.R. competent to testify?

4. Did the trial court commit reversible error when it made evidentiary errors at trial?

5. Did the trial court commit reversible error when it did not issue a missing evidence and/or missing witness instruction to the jury?

6. Did the trial court arrive at a manifestly unreasonable sentence for the Defendant considering the discretionary aspects of sentencing?

Appellant's Brief at 8-9 (suggested answers omitted).

In his first issue, Appellant contends the Honorable Margaret Moyle violated the coordinate jurisdiction rule when she granted, in part, the Commonwealth's motion for reconsideration as it relates to an order entered by then President Judge Michael J. Barrasse. We conclude Appellant is not entitled to relief on this claim.

In the case sub judice , the Commonwealth filed a motion in limine seeking to introduce evidence of other crimes pursuant to Pa.R.E. 404(b). Specifically, the Commonwealth sought to admit testimony from D.D. and S.T., both of whom reported that Appellant sexually abused them when they were young children and in his care. Judge Barrasse denied the motion in limine , thus precluding the testimony.

However, the Commonwealth filed a timely motion for reconsideration of Judge Barrasse's order. The next day, to assist the trial court in conducting several jury trials scheduled for December 7, 2020, Judge Barrasse transferred Appellant's case to Judge Moyle for trial. See Trial Court Opinion, filed 10/26/21, at 6. Judge Barrasse specifically instructed Judge Moyle to rule on the Commonwealth's outstanding motion for reconsideration. See id.

Accordingly, Judge Moyle held oral argument on the Commonwealth's motion for reconsideration and granted, in part, the motion. Specifically, Judge Moyle held that D.D. and S.T. could testify to Appellant's sexual abuse, but she limited the testimony to acts committed against them as of the time they were five years old. Judge Moyle specifically excluded testimony related to Appellant's sexual abuse of D.D. after he turned five years old.

Appellant now contends that, under the coordinate jurisdiction rule, Judge Moyle was required to adopt Judge Barrasse's order, which denied the Commonwealth's motion in limine in its entirety, when the case was transferred to her to rule on the Commonwealth's motion for reconsideration.

Initially, we note Appellant raised his coordinate jurisdiction challenge for the first time in his post-sentence motion. That is, despite Judge Moyle advising the parties that the case had been transferred to her docket, she would be ruling on the Commonwealth's motion for reconsideration, and she then held a pre-trial hearing on the motion, Appellant did not lodge a timely objection based on the coordinate jurisdiction rule.³

Thus, this issue has been waived. See Commonwealth v. Sanchez , 623 Pa. 253, 82 A.3d 943 (2013) (holding that, in order to preserve an issue, an objection must be lodged as soon as is practical); Keffer v. Bob Nolan's Auto Service, Inc. , 59 A.3d 621, 629 (Pa.Super. 2012) (finding issue based on coordinate jurisdiction rule to be waived where it was raised for the first time in post-trial motions).

Nevertheless, even if Appellant has properly preserved this claim, we conclude Appellant's claim is meritless.⁴ It is well-settled that the coordinate jurisdiction rule is part of the law of the case doctrine and prohibits a court involved in the later phases of a litigated matter from reopening questions decided by another judge of the same court in earlier phases of the matter. See Commonwealth v. Starr , 541 Pa. 564, 664 A.2d 1326 (1995). In deciding whether to apply the coordinate jurisdiction rule, the court must look to where the rulings occurred in the context of the procedural posture of the case. See Riccio v. American Republic Ins. Co. , 550 Pa. 254, 705 A.2d 422 (1997).

Generally, the coordinate jurisdiction rule commands that, upon transfer of a matter between trial judges of coordinate jurisdiction, a transferee trial judge may not alter resolution of a legal question previously decided by a transferor trial judge. See Starr , supra . As our Supreme Court stated in Starr , "[J]udges of coordinate jurisdiction sitting in the same case should not overrule each others’ decisions." Id. at 1331.

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