Commonwealth v. Taylor

279 A.3d 1279 (Table)

COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania

v.Sean TAYLOR, Appellant

Commonwealth of Pennsylvania

v.Sean Taylor, Appellant

No. 792 EDA 2021

No. 793 EDA 2021

Superior Court of Pennsylvania.

Filed May 24, 2022

MEMORANDUM BY KUNSELMAN, J.:

Sean Taylor appeals the denial of his first petition filed under the Post Conviction Relief Act (PCRA), 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541 – 9546. We conclude that Taylor's pro se petition and counseled supplemental petitions were sufficient to warrant an evidentiary hearing. We find that the PCRA court properly denied Taylor's sexually violent predator (SVP) claim outside of the PCRA. We thus affirm in part, vacate in part, and remand for an evidentiary hearing.

Taylor was initially charged at separate dockets with sexual offenses against his step-niece (S.R.) and another child (C.M.). Both cases were consolidated for trial.¹ S.R. testified that Taylor abused her when she was ages seven to fourteen. C.M. testified that Taylor abused her when she was ages nine to eleven. A jury convicted Taylor in both cases. Taylor retained new counsel following trial. On June 27, 2014, the trial court found that Taylor was an SVP and sentenced him to an aggregate term of 25 to 50 years of imprisonment. Taylor appealed, and on December 11, 2015, this Court affirmed Taylor's judgment of sentence. Commonwealth v. Taylor , No. 1893 EDA 2014 (Pa. Super. Dec. 11, 2015) (unpublished memorandum). Taylor did not seek discretionary review by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court.

Taylor and his appellate counsel exchanged letters for the next two years regarding the filing of a PCRA petition. Six of these letters were included in filings before the PCRA court and this Court.

On September 14, 2018,² Taylor filed a pro se PCRA petition and a 42-page pro se amended petition. For simplicity, we will refer to both documents as the pro se petition. Therein, Taylor argued that the pro se petition was timely based on August 2018 affidavits from D.L. and from his nephew Eric Taylor. He claimed that his trial and appellate counsel were ineffective, and that his appellate counsel had abandoned him after June 21, 2017.

PCRA counsel was appointed. On June 3, 2019, PCRA counsel filed a supplemental petition. He raised additional ineffectiveness claims and argued that the pro se petition was timely because it was filed within one year of the date Taylor discovered that prior counsel had abandoned him. PCRA counsel filed a second supplemental petition on September 9, 2019, adding a claim that Taylor's SVP designation was unconstitutional.

On September 10, 2019, the Commonwealth responded that the pro se petition was untimely. PCRA counsel replied on December 2, 2019, arguing that appellate counsel abandoned Taylor after he did not reply to three attached letters from Taylor. The Commonwealth responded again on January 22, 2020, reiterating its position that the pro se petition was untimely.

On March 17, 2021, the PCRA court provided a form notice of intent to dismiss Taylor's counseled petition without a hearing pursuant to Pennsylvania Rule of Criminal Procedure 907.³ Taylor did not file a response. The PCRA court dismissed Taylor's petition on April 15, 2021 based on untimeliness and a lack of merit. These timely appeals followed. Instead of directing Taylor to file a concise statement of errors complained of on appeal, the PCRA court issued a Rule 1925(a) opinion addressing timeliness and the four substantive issues raised by PCRA counsel in his supplemental petitions.

Taylor identifies the following three issues in his statement of questions:

1. Did the [PCRA c]ourt commit legal error when dismissing [Taylor's] PCRA Petition as untimely, without merit and a hearing?

2. Did [Taylor] raise genuine issues of fact which, if resolved in his favor, would have entitled him to relief, or that the court otherwise abused its discretion in denying a hearing?

3. Did [Taylor] demonstrate that (1) the underlying legal issue has arguable merit; (2) trial and appellate counsel's actions lacked an objective reasonable basis; and (3) [Taylor] was prejudiced by counsel's act or omission[?]

Taylor's Brief at 3.⁴

"This Court's standard of review regarding an order dismissing a petition under the PCRA is to ascertain whether ‘the determination of the PCRA court is supported by the evidence of record and is free of legal error. The PCRA court's findings will not be disturbed unless there is no support for the findings in the certified record.’ " Commonwealth v. Larkin , 235 A.3d 350, 355 (Pa. Super. 2020) (en banc ) (quoting Commonwealth v. Barndt , 74 A.3d 185, 191–92 (Pa. Super. 2013) ). "Our scope of review is limited to the findings of the PCRA court and the evidence of record, viewed in the light most favorable to the party who prevailed in the PCRA court proceeding." Commonwealth v. Snyder , 250 A.3d 1253, 1258 (Pa. Super. 2021) (quoting Commonwealth v. Busanet , 54 A.3d 35, 45 (Pa. 2012) ).

The PCRA court has discretion to dismiss a petition without a hearing when the court is satisfied that there are no genuine issues concerning any material fact, the petitioner is not entitled to post-conviction collateral relief, and no legitimate purpose would be served by further proceedings. To obtain a reversal of a PCRA court's decision to dismiss a petition without a hearing, an appellant must show that he or she raised a genuine issue of fact which, if resolved in his favor, would have entitled him to relief, or that the court otherwise abused its discretion in denying a hearing.

Commonwealth v. Blakeney , 108 A.3d 739, 750 (Pa. 2014) (quotation marks and citation omitted); see Pa.R.Crim.P. 907(1), 908(A)(2).

We start with Taylor's first issue, in which he challenges the PCRA court's determination that his petition was facially untimely and that he did not plead and prove an exception to the PCRA's time bar. The PCRA provides:

(1) Any petition under this subchapter, including a second or subsequent petition, shall be filed within one year of the date the judgment becomes final, unless the petition alleges and the petitioner proves that:

(i) the failure to raise the claim previously was the result of interference by government officials with the presentation of the claim in violation of the Constitution or laws of this Commonwealth or the Constitution or laws of the United States;

(ii) the facts upon which the claim is predicated were unknown to the petitioner and could not have been ascertained by the exercise of due diligence; or

(iii) the right asserted is a constitutional right that was recognized by the Supreme Court of the United States or the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania after the time period provided in this section and has been held by that court to apply retroactively.

(2) Any petition invoking an exception provided in paragraph (1) shall be filed within one year of the date the claim could have been presented.

42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1) and (2).

The Section 9545(b) timeliness requirements are jurisdictional. Commonwealth v. Cobbs , 256 A.3d 1192, 1207 (Pa. 2021) (citing Commonwealth v. Albrecht , 994 A.2d 1091, 1093 (Pa. 2010) ). A PCRA petition that is not filed within one year of the date that the judgment of sentence became final is facially untimely. If a petition is facially untimely, then the petitioner must plead and prove an exception to the time bar under Section 9545(b)(1). Exceptions to the PCRA time bar must be pled in the petition and may not be raised for the first time on appeal. Commonwealth v. Burton , 936 A.2d 521, 525 (Pa. Super. 2007) ; see also Pa.R.A.P. 302(a). Courts do not have power to make equitable exceptions to the PCRA's timeliness requirements. Commonwealth v. Tedford , 228 A.3d 891, 905 (Pa. 2020). A petition invoking a statutory exception must be filed within the period specified in Section 9545(b)(2).⁵

If a PCRA petition is facially untimely and the petitioner has not pled and proven a Section 9545(b)(1) exception, then neither the PCRA court nor this Court has jurisdiction over the petition. Cobbs , 256 A.3d at 1207. "Without jurisdiction, we simply do not have the legal authority to address the substantive claims." Commonwealth v. Derrickson , 923 A.2d 466, 468 (Pa. Super. 2007) (citation omitted).

Here, Taylor's judgment of sentence became final on January 11, 2016, at the conclusion of the time to seek discretionary review by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania of this Court's ruling on Taylor's direct appeal. Pa.R.A.P. 1113(a) (providing that generally, a petition for allowance of appeal must be filed within 30 days of the Superior Court's order); see also 1 Pa.C.S.A. § 1908. Therefore, Taylor had until January 11, 2017 to file a facially timely petition. Because Taylor filed his pro se petition on September 14, 2018, it is untimely unless he has met his burden of pleading and proving that one of the enumerated exceptions applies. Cobbs , supra .

Taylor claims that he did not know that prior counsel never filed a PCRA petition and that he filed his pro se petition within one year of learning that his counsel had abandoned him. Thus, he claims he met the "newly discovered fact" exception. We have previously explained that this exception

requires a petitioner to demonstrate he did not know the facts upon which he based his petition and could not have learned those facts earlier by the exercise of due diligence. Due diligence demands that the petitioner take reasonable steps to protect his own interests. A petitioner must explain why he could not have learned the new fact(s) earlier with the exercise of due diligence. This rule is strictly enforced. Additionally, the focus of this exception is on the newly discovered facts, not on a newly discovered or newly willing source for previously known facts.

The timeliness exception set forth at Section 9545(b)(1)(ii) has often mistakenly been referred to as the "after-discovered evidence" exception. This shorthand reference was a misnomer, since the plain language of subsection (b)(1)(i

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