Commonwealth v. Thomas

1

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA v. ANTHONY ISAIAH THOMAS Appellant

No. 1651 MDA 2023

No. J-S36035-24

Superior Court of Pennsylvania

November 7, 2024

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered October 23, 2023 In the Court of Common Pleas of Lancaster County Criminal Division at No(s): CP-36-CR-0000978-2022.

Benjamin D. Kohler, Esq.

BEFORE: LAZARUS, P.J., McLAUGHLIN, J., and BENDER, P.J.E.

MEMORANDUM

BENDER, P.J.E.

Anthony Isaiah Thomas ("Appellant") appeals from the judgment of sentence imposed for possession of marijuana and other offenses. Appellant challenges the denial of suppression, as well as the sufficiency of the evidence to support his conviction for tampering with evidence. After careful review, we affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for further proceedings.

The facts were set forth by the trial court as follows:

Appellant asserted [that] Lancaster City Bureau of Police (hereinafter "LPD") unconstitutionally stopped him because they lacked reasonable suspicion. LPD testified that they were conducting surveillance in the area [] Appellant was detained because it was a high drug area. LPD particularized their suspicion to that corner where [] Appellant's activity occurred because a confidential informant (hereinafter "CI") notified them of drug trafficking at that address. An individual (hereinafter "Person of Interest") came out of the targeted building acting in a manner consistent with drug dealing. A vehicle drove up to the address and parked. The driver of the vehicle was later identified as [] Appellant. The Person of Interest quickly entered and exited the vehicle. [] Appellant drove off immediately as if "trying to create distance between themselves and where the activity took place." LPD developed a suspicion of illegal drug activity and sought to stop [] Appellant. Upon LPD signaling their intent to stop, [] Appellant attempted to pull out of the view of LPD. Upon temporarily stopping, he discarded an item from his vehicle window. This item was a package containing marijuana. [] Appellant then moved to a new location and complied with the commands of LPD. Upon being stopped, [] Appellant admitted to having marijuana in his car. Upon a consented search of the vehicle, LPD found marijuana in [] Appellant's vehicle.

Trial Court Opinion (TCO), 2/27/24, at 2-3 (internal citations to transcript omitted, footnote omitted).

A criminal information filed March 10, 2022, charged Appellant with four counts: possession of marijuana (35 P.S. § 780-113(a)(31)), possession of drug paraphernalia (35 P.S. § 780-113(a)(32)), tampering with evidence (18 Pa.C.S. § 4910(1)), and scattering rubbish (18 Pa.C.S. § 6501(a)(1)). Defense counsel filed a motion to suppress the evidence against Appellant on April 8, 2022. Following a hearing, the motion was denied on May 24, 2022.^[1]After numerous continuances, a stipulated bench trial followed on October 23, 2023, after which the trial court found Appellant guilty of all four counts. The court then imposed an aggregate sentence of two years of probation. Sentencing Order, 10/23/23.

No post-sentence motions were filed. Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal on November 22, 2023, and a timely statement of errors complained of on appeal pursuant Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) on December 27, 2023. The trial court issued its Rule 1925(a) opinion on February 27, 2024.

Appellant raises the following claims in this appeal:

I. Did the trial court err in denying the [m]otion to [s]uppress the fruits of [Appellant's] illegal detention, which was unsupported by reasonable suspicion, and which was in violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania?

II. Was the evidence presented by the Commonwealth insufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that [Appellant] committed the offense of tampering with physical evidence, where [Appellant] merely abandoned the evidence in clear view of the police after they initiated a traffic stop?

Brief for Appellant at 5.

Appellant first argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress the evidence. This Court's well-settled standard of review of a denial of a motion to suppress is as follows:

An appellate court's standard of review in addressing a challenge to the denial of a suppression motion is limited to determining whether the suppression court's factual findings are supported by the record and whether the legal conclusions drawn from those facts are correct. Because the Commonwealth prevailed before the suppression court, we may consider only the evidence of the Commonwealth and so much of the evidence for the defense as remains uncontradicted when read in the context of the record as a whole. Where the suppression court's factual findings are supported by the record, the appellate court is bound by those findings and may reverse only if the court's legal conclusions are erroneous. Where … the appeal of the determination of the suppression court turns on allegations of legal error, the suppression court's legal conclusions are not binding on an appellate court, whose duty it is to determine if the suppression court properly applied the law to the facts. Thus, the conclusions of law of the courts below are subject to plenary review.

Commonwealth v. Jones, 121 A.3d 524, 526-27 (Pa. Super. 2015) (cleaned up). The reviewing court's scope of review is limited to the record evidence from the suppression hearing. Id.

The Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution and Article I, Section 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution both protect individuals from unreasonable searches and seizures. Parker, 161 A.3d at 362. Moreover, in our jurisprudence, a warrantless seizure is presumptively unreasonable under both constitutions. See generally Commonwealth v. McCree, 924 A.2d 621, 627 (Pa. 2007). Our courts have delineated three categories of interactions between citizens and the police:

The first is a "mere encounter" (or request for information) which need not be supported by any level of suspicion, but carries no official compulsion to stop or respond. The second, an "investigative detention," must be supported by a reasonable suspicion; it subjects a suspect to a stop and a period of detention, but does not involve such coercive conditions as to constitute the functional equivalent of an arrest. Finally, an arrest or "custodial detention" must be supported by probable cause.

Id. If a "detention violates the Fourth Amendment, then any evidence seized during that stop must be excluded as fruit of an unlawful detention." Commonwealth v. Mattis, 252 A.3d 650, 654 (Pa. Super. 2021).

The parties in the case at bar do not dispute that the vehicle stop here was an investigative detention. We agree. See Commonwealth v. Chase, 960 A.2d 108 (Pa. 2008) (noting, inter alia, that a vehicle stop is generally considered to be an investigative detention). As such, it must be supported by a reasonable suspicion that criminal activity is afoot. Commonwealth v. Way, 238 A.3d 515, 519 (Pa. Super. 2020).

To prove reasonable suspicion, the police officer must be able to point to specific and articulable facts and reasonable inferences drawn from those facts in light of the officer's experience. The determination of whether an officer had reasonable suspicion that criminality was afoot so as to justify an investigatory detention is an objective one, which must be considered in light of the totality of the circumstances.

Id. (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). While the term "reasonable suspicion" has been interpreted in various ways, it is clear it requires more than an "educated hunch" by law enforcement. Commonwealth v. Donaldson, 786 A.2d 279, 281 (Pa. Super. 2001).

In the present case, Officer Brandon McCormick testified at the suppression hearing that he was a member of a special unit of the LPD which focused mostly on street-level drug crimes throughout the city of Lancaster. N.T., 5/24/22, at 6. Officer McCormick testified that he had participated in approximately one hundred drug transactions in an undercover capacity. Id. at 9. On the day in question, the officer was involved in surveillance at the intersection of Dauphin and South Ann Street, calling this location a "high crime area" due to the high number of citizen complaints and incidents involving drug sales at that specific intersection. Id. at 12-13. Officer McCormick reported that, just a few weeks prior to Appellant's arrest, a confidential informant had purchased narcotics at this same intersection and sold them to an undercover officer. Id. at 13.

Officer McCormick described what he observed that evening as follows:^[2]

As I'm parked [across the street], I see a subject walk out of the corner store at Dauphin and Ann. He's intently looking at his phone. He's intently looking around. Clearly to me it's looking that he's looking for somebody. …

So as that subject comes out of the corner store, a little bit of time passes. I would say not even a minute passes and a vehicle comes south on Ann Street [and parks.] … I can see the subject who had walked out of the corner store - I can see as this vehicle is pulling up, making the turn and parking there - intently looking at the car. So this is clearly who they were waiting for, who I interpreted as them communicating with on their phone.

They walk up to the front passenger seat of this silver -- like a silver hatchback. They get in the vehicle -- I'm radioing this out the entire time -- and the subject exits within, I'd say, 15 to 20 seconds or so.

The vehicle then immediately drives off eastbound on Dauphin Street and turns north onto Marshall

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