Commonwealth v. Valdez

88 Mass.App.Ct. 332

37 N.E.3d 1098

COMMONWEALTH

v.Frank VALDEZ.¹

No. 14–P–668.

Appeals Court of Massachusetts, Middlesex.

Argued Feb. 3, 2015.

Decided Sept. 14, 2015.

Scott W. Kramer, Norwood, for the defendant.

Jamie Michael Charles, Assistant District Attorney, for the Commonwealth.

Present: CYPHER, HANLON, & AGNES, JJ.

Opinion

HANLON, J.

The defendant appeals from the orders denying his motions to vacate a 1989 guilty plea, and for reconsideration. He argues that his plea was invalid because the plea judge failed to advise him, as required by G.L. c. 278, § 29D, of all the possible immigration consequences from such a plea—including, particularly, the possibility of exclusion from admission if he left the United States and attempted to return. We recognize that, on this record, the Commonwealth is unable to prove that the defendant received the required warning. However, because the defendant has not been excluded from the United States, and the United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) has taken no steps to accomplish that, we affirm.

In support of his motion to vacate his plea, the defendant filed an affidavit reciting that he was born in the Dominican Republic, but was admitted to the United States as a “lawful resident alien” in 1985. He received a high school graduate equivalency degree from a school in the Bronx, New York, and had been “gainfully employed by a number of employers including a subcontractor for the U.S. Navy at the Brooklyn Navy Yard.” At the time he filed the motion, he had been in a sixteen-year relationship with a United States citizen, and they had three children, ages fourteen, twelve, and nine years old. He owned an automobile sales business and resided in Connecticut.

The defendant pleaded guilty on January 25, 1989, to one count of larceny of a motor vehicle and was sentenced to five years of imprisonment.² On November 4, 2013, he filed a motion to “vacate judgment,” citing G.L. c. 278, § 29D. He also asserted that he had consulted an immigration attorney to determine whether he could become a citizen of the United States and, given his “desire to travel outside of the United States, especially to visit with friends and family who[m he had] not seen in many years,” whether he could do so. According to the defendant, the attorney told him that, because of his 1989 conviction, he was deportable, was ineligible to become a naturalized citizen, and would be excluded from the United States if he left and tried to return.³

In support of its opposition to the defendant's motion, the Commonwealth

filed an affidavit from the plea judge (who since had retired). In the affidavit, the judge stated that, although he did not recall the defendant's case specifically, during the time period when he accepted the plea, the judge had used a “script” for providing immigration warnings before accepting a guilty plea. As a result, the judge was certain that he had “informed the defendant that, if he ... were not a citizen of the United States, the guilty plea might lead to his ... deportation or prevent him ... from becoming a naturalized citizen.” The judge added that, at some point after 1988, he had “added a warning that the guilty plea might also prevent reentry into the United States, but [he could not] recall precisely when [he] did so.”

The motion judge denied the defendant's motion to vacate his plea without a hearing. She found that, with respect to reentry into the United States, the defendant had failed to establish that he would be subject to a written policy of exclusion should he choose to leave the United States and desire to reenter; his showing was “no more than a hypothetical risk.” On January 10, 2014, the defendant's motion for reconsideration was denied by the motion judge; he timely appealed both orders.

“[I]f the court fails to give immigration warnings and the defendant ‘at any time shows that his plea and conviction may have one of the enumerated consequences, the [c]ourt ... shall vacate the judgment, and permit the defendant to withdraw the plea’ (emphasis supplied). G.L. c. 278, § 29D. The statute is equally explicit that, absent a record that the warnings were provided, ‘the defendant shall be presumed not to have received the required advisement.’ ” Commonwealth v. Grannum, 457 Mass. 128, 133, 928 N.E.2d 339 (2010), quoting from G.L. c. 278, 29D. The statute unambiguously places on the Commonwealth the burden of proving that the § 29D requirements were “satisfied, irrespective of the amount of time that may have passed between a conviction and a defendant's motion to withdraw his plea or his admission to sufficient facts.” Ibid., quoting from Commonwealth v. Jones, 417 Mass. 661, 664, 632 N.E.2d 408 (1994).

That is the situation here. There appears to be no record of the defendant's 1989 plea colloquy, and the Commonwealth's attempt to reconstruct the record makes it clear that, while there is

reason to believe that the defendant was warned that he could be subject to deportation and denial of naturalization, the plea judge was not certain that he had advised the defendant that he could be excluded from admission to the United States. “Therefore, the defendant is entitled to a presumption that he did not receive [that] immigration warning[ ], and the Commonwealth has not satisfied its burden to establish that the presumption has been overcome.” Id. at 134, 928 N.E.2d 339.

However, even when it is clear that the defendant did not receive the proper warning, the “remedy clause of G.L. c. 278, § 29D, is triggered only when a defendant can ... demonstrate that he ‘may’ become subject to one of the immigration consequences enumerated in the statute. [The court has] construe [d] this requirement to mean that a defendant must demonstrate more than a hypothetical risk of such a consequence, but that he actually faces the prospect of its occurring.”

Commonwealth v. Casimir, 68 Mass.App.Ct. 257, 259, 861 N.E.2d 497 (2007), quoting from Commonwealth v. Berthold, 441 Mass. 183, 185, 804 N.E.2d 355 (2004).

In Berthold, although the defendant had not received all of the warnings required by the statute, he had been told that he “could be deported.” 441 Mass. at 184, 804 N.E.2d 355. “Because the defendant was warned of the precise immigration consequence that he subsequently faced, the motions to withdraw his guilty pleas were properly denied.” Id. at 186–187, 804 N.E.2d 355. In Casimir, the Commonwealth made no claim that the presumption applied that the warnings had been provided to the defendant (who sought to become a United States citizen), and the court assumed, “without deciding, that [he] was not provided the immigration warning.” Casimir, supra at 258–259, 861 N.E.2d 497. Nonetheless, “[b]ecause there ha[d] been no showing that the defendant [was] actually facing any of the enumerated consequences that trigger the allowance of a motion to withdraw a guilty plea pursuant to G.L. c. 278, § 29D, i.e., deportation, exclusion from the United States, or the denial of naturalization, his claim [was] not ripe. Thus, it was error for the ... judge to have allowed his motion.” Id. at 259, 861 N.E.2d 497.

Here, the defendant claimed that, as a consequence of his plea, he is deportable, is ineligible for naturalization, and would be denied reentry to the United States. Because the Commonwealth established that the defendant received proper warnings about his risk of deportation and denial of naturalization, to succeed here, the defendant must show that he faces the consequence of exclusion.

Larceny is a crime involving moral turpitude. See Commonwealth v. Cano, 87 Mass.App.Ct. 238, 245 n. 15, 28 N.E.3d 491 (2015), quoting

from Morasch v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 363 F.2d 30, 31 (9th Cir.1966) (“[P]etty or grand larceny, i.e., stealing another's property qualifies [as a crime involving moral turpitude”] ). As a result of the 1989 plea, the defendant not only is classified as deportable based on an aggravated felony conviction,⁴ but also qualifies as inadmissible upon reentry resulting from the conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude.⁵ See 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii) (2012) ; 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(I) (2012). In light of the foregoing, the defendant very likely would be excluded from reentry if he travels outside the United States. Cf. Grannum, supra at 135–136, 928 N.E.2d 339.

The question before us is whether the defendant's showing is sufficient to meet his burden. On the one hand, we have in mind the recent teaching of the Supreme Judicial Court, albeit in a different context, that “[a]fter the 1996 effective date of amendments to the 1952 Immigration and Nationality Act, ... ‘if a noncitizen has committed a removable offense ..., his removal is practically inevitable,’ subject to limited exceptions.” Commonwealth v. DeJesus, 468 Mass. 174, 180, 9 N.E.3d 789 (2014), quoting from Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 363–364, 130 S.Ct. 1473, 176 L.Ed.2d 284 (2010). Arguably, requiring the defendant, despite his attorney's informed advice, to risk exclusion by leaving the country, including his family and his business, to test the issue whether he actually would be excluded is too great a burden. Nor is it reasonable to require a motion judge, in the context of a hearing on a motion to withdraw a plea, to determine whether the defendant actually wished to leave the country,⁶ or to predict, with any hope of accuracy, what actions ICE officials might take at some future date after unforeseen

national and international events.

On the other hand, in most of the recent cases where a defendant's motion under § 29D was allowed, he already was experiencing the consequences for which he had not been warned. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Soto, 431 Mass. 340, 342, 727 N.E.2d 811 (2000), where the “judge at the plea colloquy did not advise the defendant that he could be excluded from admission to the United States.” After his plea, “the Immigration and Naturalization...