Commonwealth v. Vigiani

488 Mass. 34

170 N.E.3d 1135

COMMONWEALTH

v.Eli VIGIANI.

SJC-13087

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Suffolk.

Argued May 7, 2021.

Decided July 20, 2021.

Ian MacLean, Assistant District Attorney, for the Commonwealth.

Michelle Menken, for the defendant.

Robert F. Hennessy, Springfield, & Merritt Schnipper, for youth advocacy division of the Committee for Public Counsel Services & another, amici curiae, submitted a brief.

Present: Budd, C.J., Gaziano, Lowy, Cypher, Kafker, Wendlandt, & Georges, JJ.

LOWY, J.

General Laws c. 233, § 20 ( § 20 ), limits who may give what sort of testimony in various civil and criminal proceedings. One set of limitations is found in § 20, Fourth, which applies to the testimony of a parent or minor child¹ against the other in criminal, delinquency, and youthful offender proceedings where the victim is not a family member and does not reside in the household. The central issue in this case is whether § 20, Fourth, disqualifies parents from being called to testify in their child's defense at an evidentiary hearing for a motion to suppress. We conclude that while § 20, Fourth, prevents the prosecution from calling the child's parents to testify for the Commonwealth in such proceedings, it allows the child to call his or her parents as witnesses for the defense and then the Commonwealth to cross-examine them.²

Background. Three days after the sixteen year old juvenile in this case was allegedly involved in a shooting incident, he and his mother arrived at Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority (MBTA) transit police headquarters to be questioned. Both were informed of the juvenile's Miranda rights. In an affidavit filed with the juvenile's subsequent motion to suppress, the juvenile's mother alleges that the juvenile then invoked his right to counsel. At this point, the juvenile's mother claims that a detective spoke with her privately and encouraged her to convince the juvenile to speak with the police, promising that if he did, he would be permitted to leave and that the police would speak to the prosecutor on his behalf. The juvenile spoke with his mother for approximately fifteen minutes and then agreed to speak with police. During this conversation with police, the juvenile made incriminating statements. The juvenile was later indicted as a youthful offender, G. L. c. 119, § 54, on the charge of carrying a firearm without a license, G. L. c. 269, § 10 (a ).

Before trial in the Juvenile Court, the juvenile moved to suppress his statements at MBTA police headquarters. To support his motion, the juvenile sought to call his mother to testify at the evidentiary hearing about her conversation with officers. In response, the Commonwealth moved to reserve and report the question whether § 20, Fourth, disqualified the juvenile's mother from testifying. Alternatively, the Commonwealth moved to prohibit the juvenile's mother from testifying based on § 20, Fourth. The judge denied both motions, and the Commonwealth filed a G. L. c. 211, § 3, petition in the county court. A single justice reserved and reported the case.

Discussion. 1. Mootness. Before turning to the statutory matter, we resolve a threshold issue. The Commonwealth argued in the Juvenile Court that § 20, Fourth, disqualified the juvenile's mother from testifying at the evidentiary hearing for his motion to suppress. By oral argument, the Commonwealth's position had changed, and it claimed that § 20, Fourth, does not apply to evidentiary hearings on motions to suppress at all. As a result, because the proceeding at issue was an evidentiary hearing on a motion to suppress, the Commonwealth has conceded that the mother could be called by the juvenile to testify. Due to the parties agreeing on this issue, the matter is moot. See Metros v. Secretary of the Commonwealth, 396 Mass. 156, 159, 484 N.E.2d 1015 (1985) ("It is the general rule that courts decide only actual controversies").

Mootness does not, however, necessarily prevent us from hearing a case. "We may choose to express our opinion on moot questions because of the public interest involved and the uncertainty and confusion that exist." Metros, supra. Whether § 20, Fourth, prevents a child from calling his or her parent to testify for the defense in applicable proceedings is a matter of importance and has been fully briefed. Thus, as we have in similar cases, see, e.g., Matter of a Grand Jury Subpoena, 447 Mass. 88, 89, 849 N.E.2d 797 (2006) ; Matter of a Grand Jury Investigation, 443 Mass. 20, 21, 819 N.E.2d 171 (2004), we exercise our discretion to decide the issue before us.

2. Section 20, Fourth. Because whether § 20, Fourth, prevents parents from testifying in their child's defense is a matter of statutory interpretation, we review de novo. Commonwealth v. Ruiz, 480 Mass. 683, 685, 108 N.E.3d 447 (2018).

a. Legal backdrop. "When construing a statute, we look first and foremost to the language of the statute as a whole," Matter of a Grand Jury Subpoena, 447 Mass. at 90, 849 N.E.2d 797, and strive to "give effect to each word." Ropes & Gray LLP v. Jalbert, 454 Mass. 407, 412, 910 N.E.2d 330 (2009). "A fundamental tenet of statutory interpretation is that statutory language should be given effect consistent with its plain meaning and in light of the aim of the Legislature unless to do so would achieve an illogical result." Rahim v. District Attorney for the Suffolk Dist., 486 Mass. 544, 547, 159 N.E.3d 690 (2020), quoting Sullivan v. Brookline, 435 Mass. 353, 360, 758 N.E.2d 110 (2001). Because legislative intent controls our interpretation of statutes, "[w]e derive the words’ usual and accepted meaning from sources presumably known to the statute's enactors, such as their use in other legal contexts and dictionary definitions." Commonwealth v. Montarvo, 486 Mass. 535, 536, 159 N.E.3d 682 (2020), quoting Commonwealth v. Garvey, 477 Mass. 59, 61-62, 76 N.E.3d 987 (2017).

Generally, individuals have a duty to testify when subpoenaed because of "the fundamental principle that the public ... has a right to every [person's] evidence" (quotation omitted). See Matter of a Grand Jury Investigation, 443 Mass. at 24, 819 N.E.2d 171, quoting Three Juveniles v. Commonwealth, 390 Mass. 357, 359, 455 N.E.2d 1203 (1983), cert. denied sub nom. Keefe v. Massachusetts, 465 U.S. 1068, 104 S.Ct. 1421, 79 L.Ed.2d 746 (1984). Privileges and disqualifications are both exceptions to this rule, though they each operate differently. See generally M.S. Brodin & M. Avery, Handbook of Massachusetts Evidence § 5.1 (2016).

Drawing examples from the statute at issue to demonstrate the point, § 20, Second, creates a privilege known as the spousal privilege. See Mass. G. Evid. § 504(a) (2021). Under § 20, Second, a witness-spouse has a right not to be compelled to testify in a criminal proceeding against his or her spouse.³ See Commonwealth v. Garcia, 476 Mass. 822, 826, 73 N.E.3d 296 (2017). This privilege belongs to the testifying spouse who may choose whether to testify or not. See id. By contrast, disqualifications are nonwaivable. See id. This is illustrated by § 20, First, otherwise known as the spousal communications disqualification.⁴ See Mass. G. Evid. § 504(b). Specifically, § 20, First, disqualifies spouses "from testifying to private marital conversations, absent certain statutory exceptions ... even when both spouses wish for the conversation to be considered in evidence." Garcia, supra.

As the spousal privilege and spousal communication disqualification suggest, the Legislature may, within constitutional bounds, craft privileges and disqualifications that limit testimony to various degrees. See Commonwealth v. Maillet, 400 Mass. 572, 575-577, 511 N.E.2d 529 (1987) (tracing legislative evolution of spousal disqualification from "absolute prohibition against testimony where one spouse was a party" to current spousal privilege and spousal communication disqualification). In determining the ways in which testimony will be limited, the Legislature must balance multiple policy considerations. See Matter of a Grand Jury Subpoena, 430 Mass. 590, 597-599, 722 N.E.2d 450 (2000) (noting policy considerations in context of creating possible parent-child privilege); Gallagher v. Goldstein, 402 Mass. 457, 460-461, 524 N.E.2d 53 (1988) (same for spousal communication privilege). Once that balance is struck, we construe the resulting limitation narrowly due to the overarching duty to provide evidence. See Matter of a Grand Jury Investigation, 443 Mass. at 23-24, 819 N.E.2d 171. This discussion sets the stage for our interpretation of § 20, Fourth.

b. Scope of disqualification. To start, the text of § 20, Fourth, provides:

"A parent shall not testify against the parent's minor child and a minor child shall not testify against the child's parent in a proceeding before an inquest, grand jury, trial of an indictment or complaint or any other criminal, delinquency or youthful offender proceeding in which the victim in the proceeding is not a family member and does not reside in the family household; provided, however, that for the purposes of this clause, ‘parent’ shall mean the biological or adoptive parent, stepparent, legal guardian or other person who has the right to act in loco parentis for the child; provided further, that in a case in which the victim is a family member and resides in the family household, the parent shall not testify as to any communication with the minor child that was for the purpose of seeking advice regarding the child's legal rights" (emphasis added).

In proceedings where § 20, Fourth, applies, the Legislature clearly intended to disqualify the testimony of parents and their children in some manner. The Commonwealth and the juvenile agree on this point.⁵

The parties do dispute, however, the scope of this disqualification. The Commonwealth maintains that § 20, Fourth, is a total disqualification: when the proceeding is against the child, neither the Commonwealth nor, absent...