Commonwealth v. Williams

1

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA v. NIRAN L. WILLIAMS Appellant COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA v. NIRAN L. WILLIAMS Appellant COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA v. NIRAN L. WILLIAMS Appellant COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA v. NIRAN L. WILLIAMS Appellant COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA v. NIRAN L. WILLIAMS Appellant COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA v. NIRAN L. WILLIAMS Appellant

Nos. 176 EDA 2022, 177 EDA 2022, 178 EDA 2022, 179 EDA 2022,180 EDA 2022, 181 EDA 2022

Superior Court of Pennsylvania

July 12, 2023

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered December 15, 2021 In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-0001887-2016, CP-51-CR-0001889-2016 CP-51-CR-0001890-2016, CP-51-CR-0001891-2016 CP-51-CR-0001892-2016, CP-51-CR-0001893-2016

BEFORE: DUBOW, J., McLAUGHLIN, J., and McCAFFERY, J.

MEMORANDUM

McLAUGHLIN, J.

Niran L. Williams appeals the denial of his Post Conviction Relief Act ("PCRA") petition. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546. He maintains that the court erred in denying his PCRA petition because he raised meritorious ineffectiveness, constitutional, and sentencing claims. He also contends that the court erred by failing to hold an evidentiary hearing. We vacate the PCRA order to the extent it denied Williams' challenge to the constitutionality of his Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act ("SORNA") registration requirements and remand for further proceedings.^[1] We affirm the remainder of the order denying Williams relief.

A jury found Williams guilty in June 2017, of six counts of robbery, two counts each of rape, involuntary deviate sexual intercourse (IDSI), and sexual assault, and three counts each of possessing an instrument of crime (PIC), possessing a firearm without a license, and carrying a firearm on public streets in Philadelphia.^[2] In a separate bench trial following the jury's verdict, the court found Williams guilty of three counts of persons not to possess a firearm.^[3] See Commonwealth v. Williams, No. 1118 EDA 2018, 2019 WL 1522643, at *1 n.1 (Pa.Super. filed Apr. 5, 2019). The court deferred sentencing to

September 2017, to obtain a presentence investigation ("PSI") report and mental health evaluation, with no objection from counsel. See Tr. Ct. Docket Entry No. 125. Before sentencing, counsel requested a continuance for further investigation and waived the issue of speedy sentencing. See Tr. Ct. Docket Entry No. 129; Pa.R.Crim.P. 704. The court continued sentencing to December 1, at which time it held a hearing. See Tr. Ct. Docket Entry No. 129. The trial court sentenced Williams to an aggregate term of 36 to 73 years' incarceration. We affirmed the judgment of sentence, and our Supreme Court denied Williams' petition for allowance of appeal. Williams, No. 1118 EDA 2018, 2019 WL 1522643, appeal denied, 217 A.3d 1209 (Pa. filed Sept. 17, 2019).

Williams filed the instant PCRA petition, his first, in August 2020. The court appointed counsel who filed an amended petition. Williams claimed ineffective assistance of counsel for several issues, a violation of his constitutional rights based on the sufficiency and weight of the evidence, the imposition of an illegal sentence, and a violation of his due process rights due to his lifetime registration as a sexual offender pursuant to SORNA.

The PCRA court issued a Rule 907 notice of its intent to dismiss the petition without a hearing. It concluded that Williams failed "to state a claim upon which post-conviction relief could be granted." Notice of Court's Intent to Dismiss Without Hearing Defendant's Petition for Post-Conviction Relief Pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P. 907, filed 11/22/21, at ¶ 10; Pa.R.Crim.P. 907(1). The court stated that Williams had not presented evidence to support his ineffectiveness claims and failed to show prejudice. The court also concluded that Williams' claims regarding the weight and sufficiency of the evidence were both previously litigated on direct appeal and without merit. Williams did not file a response, and the court denied the petition. Order Dismissing PCRA Petition, filed 12/15/21. This timely appeal followed.^[4]

Williams presents the following claims:

1. Whether the PCRA court erred by dismissing the PCRA petition when clear and convincing evidence was presented to establish that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to protect [Williams'] constitutional rights and the application of the Pennsylvania Rules of Criminal Procedure on multiple occasions; investigate or interview potential witnesses, including alibi witnesses; adequately prepare for trial or properly object to the introduction of prejudicial evidence and improper amendment of the bills of information; protect [Williams'] speedy trial rights; and appeal the pre-trial hearing decision granting joinder of the cases, or file a motion to sever prior to trial.

2. Whether the PCRA court erred by dismissing the PCRA petition when clear and convincing evidence was presented to establish violations of [Williams'] constitutional rights under the United States and Pennsylvania Constitutions, including Fourth Amendment violations based on the inclusion of knowingly false information on the affidavits of probable cause for arrest; due process violations based on the improper amendment of the bills of information; admission of prejudicial evidence; a violation of his speedy trial rights; a conviction based on insufficient evidence; a verdict against the weight of the evidence; and the Sixth Amendment violation established by counsel's ineffectiveness.

3. Whether the trial court imposed an illegal sentence in excess of the statutory maximum.

4. Whether the PCRA court erred by failing to grant an evidentiary hearing.

Williams' Br. at 9.

"Our standard of review of the denial of a PCRA petition is limited to examining whether the evidence of record supports the court's determination and whether its decision is free of legal error." Commonwealth v. Beatty, 207 A.3d 957, 960-61 (Pa.Super. 2019).

Within his first issue, Williams raises several ineffectiveness claims. A petitioner claiming ineffective assistance of counsel must overcome the presumption of effectiveness. See Commonwealth v. Mason, 130 A.3d 601, 618 (Pa. 2015). The petitioner may do so by pleading and proving: "(1) the legal claim underlying the ineffectiveness claim has arguable merit; (2) counsel's action or inaction lacked any reasonable basis designed to effectuate petitioner's interest; and (3) counsel's action or inaction resulted in prejudice to petitioner." Id. (citation omitted). Prejudice in this context means "that there is a reasonable probability that the outcome of the proceedings would have been different but for counsel's action or inaction." Commonwealth v. Johnson, 139 A.3d 1257, 1272 (Pa. 2016) (citation omitted). Counsel will not be deemed ineffective for failing to raise meritless claims. See id. Furthermore, a failure to establish any of the prongs of an ineffectiveness claim will result in rejection of the claim. See Commonwealth v. Basemore, 744 A.2d 717, 738 n.23 (Pa. 2000).

Williams raises multiple ineffectiveness claims within his first issue; we address each separately. We note that collectively for the prejudice prong, Williams maintains that counsel's actions or inactions "adversely affected the outcome of the trial" and denied him the opportunity to prove his innocence. Williams' Br. at 18. He also claims that counsel's failures prejudiced him by "undermin[ing] the jury's ability to make a reliable determination of guilt or innocence." Id. at 19.

Failure to Object to Commonwealth's Noncompliance with Rule 556(B)

Williams argues that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to, or file a motion to quash, the indictment due to the Commonwealth's failure to comply with Rule 556(B) of the Pennsylvania Rules of Criminal Procedure. He maintains that the Commonwealth failed to comply with Rule 556 because it did not provide proof that the Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas petitioned our Supreme Court to resume an indicting grand jury.

This claim of ineffectiveness fails as it lacks arguable merit. Williams confuses the Court of Common Pleas' responsibility pursuant to Rule 556(B) with the Commonwealth's responsibility under Rule 556.2(A) as it relates to indicting grand juries. Pursuant to Rule 556(B), the Court of Common Pleas, not the Commonwealth, petitioned the Supreme Court to resume indicting grand juries and was granted that ability "on or after December 18, 2012." In re Empanelment of Indicting Grand Jury, 54 A.3d 13, 14 (Pa. 2012); Pa.R.Crim.P. 556(B). In comparison, Rule 556.2 requires that when the Commonwealth wishes to proceed by way of a grand jury, it files a motion to "present the matter to an indicting grand jury instead of proceeding to a preliminary hearing." Pa.R.Crim.P. 556.2(A). Upon receiving this motion, "the president judge, or the president judge's designee" reviews the motion and determines whether to grant the motion. Id. at 556.2(A)(3). Here the Commonwealth motioned for a grand jury before the president judge in the instant case in 2016, more than three years after our Supreme Court's 2012 order. See Docket Entry No. 6. Counsel was not ineffective for failing to raise this meritless claim. Johnson, 139 A.3d at 1272.

Failure to Object to Amendment of Bills of Information

Williams maintains that the Commonwealth "amended the bills on the day jury selection was to begin, without objection from trial counsel." Williams' Br. at 16. He states that he did not know the additional charges and was not able to "prepare a defense against the new claims." Id. He argues that this amendment was not proper and counsel's failure to object ...