Commonwealth v. Williams

481 Mass. 443

116 N.E.3d 609

COMMONWEALTH

v.Quinton K. WILLIAMS.

SJC-12549

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Plymouth..

Argued October 2, 2018.

Decided February 13, 2019.

Edward Crane, Cambridge, for the defendant.

Gail M. McKenna, Assistant District Attorney, for the Commonwealth.

Anthony Mirenda, Caroline S. Donovan, Amanda Hainsworth, Christopher J. Cifrino, & Justin Marble, Boston, for Massachusetts Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers & others, amici curiae, submitted a brief.

Rebecca Kiley, Committee for Public Counsel Services, for Committee for Public Counsel Services, amicus curiae, submitted a brief.

Present (Sitting at Worcester): Gants, C.J., Lenk, Gaziano, Lowy, Budd, Cypher, & Kafker, JJ.

BUDD, J.

The defendant, Quinton K. Williams, an African-American man, was charged with possession of a class B substance with the intent to distribute pursuant to G. L. c. 94C, § 32A (a ). During jury selection, over the defendant's objection, the judge excused for cause a prospective juror who stated that she believed that "the system is rigged against young African American males." The defendant subsequently was convicted and now appeals, claiming that the judge abused his discretion in dismissing the prospective juror.

Our jurisprudence regarding how to assess beliefs or opinions expressed by prospective jurors during voir dire has been less than clear. Accordingly, we take this opportunity to set forth the factors that a judge should consider when a prospective juror discloses a belief or opinion based on his or her world view. We conclude that although the voir dire was incomplete, it did not prejudice this defendant. Thus, we affirm the conviction.¹

Background. During jury selection, the judge asked questions of the entire venire, including the following:

"[Y]ou've been read a copy of the complaint which charges [the defendant], which is just an allegation, that he possessed [a] class B controlled substance, cocaine, with the intent to distribute.

"Is there anything about the subject matter or your views about the subject matter that would affect your ability to be fair and impartial in deciding the case?"

Prospective juror no. 15 (prospective juror), among other potential jurors, answered in the affirmative. Subsequently, the judge and the prospective juror had the following exchange at sidebar:

Q.: "I believe you might have answered a question affirmatively. Was that a -- a hardship question?"

THE CLERK : "No.... It was on fair and impartial ... [o]r bias."

Q.: "You feel like you might have a bias in the case?"

A.: "Yeah. I worked with, like, low income youth in a school setting. I worked a lot with people who were convicted of -- like teenagers who were convicted of drug crimes.

"And frankly, I think the system is rigged against young African American males.

"I'm happy to serve on the jury trial -- on the jury because I think it's important, but -- "Q.: "You think that belief might interfere with your ability to be fair and impartial?"

A.: "I don't think so."

Q.: "You -- you think you can put aside that opinion and bias -- "

A.: "I don't think I can put it aside. I think that's --"

Q.: "No?"

A.: " -- the lens that I view the world through, but I think I can be unbiased -- I think I can be -- I think I can listen to the evidence."

Q.: "All right. But you're going to have to be able to put that out of your mind and look at only the evidence. Do you think you can do that?"

A.: "I think so."

Q.: "I have to be assured that you can though. You think you -- as -- as you sit in there, it might -- your experiences with -- with people in that type of a situation is going to have you look at it differently?"

A.: "Probably."

Q.: "Okay. Step over there for a minute."

When the prospective juror stepped away from the sidebar, the Commonwealth requested that she be excused for cause and the following discussion ensued between the judge and the parties:

THE PROSECUTOR : "I ask that she be excused for cause."

THE JUDGE : "Okay. What do you say?"

DEFENSE COUNSEL : "Judge, I'm objecting.

"I mean there -- there's -- the drug -- the issues regarding the mass incarceration of young African American males has been all over the news. Everybody has read about it. This is -- she has a little more information, but she did say she could be impartial.

"And by the way, he's not a juvenile. He's an adult."

THE JUDGE : "Yeah. But he's a youthful looking guy, and she says she's going to have trouble. She hesitated quite a bit, Counsel, and I -- I -- I find on the record that she really struggled with it.

"She said I'll try to and then that --

"I'm going to let her go for cause. I think -- "

The judge thereafter excused the prospective juror for cause. By the end of jury selection, the Commonwealth and the defendant each had one remaining peremptory challenge. Ultimately, the jury found the defendant guilty. We granted the defendant's application for direct appellate review.

Discussion. The defendant argues on appeal that it was error to dismiss the prospective juror for cause because neither her work experience nor her belief that the criminal justice system is unfair to African-American men rendered her unfit to serve, and further that the dismissal was prejudicial.

We agree that holding particular beliefs about how African-American men are treated in the criminal justice system should not be automatically disqualifying. See Mason v. United States, 170 A.3d 182, 187 (D.C. 2017). However, that is not what happened here. The judge undertook to determine whether, given her opinion about the criminal justice system, the prospective juror could nevertheless be an impartial juror in the trial of an African-American man. However, the voir dire ultimately was incomplete because the judge did not inquire further to determine whether, given the prospective juror's beliefs based on her life experiences, she nevertheless could fairly evaluate the evidence and follow the law.

Instead, the judge decided that the prospective juror was not able to be impartial because she expressed uncertainty about being able to "put aside" her beliefs and experiences and because she acknowledged that she would look at the case "differently" due to her experiences. As discussed infra, a judge in this situation should focus not on a prospective juror's ability to put aside his or her beliefs formed as a result of life experiences, but rather on whether that juror, given his or her life experiences and resulting beliefs, is able to listen to the evidence and apply the law as provided by the judge.

A judge's discretion in this realm, although broad, is rooted in determining a prospective juror's impartiality based on the juror's answers in a sufficiently thorough voir dire. Because the voir dire of the prospective juror here did not address whether she could fairly evaluate the evidence and apply the law given her belief regarding the justice system, the judge's assessment of her ability to be a fair and impartial juror was incomplete. However, because we conclude that the defendant was not prejudiced as a result, we affirm.

1. Standard. A criminal defendant is entitled to a trial by an impartial jury pursuant to the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and art. 12 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights. See Commonwealth v. Vann Long, 419 Mass. 798, 802, 647 N.E.2d 1162 (1995), and cases cited. That is, each juror must be "impartial as to the persons involved and unprejudiced and uncommitted as to the defendant['s] guilt or past misconduct." Commonwealth v. Ricard, 355 Mass. 509, 512, 246 N.E.2d 433 (1969). General Laws c. 234A, § 67A, addresses the situation when a prospective juror indicates that he or she may not be able to be impartial, stating in pertinent part:

"To determine whether a juror stands indifferent in the case, if it appears that, as a result of the impact of considerations which may cause a decision to be made in whole or in part upon issues extraneous to the case, including, but not limited to, community attitudes, possible exposure to potentially prejudicial material or possible preconceived opinions toward the credibility of certain classes of persons, the juror may not stand indifferent, the court shall, or the parties or their attorneys may, with the permission and under the direction of the court, examine the juror specifically with respect to such considerations, attitudes, exposure, opinions or any other matters which may cause a decision to be made in whole or in part upon issues extraneous to the issues in the case."

Thus, if it appears that a juror might not stand indifferent, the judge must hold an individual voir dire, the scope of which is within the judge's sound discretion. See Commonwealth v. Flebotte, 417 Mass. 348, 355, 630 N.E.2d 265 (1994). Concluding whether a prospective juror stands indifferent is also within the judge's discretion. Commonwealth v. Ruell, 459 Mass. 126, 136, 943 N.E.2d 447, cert. denied, 565 U.S. 841, 132 S.Ct. 153, 181 L.Ed.2d 69 (2011). However, this discretion is not unfettered; the judge's conclusion must be supported by a voir dire that sufficiently uncovers whether the prospective juror can fairly evaluate the evidence and follow the law. See Commonwealth v. Perez, 460 Mass. 683, 688, 954 N.E.2d 1 (2011) ("judge's duty is to ‘examine jurors fully regarding possible bias or prejudice’ ").

We have not been particularly precise when discussing the handling of juror opinions, and, as a result, our jurisprudence is somewhat muddled regarding the proper procedure for determining impartiality when a prospective juror expresses any preconceived opinions he or she has regarding the case to be tried as compared to an opinion formed based on his or her life experiences or belief system. Nonetheless, there is an important difference between the two: asking a prospective juror to put aside his or her preconceived notions about the case to be tried is entirely appropriate (and indeed necessary)² ; however, asking him or her to...