Commonwealth v. Yale

249 A.3d 1001

COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Appellee

v.Eric YALE, Appellant

No. 9 MAP 2020

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.

Argued: September 16, 2020

Decided: April 29, 2021

Robert Michael Buttner, Esq., Scranton, Steven M. Greenwald, Esq., Wilkes-Barre, Luzerne County Public Defender's Office, Jules Epstein, Esq., Temple University Beasley School of Law, for Appellant.

James L. McMonagle, Esq., Wilkes Barre, Stefanie Joy Salavantis, Esq., Luzerne County District Attorney's Office, for Appellee.

BAER, C.J., SAYLOR, TODD, DONOHUE, DOUGHERTY, WECHT, MUNDY, JJ.

OPINION

JUSTICE DONOHUE

We granted discretionary review to clarify the appropriate standard for the admission of evidence of a third person's crimes, wrongs or other acts ("third person guilt") offered by a criminal defendant in an effort to raise a reasonable doubt that he was not the perpetrator of the crime charged. The Superior Court applied the standard of admissibility typically associated with the Commonwealth's introduction of crimes, wrongs or other acts evidence against a criminal defendant pursuant to Pennsylvania Rule of Evidence ("Pa.R.E.") 404(b).¹ We hold that evidence of a third person's guilt offered by a defendant is admissible if it is relevant pursuant to Pa.R.E. 401² and not otherwise excludable pursuant to Pa.R.E. 403.³ Thus, we vacate the Superior Court order and remand for proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Background

On March 21, 2017, United States Marshalls went to the home of appellant Eric Yale's mother where Yale resided to serve an arrest warrant on Larry Thompson. Officer Jeffrey Ference of the Wilkes-Barre Police Department assisted the Marshalls in serving the warrant. While searching the residence for Thompson, Officer Ference entered Yale's bedroom, where he found Yale, soda bottles containing methamphetamine, and materials commonly used to produce methamphetamine, including lighter fluid, Drano, lithium batteries, and soda bottles with tubes coming out of them. The chemicals are "mixed together in a plastic soda bottle" to produce the drug; this method of producing the drug is commonly referred to as the "one-pot" method. N.T., 9/26/2017, at 45-46. Officer Ference found Thompson hiding in the closet in Yale's bedroom. He took both Thompson and Yale into custody. After being read his Miranda rights, Yale admitted that the materials found in his bedroom were for the manufacture of methamphetamine. Because the chemicals present in the bedroom have a tendency to catch on fire or emit toxic gasses, Officer Ference contacted a special unit of the Pennsylvania State Police to dispose of the materials. The Commonwealth alleged that Yale and Thompson were liable under both principal and accomplice theories of liability.

Yale proceeded to a jury trial on September 26, 2017.⁴ He attempted to prove that Thompson was solely responsible for the contraband found in Yale's bedroom. In support of this defense, Yale sought to introduce evidence of Thompson's previous arrests for methamphetamine-related offenses, including an October 12, 2016 arrest and a November 3, 2015 guilty plea. Both incidents involved Thompson's use of the "one-pot" method to manufacture methamphetamine. The trial court prohibited Yale from introducing this third person guilt evidence, finding that it was irrelevant and would confuse the jury. N.T., 9/26/17, at 81–82. Relying on Commonwealth v. Rini , 285 Pa.Super. 475, 427 A.2d 1385 (1981),⁵ and later cases, including Commonwealth v. Nocero , 399 Pa.Super. 346, 582 A.2d 376 (1990),⁶ appeal denied , 527 Pa. 643, 593 A.2d 416 (1991), which announced a two-part admissibility test that includes a "signature crime" prong, and Commonwealth v. Palagonia , 868 A.2d 1212 (Pa. Super. 2005),⁷ the trial court opined that Thompson's prior acts and the current case did not have "such detailed similarities or the same methodology" so as to exonerate Yale. Trial Court Opinion, 10/26/2018, at 8–9. Thus, it concluded, the evidence of third person guilt was not probative and would have confused the jury "by permitting the inference that being charged with a crime was itself suggestive of guilt" and by requiring "the holding of a trial within a trial." Id. at 9.

The jury found Yale guilty of possession with intent to manufacture or deliver, possession of red phosphorus with intent to manufacture; possession of a controlled substance; possession of drug paraphernalia; and risking catastrophe.⁸ On November 17, 2017, the trial court sentenced Yale to incarceration for an aggregate term of sixty to one hundred and forty-four months. After the trial court denied Yale's post-sentence motions, he appealed to the Superior Court. In a non-precedential decision, the Superior Court affirmed. Commonwealth v. Yale , 472 MDA 2018, 2019 WL 3763966 (Pa. Super. Aug. 9, 2019). Relevant to this appeal, Yale argued that the trial court improperly precluded the evidence of Thompson's previous methamphetamine-related offenses.

In affirming the trial court's evidentiary ruling, the Superior Court recognized that a defendant has a fundamental constitutional right to present evidence in support of a full defense and that evidence is admissible provided it is relevant and not subject to exclusion by an evidentiary rule. Yale , 2019 WL 3763966, at *4. Initially citing Rini , 427 A.2d at 1388, the Superior Court opined that a defendant may introduce "evidence that someone else committed a crime which bears a highly detailed similarity to the crime with which the defendant is charged." Yale , 2019 WL 3763966, at *4 (emphasis in original). It also referred to Nocero and Palagonia , in which the Superior Court had adopted the standard more stringent than Rini that is akin to that which is applied when the Commonwealth offers Rule 404(b) evidence against a defendant. Id. (citing Palagonia , 868 A.2d at 1216 ("Even if the proffered third-person crime and the charged crime occurred close in time to one another, the [proffered] evidence is not admissible unless the nature of the crimes is so distinctive or unusual as to be like a signature or the handiwork of the same individual.")).

Like the trial court, the Superior Court concluded that the evidence was inadmissible:

Beyond Thompson's cases involving methamphetamine production, "[Yale] did not demonstrate how the present cases against [Yale] and [Thompson] had such detailed similarities or the same methodology as the ... cases against [Thompson] to show any common scheme, plan or design which would have exonerated [Yale.]" Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) Opinion, 10/26/2018, at 9.^{[9 ]} Consequently, [Yale] fails to demonstrate how Thompson's prior bad acts are so "strikingly similar" to his own charged crimes as to establish Thompson as "the person charged with the commission of the crime on trial." Rini, supra , at 1388 ; see N.T. Trial, 9/26/2017, at 45 (describing one-pot method of methamphetamine production as "[t]he way people make methamphetamine right now[.]"). Our review of the record leads us to conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding that evidence of Thompson's prior methamphetamine-related activity was not so distinctive as to warrant admission. Palagonia , supra at 1216-17.

Yale , 2019 WL 3763966, at *5. Consequently, the Superior Court affirmed the judgment of sentence. Yale petitioned this Court for allowance of appeal, which we granted to decide the following question:

(1) Whether the Superior Court misapplied controlling case law and misapprehended controlling facts in concluding that the trial court did not err as a matter of law or abuse its discretion in precluding the defense from presenting evidence that Larry Thompson, an individual found at the scene, had been previously arrested for similar offenses and possessed knowledge of how to manufacture methamphetamine, to demonstrate that he was the perpetrator of the present charges?

Commonwealth v. Yale , ––– Pa. ––––, 226 A.3d 93 (2020).

We review an evidentiary ruling for an abuse of discretion. Commonwealth v. Travaglia , 611 Pa. 481, 28 A.3d 868, 873 (2011). This Court has explained that the "term ‘discretion’ imports the exercise of judgment, wisdom and skill so as to reach a dispassionate conclusion, within the framework of the law, and is not exercised for the purpose of giving effect to the will of the [trial] judge." Commonwealth v. Widmer , 560 Pa. 308, 744 A.2d 745, 753 (2000) (citation omitted). "An appellate court will not find an abuse of discretion ‘based on a mere error of judgment, but rather ... where the [trial] court has reached a conclusion which overrides or misapplies the law, or where the judgment exercised is manifestly unreasonable, or the result of partiality, prejudice, bias or ill-will.’ " Id. (quoting Commonwealth v. Eichinger , 591 Pa. 1, 915 A.2d 1122, 1140 (2007) (citation omitted)).

Arguments of the Parties

Yale contends that several factors underpin his right to present "substantial and highly reliable" evidence of Thompson's prior involvement in the manufacture of methamphetamine, including the lack of a search warrant for him, "no prior evidence linking him to drug manufacture, and no fingerprint or other forensic evidence linking [him] to the contraband." Yale's Brief at 17. According to Yale, the Superior Court's application of "the most stringent test possible for other acts evidence" — a "signature" threshold — where the defendant offers such evidence to negate his guilt was in contravention of Pennsylvania law, specifically, Pennsylvania Rules of Evidence 401 and 402, as well as state and federal cases recognizing a defendant's fundamental due process right to present a fair and complete defense in the form of relevant evidence, not otherwise excludable, that would tend to make the defense theory more probable than not. See Yale's Brief at 19–23 (citing cases). Yale suggests that the Superior Court erred because it altered the ordinary rules of evidence, which require that crimes, wrongs or...