Commonwealth v. A.Z.

225 N.E.3d 278

COMMONWEALTH

v.A.Z.

SJC-13455

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Norfolk.

Argued November 6, 2023.

Decided January 25, 2024.

Incompetent Person, Criminal charges, Commitment. Due Process of Law, Competency to stand trial. Practice, Criminal, Competency to stand trial. Moot Question.

Complaint received and sworn to in the Wrentham Division of the District Court Department on July 9, 2018.

A hearing on an order for hospitalization and examination was had before Steven E. Thomas, J.

The Supreme Judicial Court granted an application for direct appellate review.

Devorah Anne Vester, Committee for Public Counsel Services, for the defendant.

Michael McGee, Assistant District Attorney, for the Commonwealth.

Justin M. Woolf, Tatum A. Pritchard, Steven J. Schwartz, Alex Bou-Rhodes, Phillip Kassel, & Jennifer Honig, for Disability Law Center, Inc., & others, amici curiae, submitted a brief.

Present: Gaziano, Lowy, Kafker, Wendlandt, & Georges, JJ.

LOWY, J.

[1, 2] This case involves the constitutional rights of a criminal defendant who was involuntarily hospitalized for a competency determination pursuant to G. L. c. 123, § 15 (b) (§ 15 [b]). An involuntary commitment infringes upon a defendant’s fundamental right to liberty and thus must satisfy strict scrutiny under the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights and the United States Constitution. See Matter of a Minor, 484 Mass. 295, 309, 148 N.E.3d 1182 (2020). To pass strict scrutiny, the involuntary commitment must be the least restrictive means available to vindicate the governmental interest at stake. Id.

[3, 4] Accordingly, we conclude that substantive due process mandates that a judge find that hospitalization is required before involuntarily committing a criminal defendant to a hospital for a competency determination. Specifically, we hold that it is unconstitutional, as applied, for a court to hospitalize a pretrial defendant under § 15 (b), for a clinical evaluation and observation of competency, absent a finding by the judge, by clear and convincing evidence, that hospitalization is the least restrictive means available to determine adequately a criminal defendant’s competency to stand trial.

We have not previously held that a District Court judge acting pursuant to § 15 (b) must make such findings, and the judge here did not do so. Accordingly, we conclude that the defendant’s constitutional rights were violated.¹

1. Background. a. G. L. c. 123, § 15. As this court has observed previously, G. L. c. 123, § 15, provides for two categories of competency evaluations. See Garcia v. Commonwealth, 487 Mass. 97, 106 n.15, 164 N.E.3d 862 (2021). First, pursuant to G. L. c. 123, § 15 (a) (§ 15 [a]),

"a judge may order an evaluation of a defendant by a court clinician before trial if the judge doubts whether the defendant is competent to stand trial or criminally responsible by reason of mental illness …. That examination is typically brief and takes place in the court house or in a place where the defendant is being detained before trial."

Garcia, supra. Second, following a § 15 (a) evaluation and pursuant to § 15 (b),

"the judge may then order that the person be involuntarily hospitalized for up to twenty days, for observation and a more detailed examination, if, based on the court clinician’s evaluation, the court ‘has reason to believe that such observation and further examination are necessary in order to determine whether mental illness or mental defect have so affected a person that he is not competent to stand trial or not criminally responsible.’"

Garcia, supra, quoting G. L. c. 123, § 15 (b). The judge may specifically order the person be hospitalized under § 15 (b) at Bridgewater State Hospital if the person is male and appears to require strict security. G. L. c. 123, § 15 (b).

b. Facts. On July 9, 2018, the defendant was arraigned in the Wrentham Division of the District Court Department for a "bomb/hijack threat" in violation of G. L. c. 269, § 14 (b).² On January 10, 2019, while released on personal recognizance, she underwent a § 15 (a) evaluation with a court clinician, Dr. Leah Robertson. The District Court judge held a hearing later that day to determine whether a § 15 (b) evaluation was necessary.

The defendant asserted that hospitalization was not necessary for further evaluation of competency, and she requested an outpatient § 15 (b) examination. In support of the defendant’s motion, defense counsel asserted that Dr. Patricia Schmitz, an independently retained clinician, "told [counsel] that she believes that she could complete a [§ 15] evaluation on an outpatient basis."

[5] Thereafter, Dr. Robertson testified as to her observations of the defendant during the § 15 (a) evaluation. Dr. Robertson specifically testified that, based on the § 15 (a) evaluation, she did not believe the defendant "possesse[d] the ability to consult with her attorney in a rational manner in her own best interest."³ She then recommended that the defendant receive further evaluation at a psychiatric hospital. At the conclusion of the hearing, the judge endorsed Dr. Robertson’s recommendation and ordered that the defendant be committed to the Solomon Carter Fuller Mental Health Center for twenty days for observation and further examination.

Although the defendant was ultimately found competent to stand trial,⁴ the Commonwealth dismissed the case against her on October 1, 2019.

[6, 7] 2. Discussion. a. Mootness. The Commonwealth contends that we need not reach the merits of this appeal because the case has been dismissed and the defendant’s appeal is moot. But "[w]hen considering other statutory provisions that allow involuntary civil commitment, we have determined that the continuing stigma of a potentially wrongful commitment alone sufficed to defeat a claim of mootness." Garcia, 487 Mass. at 102, 164 N.E.3d 862, quoting Matter of a Minor, 484 Mass. at 299, 148 N.E.3d 1182. The same continuing stigma follows a wrongful, involuntary commitment under § 15 (b), and therefore, the defendant has a surviving personal interest in adjudicating whether the nature of her confinement was wrongful. Further, "even absent the defendant’s surviving interest, ‘it is well established that cases involving the confinement of mentally ill persons present classic examples of issues that are capable of repetition, yet evading review, which thus warrant appellate review even after the confinement ends.’" Garcia, supra, quoting Pembroke Hosp. v. D.L., 482 Mass. 346, 351, 122 N.E.3d 1058 (2019). Accordingly, the defendant’s appeal is not moot.

[8] b. Standard of commitment under G. L. c. 123, § 15 (b). The defendant argues that § 15 (b) requires a judge to make two factual findings before involuntarily committing a defendant: (i) a finding of a likelihood of serious harm absent hospitalization and (ii) a finding that hospitalization is the least restrictive means of determining competency. We review questions of statutory interpretation de novo. Pembroke Hosp., 482 Mass. at 351, 122 N.E.3d 1058.

[9] i. Likelihood of serious harm. The defendant contends that § 15 (b) only authorizes an involuntary commitment if the failure to detain a defendant would create a likelihood of serious harm to the defendant or others. We decline to adopt this statutory interpretation.

[10] "Our primary duty is to interpret a statute in accordance with the intent of the Legislature." Pembroke Hosp., 482 Mass. at 352, 122 N.E.3d 1058, quoting Pyle v. School Comm. of S. Hadley, 423 Mass. 283, 285, 667 N.E.2d 869 (1996). Here, the Legislature expressly incorporated a likelihood of serious harm standard in several nearby provisions of c. 123. See, e.g., G. L. c. 123, §§ 7, 8, 9, 12. That the Legislature chose to exclude this standard in § 15 (b) demonstrates that the Legislature did not intend for this standard to govern a § 15 (b) determination. See Commonwealth v. Gagnon, 439 Mass. 826, 833, 792 N.E.2d 119 (2003), quoting 2A N.J. Singer, Sutherland Statutory Construction § 46.06, at 194 (6th ed. rev. 2000) ("[W]here the legislature has carefully employed a term in one place and excluded it in another, it should not be implied where excluded").

The defendant argues that the Legislature’s intent is instead demonstrated through § 15 (b)’s reference to a "strict security" standard, which incorporates a likelihood of serious harm standard. Section 15 (b) provides for two independent alternatives: "hospitaliz[ation] [(i)] at a facility or, [(ii)] if such person is a male and appears to require strict security, at the Bridgewater state hospital" (emphasis added). See G. L. c. 123, § 15 (b); Miller v. Miller, 448 Mass. 320, 329, 861 N.E.2d 393 (2007), quoting Bleich v. Maimonides Sch., 447 Mass. 38, 46-47, 849 N.E.2d 185 (2006) ("It is fundamental to statutory construction that the word ‘or’ is disjunctive ‘unless the context and the main purpose of all the words demand otherwise’"). The latter "strict security" standard is thus inapposite to the preceding clause of the statute and provides no evidence of the Legislature’s intent as to commitments that, like the one in this case, do not take place at Bridgewater State Hospital.

[11] ii. Least restrictive means. The question we address next is whether a defendant’s hospitalization for twenty (or even forty⁵) days for the purpose of determining competency is the least restrictive means available to vindicate a compelling governmental interest. The Commonwealth has a compelling governmental interest in determining whether a defendant is competent to stand trial, and a defendant has a constitutional right not to be tried if he or she is incompetent. See Matter of E.C., 479 Mass. 113, 119, 92 N.E.3d 724 (2018) (there is "a compelling interest in [the defendant] not being tried if incompetent").

[12] To further this compelling interest, § 15 (b) authorizes a court to involuntarily hospitalize a defendant for up to twenty, or forty, days. Section 15 (b) thus infringes upon...