Conatser v. Fentress Cnty.

LINDA CONATSER and DANNY CONATSER, Plaintiffs, v. FENTRESS COUNTY, TENNESSEE, et al., Defendants.

No. 2:17-cv-00023

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT MIDDLE DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE COOKEVILLE DIVISION

July 10, 2018

CHIEF JUDGE CRENSHAW

MEMORANDUM OPINION

After Fentress County, Tennessee, Sheriff Charles Cravens detained Linda Conatser, Jamestown, Tennessee, Police Detective Jeff Hancock and Chief Ken Hancock (collectively, the "Jamestown officials") walked Conatser to a Fentress County Sheriff vehicle to transport her to the jail. Conatser sued the Jamestown officials and the City of Jamestown, Tennessee (collectively, the "Jamestown Defendants") for the incident, alleging false arrest and false imprisonment, in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983; civil conspiracy, in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3); and state law claims.¹ (Doc. No. 52.) Before the Court is the Jamestown Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment. (Doc. No. 56.) For the following reasons, the Motion is granted.

I. Undisputed Facts²

On October 4, 2016, Linda Conatser went to McDonald's in Jamestown, Tennessee, to have breakfast. (Doc. No. 62-6 at 4.) After breakfast, she went to the counter to ask her grandson-in-law, a chef at the McDonald's, if he wanted a ride home. (Id. at 5.) When Linda Conatser turned to leave the conversation, she saw Cravens glaring at her. (Id.) She knew Cravens was angry about a dispute she had with her neighbor, Cravens' friend, on Fourth of July. She approached Cravens and told him that her husband Danny Conatser had told her that Cravens wanted to talk with her. (Id.)

The conversation escalated and at some point Cravens told Linda Conatser to "get out." (Id. at 6.) Linda Conatser countered that she was not going to "get out" because of her (apparently mistaken) belief that McDonald's was in the city, rather than the county, so the Sheriff did not have jurisdiction. (Id.) Cravens told Linda Conatser that if she did not leave, he was going to "lock [her] up." (Id.) Linda Conatser retorted that Cravens likes to "lock people up," at which point Cravens told her, "You stay right here. Don't you go anywhere. Don't you move. Do you hear me? Don't go anywhere." (Id.)

The video shows that Linda Conatser complied with Cravens' demands and stayed in the restaurant. (Doc. No. 62-2.) Cravens went outside to call for backup, and Linda Conatser told other patrons that "it look[ed] like [she was] going to get arrested." (Doc. No. 62-6 at 6.) Her grandson then came up to her, and she told him, "I think I'm fixing to get arrested." (Id. at 8.) Soon, Linda Conatser's granddaughter arrived, to which Linda Conatser said, "I think I'm going to getarrested." (Id. at 9.) Linda Conatser testified that at this point, she did not feel like she could leave the restaurant or she would be charged with "alluding arrest." (Id.)

Within a few minutes, the Jamestown officials arrived. (Id. at 10.) The Jamestown Police Department came in aid of the Fentress County Sheriff's Department because the two departments had a verbal "Mutual Aid Agreement," under which they would help each other in the event one calls for backup. (Doc. No. 62-10.) Cravens told Ken Hancock that Linda Conatser was belligerent and in his face and refused to walk away after being asked three times. Ken Hancock signaled for Linda Conatser to come with him and she complied. (Doc. No. 62-6 at 10.) Ken Hancock asked her to get into a Fentress County Sheriff's Department vehicle and she complied. (Id. at 11.) A Sheriff's Deputy then transported her to jail. (Id.) The Jamestown officials did not handcuff Linda Conatser or use any force on her. (Id. at 13.)

II. Analysis

The Jamestown officials move for summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity. The Supreme Court set forth the standard for analyzing whether a government official is entitled to qualified immunity:

In [Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 121 S.Ct. 2151 (2001)], this Court mandated a two-step sequence for resolving government officials' qualified immunity claims. First, a court must decide whether the facts that a plaintiff has alleged (see Fed. Rules Civ. Proc. 12(b)(6), (c)) or shown (see Rules 50, 56) make out a violation of a constitutional right. 533 U.S., at 201, 121 S.Ct. 2151. Second, if the plaintiff has satisfied this first step, the court must decide whether the right at issue was "clearly established" at the time of defendant's alleged misconduct. Ibid. Qualified immunity is applicable unless the official's conduct violated a clearly established constitutional right. Anderson, at 640, 107 S.Ct. 3034.

Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 232 (2009).

In evaluating if a defendant is entitled to qualified immunity, the Court must adopt "the plaintiff's version of the facts . . . unless the plaintiff's version is 'blatantly contradicted by therecord, so that no reasonable jury could believe it.'" Soudemire v. Mich. Dept. of Corr., 705 F.3d 560, 565 (6th Cir. 2013) (quoting Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380 (2007)). When, as here, there is a video recording of the incident, the Court cannot construe the facts in a light that "is wholly unsupportable—in the view of any reasonable jury—by the video recording." Shreve v. Franklin Cty., Ohio, 743 F.3d 126, 132 (6th Cir. 2014) (quoting Marvin v. City of Taylor, 509 F.3d 234, 239 (6th Cir. 2007)). The plaintiff "has the burden to prove that a right is clearly established." Everson v. Leis, 556 F.3d 484, 494 (6th Cir. 2009) (citing Barrett v. Steubenville City Sch., 388 F.3d 967, 970 (6th Cir. 2004)). When, on summary judgment, "the legal question of immunity is completely dependent on which view of the disputed facts is accepted by the jury," then summary judgment must be denied. Humphrey v. Mabry, 482 F.3d 840, 846 (6th Cir. 2007) (quoting Brandenburg v. Cureton, 882 F.2d 211, 216 (6th Cir. 1989)).

A. False Arrest and False Imprisonment

The Conatsers bring false arrest and false imprisonment claims against the Jamestown defendants. False arrest is a type of false imprisonment claim, and the two are typically analyzed together. Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 388 (2007); see also Taylor v. Terry, No. 3:15-cv-794, 2015 WL 5008782, at *2 (M.D. Tenn. Aug. 19, 2015) (noting that false arrest and false imprisonment cases are analyzed together) (citing references omitted). The Conatsers argue that the Jamestown Defendants violated Linda Conatser's Fourth Amendment right "to be free from unreasonable seizure (without probable cause seizure)." (Doc. No. 62 at 15 (citing Miller v. Maddox, 866 F.3d 386 (6th Cir. 2017))). The citing reference, Miller v. Maddox, dealt solely with a malicious prosecution claim, which is not at issue in this case.³ 866 F.3d at 396. Rather, this case involves the clearly established right "that an arrest without probable cause violates the FourthAmendment." Thacker v. City of Columbus, 328 F.3d 244, 260 (6th Cir. 2003) (quoting Donovan v. Thames, 105 F.3d 291, 297-98 (6th Cir. 1997)). The Conatsers agree that Cravens ordered Linda Conatser not to leave the McDonald's, but contend that she was not actually arrested until Ken Hancock escorted her to the county vehicle. (Doc. No. 62 at 12.)

The undisputed facts viewed in the light most favorable to the Conatsers and consistent with the video evidence show that Cravens arrested Linda Conatser. "Interactions between police and civilians are divided into three categories: (1) encounters, (2) investigative detentions, and (3) arrests." 5 Am. Jur. 2d Arrest § 1 n.2 (2d ed. May 2018) (citing reference omitted). There "is no bright line rule differentiating an arrest from a detention supported by less than probable cause." Posr v. Doherty, 944 F.2d 91, 98 (2d Cir. 1991) (citing Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 506 (1983)). "There has been an arrest if . . . a reasonable person would conclude that he was not free to leave after brief questioning." Stevens v. Rose, 298 F.3d 880, 883 (9th Cir. 2002) (quoting United States v. Del Vizo, 918 F.2d 821, 824 (9th Cir. 1990)). "Whether a seizure is an arrest or merely an investigatory detention [ ] depends on the reasonableness of the level of intrusion under the totality of the circumstances." Posr, 944 F.2d at 98 (citing United States v. Martinez, 808 F.2d 1050, 1053 (5th Cir. 1987)); see also United States v. Pacheco-Alvarez, 227 F. Supp. 3d 863, 887 (S.D. Ohio 2016) (discussing the factors to determine whether an investigatory stop turns into an arrest) (citing Brown v. Lewis, 779 F.3d 401, 414 (6th Cir. 2015)). "An arrest need not be formal; it may occur even if the formal words of arrest have not been spoken provided that the subject is restrained and his freedom of movement is restricted." Id. (citing United States v. Levy, 731 F.2d 997, 1000 (2d Cir. 1984)). "[T]o constitute an 'arrest' all that is required 'is some act by the officer which indicates his intention to detain or to take a person into custody, thereby subjecting that person tothe actual control and will of the officer.'" United States v. Randle, 67 F. Supp. 2d 734, 738 (E.D. Mich. 1999) (quoting Commonwealth of Pennsylvania v. Brown, 326 A.2d 904 (1974)).

Here, Cravens was not investigating Linda Conatser for anything or questioning her—he told her not to leave for the purpose of arresting her. Linda Conatser did not believe she was free to leave, and neither would any reasonable person. Under the totality of the circumstances, no reasonable jury could conclude that when Cravens told Linda Conatser not to leave the restaurant and then called for backup for the purposes of transporting her to jail, he was subjecting her to an "encounter" or an "investigative detention." Linda Conatser had been arrested as a matter of law.

Because Cravens arrested Linda Conatser, the Conatsers cannot establish a false arrest claim against the Jamestown officials. To prevail on a false arrest claim, Linda Conatser would have to prove that the "arresting officer lacked probable cause to arrest the plaintiff." Sykes v. Anderson, 625...