Congregation Rabbinical Coll. of Tartikov v. Vill. of Pomona

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CONGREGATION RABBINICAL COLLEGE OF TARTIKOV, INC., et al., Plaintiffs, v. VILLAGE OF POMONA, et al., Defendants.

No. 20-CV-6158 (KMK)

United States District Court, S.D. New York

September 23, 2024

Joseph A. Churgin, Esq.

Donna C. Sobel, Esq.

Savad Churgin, Attorneys at Law

Nanuet, NY

Counsel for Plaintiffs

Roman P. Storzer, Esq.

Storzer & Associates, P.C.

Washington, DC

Counsel for Plaintiffs

John G. Stepanovich, Esq.

Stepanovich Law P.L.C.

Virginia Beach, VA

Counsel for Plaintiffs

Brian D. Nugent, Esq.

Matthew W. Lizotte, Esq.

Patrick J. McGorman, Esq.

Feerick Nugent MacCartney PLLC

South Nyack, NY

Counsel for Defendants

OPINION & ORDER

KENNETH M. KARAS UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Congregation Rabbinical College of Tartikov, Inc. (“Tartikov”) and several individuals (collectively “Plaintiffs”) brought this Action against the Village of Pomona (the “Village”) and the Board of Trustees of the Village of Pomona (the “Board,” collectively “Defendants”), challenging certain zoning ordinances enacted by the Village. (See Compl. (Dkt. No. 1).) Before the Court is Defendants' Motion for Attorneys' Fees. (Not. of Mot. (Dkt. No. 90).) For the following reasons, the Motion is denied.

I. Background

A. Factual Background & Prior Case History

This is the last act of long-running litigation dating back to 2007. It revolves around Plaintiffs' proposal to build a rabbinical college on a 100-acre plot of land they own within the Village. See Congregation Rabbinical Coll. of Tartikov, Inc. v. Village of Pomona, 280 F.Supp.3d 426, 434 (S.D.N.Y. 2017), aff'd in part, rev'd in part and remanded, 945 F.3d 83 (2d Cir. 2019). In particular, it concerns Plaintiffs' challenge to “certain zoning and environmental ordinances enacted by the Village” (the “challenged laws”), which operated to “prevent the construction of Tartikov's rabbinical college.” Id. at 434, 444.

Plaintiffs raised several challenges to those laws and were partially successful. Specifically, this Court held that Tartikov “established violations of the First and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution, certain provisions of RLUIPA, the FHA, and §§ 3, 9, and 11 of the New York State Constitution.” Id. at 495. And it issued a final injunction in which the Village was “enjoined from applying the provisions of Local Law No. 1 of 2001, Local Law No. 5 of 2004, Local Law No. 1 of 2007, and Local Law No. 5 of 2007 to the Subject Property owned by Plaintiff Congregation Rabbinical College of Tartikov, Inc. in the Village of Pomona, New York.” (See Judgment and Mandatory Injunction (Dkt. No. 356, 07-CV-6304 Dkt).)

On appeal, the Second Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part. The Second Circuit agreed that the Village's two 2007 laws discriminated against Plaintiffs in violation of the Equal Protections Clause. Congregation Rabbinical Coll. of Tartikov, Inc. v. Village of Pomona, 945 F.3d 83, 124 (2d Cir. 2019). But, relevant here, it reversed as to the 2001 and 2004 laws in part because Plaintiffs lacked standing. Id. at 110. Plaintiffs, the Second Circuit explained, had “never submitted a formal proposal for the building project, applied for a permit, or engaged in any other conduct that would implicate or invoke the operation of the challenged zoning laws.” Id. Any harm “from the application of the zoning laws to [Plaintiffs'] property [was therefore] merely conjectural.” Id.

Following that decision, Tartikov attempted to engage in “conduct that would implicate . . . the operation of the challenged zoning laws.” (Pl's Opp. to Defs' Mot. (“Pls' Mem.”) 4 (Dkt. No. 96).) Namely, Tartikov petitioned the Village for an amendment under which the Village would be prevented from “applying the provisions of Local Law No. 1 of 2001 [and] Local Law No. 5 of 2004” to Tartikov. (Id. at 3.) See Congregation Rabbinical Coll. of Tartikov, Inc. v. Village of Pomona, No. 20-CV-6158, 2021 WL 4392489, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 24, 2021), aff'd, No. 21-2822, 2022 WL 1697660 (2d Cir. May 27, 2022). Tartikov then challenged the 2001 and 2004 laws again, arguing that, this time, it “availed itself of the only conduct available to it that may permit its Rabbinical College use.” (Compl. ¶ 221.)

In that case-the underlying Action-the Court ultimately granted Defendants' Rule 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Tartikov, 2021 WL 4392489, at *10. The Court explained that Plaintiffs-who still had not “submitted a formal development plan for the Rabbinical College”-failed to allege “a cognizable injury.” Id. at *9-10. Although Plaintiffs had attempted to prevent the Village from enforcing the challenged laws, the lack of a project proposal meant that the Parties never engaged in the “give-and-take negotiation that often resolves land use problems.” Id. at *7 (quotation marks omitted). The Village, therefore, never “rendered a definitive position regarding Plaintiffs' desire to build a Rabbinical College,” leaving the Action unripe for adjudication. Id. at *9. Plaintiffs appealed, and the Second Circuit affirmed. Congregation Rabbinical Coll. of Tartikov, Inc. v. Village of Pomona, No. 21-2822, 2022 WL 1697660 (2d Cir. May 27, 2022).

B. Procedural History

On September 14, 2022, Defendants moved for appellate attorneys' fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988. (Not. of Mot.; Defs' Mem. of Law in Supp. of Mot. (“Defs' Mem”) (Dkt. No. 92); Decl. of Brian D. Nugent in Supp. of Mot. (Dkt. No. 91).) Plaintiffs filed their Opposition on November 15, 2022. (See Pl's Mem.) And Defendants filed their reply on December 15, 2022. (Defs' Reply Mem. of Law (“Defs' Reply”) (Dkt. No. 97).)

On July 23, 2023, counsel for Plaintiffs advised that the Parties were engaged in global settlement discussions and requested a stay of the fee motion for the pendency of those discussions. (Letter from Joseph A. Churgin, Esq., to Court (July 23, 2023) (Dkt. No. 98).) The Court initially stayed the case for 30 days starting on June 26, 2023, (see Memo Endorsement (Dkt. No. 99)), and later extended the stay through October 2, 2023, (see Memo Endorsement (Dkt. N0. 103)). In a letter dated November 28, 2023, counsel for Defendants advised that the Parties concluded settlement discussions and requested a ruling on the instant Motion. (Letter from Brian D. Nugent, Esq., to Court (Nov. 28, 2023) (Dkt. No. 112).)

II. Discussion

Defendants, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988, request $87,037.50 in fees incurred throughout their successful appeal in this Action. (Nugent Decl. ¶ 7.) Plaintiffs argue that the Court lacks jurisdiction to decide the instant Motion because the underlying Action was dismissed on standing grounds. (Pls' Mem. 8-13.) The Court is obliged to consider that argument first, and it agrees. See Tao v. Elite Cold Storage, LLC, No. 23-CV-6599, 2023 WL 7738490, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 15, 2023) (“Federal courts ‘have an independent obligation to determine whether subject-matter jurisdiction exists, even in the absence of a challenge from any party.'” (quoting Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 514 (2006))); accord MLC Fishing, Inc. v. Velez, 667 F.3d 140, 143 (2d Cir. 2011) (per curiam).

A. Legal Framework

42 U.S.C. § 1988 allows a court to award attorneys' fees to “the prevailing party” “[i]n any action or proceeding to enforce a provision of ... [42 U.S.C. §] 1983,” and other substantive sections of the civil rights laws. 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b); see also Chabad Lubavitch of Litchfield Cnty., Inc. v. Borough of Litchfield, No. 09-CV-1419, 2020 WL 1527239, at *2 (D. Conn. Mar. 31, 2020) (considering a motion for appellate attorneys' fees pursuant to Section 1988).^[1] Here, there is no dispute here that Defendants “prevailed]” in a “proceeding” under [S]ection 1988 when they obtained a dismissal of Plaintiffs' Complaint and when they successfully defended that judgment on appeal. (See Defs' Mem. 8-9; see generally Pls' Mem. (appearing to assume the Village is a “[prevailing [d]efendant”).) The Second Circuit, however, has held that “[w]here there is no subject matter jurisdiction to proceed with the substantive claim, as a matter of law [t]hat lack of jurisdiction bar[s] an award of attorneys['] fees under Section 1988.” W.G. v. Senatore, 18 F.3d 60, 64 (2d Cir. 1994) (citation and quotation marks omitted).

In the thirty years since W.G. was decided, the Second Circuit and numerous district courts have reinforced that understanding. See Castillo Grand, LLC v. Sheraton Operating Corp., 719 F.3d 120, 123 (2d Cir. 2013) (stating that, “in the absence of statute, federal courts lack authority to assess costs when subject matter jurisdiction is lacking” (citing W.G., 18 F.3d at 64 & n.1)); see also Young v. Young, No. 15-CV-675, 2015 WL 3795871, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. June 17, 2015) (“As the Court lacks jurisdiction over this action, it also lacks jurisdiction to award attorneys' fees to defendant.”); EMI Ent. World, Inc. v. Karen Recs., Inc., No. 05-CV-390, 2015 WL 1623805, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 27, 2015) (“As a preliminary matter, this Court is unable to entertain Defendants' motion for attorneys' fees because it lacks jurisdiction over this case.”); Ecogen, LLC v. Town of Italy, 461 F.Supp.2d 100, 102 (W.D.N.Y. 2006) (holding that defendants were not entitled to a fee award under Section 1988 because the “finding that the matter was not ripe for review meant that the Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction”);

Owoyemi ex rel. PDP-USA Chapter Exec. Members v. Wariboko, No 05-CV-1789, 2005 WL 1241133, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. May 23, 2005) (holding that because the “complaint [was] dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction . . . defendants' application for attorneys['] fees [was] denied”); Correspondent Servs. Corp. v. JVW Inv., Ltd., No....