Conn. Fair Hous. Ctr v. CoreLogic Rental Prop. Sols., LLC

Connecticut Fair Housing Ctr, et al. Plaintiffs, v. CoreLogic Rental Property Solutions, LLC], Defendant.

No. 18-cv-705

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT

March 30, 2021

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION ON MOTIONS IN LIMINE

Plaintiffs Connecticut Fair Housing Center ("CFHC") and Carmen Arroyo ("Ms. Arroyo"), individually and as next friend for Mikhail Arroyo ("Mr. Arroyo") (collectively, "Plaintiffs") bring the instant litigation against Defendant CoreLogic Rental Property Solutions, LLC ("Defendant" or "RPS") alleging that RPS violated the Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601 et seq. ("FHA"), the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practice Act, Conn. Gen. Stat. §§ 42-110a et seq. ("CUTPA") and the Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681 et seq. ("FCRA").

In April of 2016, Carmen Arroyo attempted to move her disabled son, Mikhail Arroyo, for whom she was conservator, into her apartment complex ArtSpace Windham, but his application was rejected. Two separate actions by Defendant regarding that incident motivate the instant lawsuit: first, Defendant, through its CrimSAFE product, notified apartment manager WinnResidential that "disqualifying records" were found for Mr. Arroyo; second, RPS did not disclose Mr. Arroyo's criminal records to Ms. Arroyo on behalf of Mr. Arroyo until the start of this litigation, despite her numerous requests and production of many documents.

Before the Court are the following motions in limine: (1) the Plaintiffs' Motion to Exclude Testimony of Jay Kacirk, Dkt. 157; (2) the Defendant's motion to exclude the expert witness report of Lila Kazemian, Dkt. 177; (3) the Defendant's motion to exclude Plaintiffs' statistical experts, Dkt. 175; (4) the Plaintiffs' motion to limit testimony of Dr. William Huber, Dkt. 179; (5) the Defendant's motion to exclude the expert witness report of Nancy B. Alisberg, Dkt. 176; (6) the Defendant's motion to exclude certain medical/injury evidence, Dkt. 173; (7) the Defendant's motion to exclude certain marketing evidence, Dkt. 174; (8) the Plaintiffs' motion to exclude exhibits as improper hearsay, Dkt. 180; and (9) the Plaintiffs' motion to exclude report of the Bureau of Justice, Dkt. 181. Oppositions have been filed with respect to each motion. Dkts. 163, 187, 184, 185, 186, 182, 183, 189, 188 (respectively).

I. BACKGROUND

On August 7, 2020, the Court entered an extensive decision on the parties' motions for summary judgment. Dkt. 194 (Dec. on Summ. J.). That decision contains a thorough recitation of the material facts relevant to this case. Id. at 2-22. Those findings are adopted and incorporated herein by reference. The Court provides only those facts relevant to each respective motion as discussed below.

As outlined in the decision on summary judgment, the following claims are proceeding to trial: (1) a FHA claim for disparate impact on the basis of race or ethnicity, (2) a FHA claim for disparate treatment on the basis of race or ethnicity, (3) a claim under CUTPA, and (4) a FCRA claim for the period from June 30, 2016 to November 18, 2016. Dec. on Summ. J. There has been no jury demand in this case and the parties have elected for the Court to sit as fact finder in a bench trial.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

"The purpose of an in limine motion is to aid the trial process by enabling the Court to rule in advance of trial on the relevance of certain forecasted evidence, as to issues that are definitely set for trial, without lengthy argument at, or interruption of, the trial." Palmieri v. Defaria, 88 F.3d 136, 141 (2d Cir. 1996) (internal quotation marks omitted). "A court's determination of a motion in limine is preliminary and may be subject to change as the case unfolds." State v. Deutsche Telekom AG, 419 F. Supp. 3d 783, 787 (S.D.N.Y. 2019).

"Evidence should be excluded on a motion in limine only when the evidence is clearly inadmissible on all potential grounds." Walker v. Schult, 365 F. Supp. 3d 266, 275 (N.D.N.Y. 2019). "The movant has the burden of establishing that the evidence is not admissible for any purpose." Id. (citing to United States v. Goodale, 831 F.Supp.2d 804, 808 (D. Vt. 2011)). "The trial judge may reserve judgment on a motion in limine until trial to ensure the motion is considered in the proper factual context." Id.

"When the judge sits as the trier of fact, it is presumed that the judge will understand the limited reason for the disclosure of the underlying inadmissible information and will not rely on that information for any improper purpose." Williams v. Illinois, 567 U.S. 50, 69 (2012). "There is a "well-established presumption" that "the judge [has] adhered to basic rules of procedure," when the judge is acting as a factfinder." Id. at 69-70 (emphasis in original). See also United States v. Duran-Colon, 252 Fed. App'x 420, 423 (2d Cir. 2007) ("In the context of a bench trial such as that conducted in this case, however, the factfinder knows thepurpose for which evidence is admitted and is presumed to rest his verdict on the proper inferences to be drawn from such evidence."); LiButti v. United States, 107 F.3d 110, 124 (2d Cir. 1997) (finding that "many of the management problems which a trial court invariably has to wrestle with in order to guard against unfair prejudice when one takes the proverbial Fifth simply do not exist in the context of a bench trial.").

Generally relevant evidence is admissible unless the United States Constitution, a federal statue, the Federal Rules of Evidence or Supreme Court rules say otherwise. Fed. R. Evid. 402. "Evidence is relevant if: (a) it has any tendency to make a fact more or less probable than it would be without the evidence; and (b) the fact is of consequence in determining the action." Fed. R. Evid. 401. Relevant evidence can be excluded "if its probative value is substantially outweighed by a danger of one or more of the following: unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, misleading the jury, undue delay, wasting time, or needlessly presenting cumulative evidence." Fed. R. Evid. 403. Rule 401's "basic standard of relevance . . . is a liberal one." Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 587 (1993).; see also Hart v. RCI Hosp. Holdings, Inc., 90 F. Supp. 3d 250, 257 (S.D.N.Y. 2015) (The "standard of relevance established by the Federal Rules of Evidence is not high.") (citing to United States v. Southland Corp., 760 F.2d 1366, 1375 (2d Cir. 1985)). "Evidence need not be conclusive in order to be relevant." Contemporary Mission, Inc. v. Famous Music Corp., 557 F.2d 918, 927 (2d Cir. 1977).

Rule 702 governs admissibility of trial expert testimony and provides that:

A witness who is qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education may testify in the form of an opinion or otherwise if:

(a) the expert's scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will help the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue;

(b) the testimony is based on sufficient facts or data;

(c) the testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods; and

(d) the expert has reliably applied the principles and methods to the facts of the case.

"[T]he trial judge must ensure that any and all scientific testimony or evidence admitted is not only relevant, but reliable." Daubert, 509 U.S. at 589 (1993). "Expert testimony which does not relate to any issue in the case is not relevant and, ergo, non-helpful." Id. at 591. In assessing relevancy and reliability, the court is "to make certain that an expert, whether basing testimony upon professional studies or personal experience, employs in the courtroom the same level of intellectual rigor that characterizes the practice of an expert in the relevant field." Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 152 (1999). An opinion that does little more than "rehash[es] otherwise admissible evidence about which [an expert] has no personal knowledge" are inadmissible. Bobcar Media, LLC v. Aardvark Event Logistics, Inc., No. 16-CV-885 (JPO), 2020 WL 1673687, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 6, 2020). "Regarding relevance, Rule 401 shapes the question facing the court: whether the proffered expert testimony has 'any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence.'" Vicuna v. O.P. Schuman & Sons, Inc., 298 F. Supp. 3d 419, 443 (E.D.N.Y. 2017) (citing to Campbell v. Metropolitan Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 239 F.3d 179, 184 (2d Cir. 2001)).

The Court plays a gatekeeping function to all expert testimony, not just scientific testimony. Kumho Tire Co., 526 U.S. at 147. Reliability, particularly in cases where the expert opinion is not scientific in nature, is tied to the facts of the particular case. Id. at 150. "[N]othing in either Daubert or the Federal Rules of Evidence requires a district court to admit opinion evidence that is connected to existing data only by the ipse dixit of the expert. A court may conclude that there is simply too great an analytical gap between the data and the opinion proffered." Gen. Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 146 (1997).

"As a general rule an expert's testimony on issues of law is inadmissible." SLSJ, LLC v. Kleban, 277 F. Supp. 3d 258, 268 (D. Conn. 2017) (citing to United States v. Bilzerian, 926 F.2d 1285, 1294 (2d Cir. 1991)). "'Generally, the use of expert testimony is not permitted if it will 'usurp either the role of the trial judge in instructing the jury as to the applicable law or the role of the jury in applying that law to the facts before it.' . . . Clearly, an opinion that purports to explain the law to the jury trespasses on the trial judge's exclusive territory." United States v. Stewart, 433 F.3d 273, 311 (2d Cir. 2006) (internal citations omitted). "An opinion is not objectionable just because it embraces an ultimate issue." Fed. R. Evid. 704. "However, Rule 704 was not intended to allow experts to offer opinions embodying legal conclusions."...