O'Connell v. Recio

ROSEMARIE O'CONNELL, et. al., Plaintiffs,

v.HUMBERTO MARRERO RECIO, et al., Defendants.

CIVIL NO.: 10-1971 (MEL)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO

Dated: August 17, 2012

OPINION AND ORDER

Pending before the court are two motions for summary judgment, filed by defendants Jorge García Faneytt ("García") and Humberto Marrero Recio ("Marrero"), Dkt. No. 67, and by defendant Jesús Méndez Rodríguez ("Méndez"), Dkt. No. 68, all in their individual and official capacities, as well as plaintiffs Rosemarie O'Connell (plaintiff, or "O'Connell") and Alejandro Franco's ("Franco") response in opposition, Dkt. No. 80, defendants' joint reply, Dkt. No. 104, and plaintiffs' surreply, Dkt. No. 111. For the reasons set forth below, both motions for summary judgment are granted.

I. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On January 19, 2011, O'Connell and Franco filed an amended complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that O'Connell was constructively discharged from her job as Director of Human Resources and Labor Relations at the Puerto Rico Permits and Regulation Administration (hereinafter "ARPE," its Spanish acronym) and terminated on her first day as Director of Human Resources and Labor Relations at the Puerto Rico Public Building Authority (hereinafter "AEP," its Spanish acronym) due to intra-party political discrimination, violating herrights under the First and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution. Dkt. No. 10. Plaintiffs also allege that Marrerro and García retaliated against O'Connell for her refusal to partake in their "illegal" actions, which violated her right to free speech under the First Amendment. Additionally, they assert claims under various Puerto Rico laws and constitutional provisions.

The complaint alleges that while Marrero was the Administrator of ARPE, he engaged in actions that forced O'Connell's constructive discharge because of their differences on two matters: the implementation of Puerto Rico Law Number 7 of March 9, 2009 ("Law 7") and their support of different candidates in a primary election for a seat in the Puerto Rico Senate. With respect to the latter matter, plaintiff alleges that she and Marrero are both members of the same political party, the New Progressive Party ("NPP"), but that they supported different candidates who were competing for a seat that had recently been vacated by an NPP senator. Plaintiff alleges that Marrero told her to vote for his preferred candidate, and that when she refused to do so, he retaliated against her by interacting with her in a belligerent and intimidating manner, threatening and instructing another employee threaten her, harassing and humiliating her, and ordering other employees to spy on her.

The complaint further asserts that Marrero's alleged actions made plaintiff's employment so unbearable that she tendered her resignation, stating that it would be effective December 15, 2009. Dkt. No. 10, ¶ 3.28. By then, defendant García had become the Administrator of ARPE, and he accepted her resignation. Id. at ¶ 3.28. However, because defendant Méndez then offered plaintiff the position of Human Resources and Labor relations Director at AEP, she changed the effective date of her resignation to October 31, 2009. Id.. Plaintiff alleges Méndez told her that her appointment would be effective as of November 2, 2009. Id. at ¶ 3.29. However, when shearrived for work on that date, she claims that Méndez told her she could not remain in the Human Resources Director position at AEP because Marrero had called him and said he "would have a problem with him" if he kept her in that position. Id. at ¶ 3.30. Plaintiff alleges that she suffered damages as a result of both alleged terminations. Franco, O'Connell's spouse, claims derivative damages from O'Connell's alleged injuries.

On February 2, 2011, all defendants filed a motion to dismiss, Dkt. No. 11, which was granted in part and denied in part. Dkt. No. 32. The court dismissed plaintiffs' claims under the First Amendment free speech clause, the Fourteenth Amendment, Article 1802 of the Puerto Rico Civil Code (31 L.P.R.A. § 5141), and Puerto Rico Laws 115 and 426. Dkt. No. 32. Therefore, the only federal claim that remains at summary judgment is plaintiffs' claim that O'Connell was discharged from both Human Resources Director positions due to impermissible political discrimination. Both motions for summary judgment request dismissal of this claim.

II. SUMMARY OF UNCONTESTED MATERIAL FACTS

After applying Local Rule 56, the facts of the case for purpose of adjudicating the instant motions are set forth below.¹

Plaintiff O'Connell began working as the Human Resources Director of ARPE on January 3, 2009. Dkt No. 69, ¶ 15; Dkt. No. 81, ¶ 15. On April 23, 2009, defendant Marrero was appointed Administrator of ARPE, where he remained until October 8, 2009, at which point co-defendant García assumed that position. Dkt. No. 69, ¶¶ 18, 22; Dkt. No. 81, ¶¶ 18, 22. Priorto becoming ARPE Administrator, García was the Deputy Administrator of ARPE, a position he had held since July or August of 2009. Dkt. No. 69, ¶ 40; Dkt. No. 81, ¶ 40.

The position of Human Resources Director at ARPE is classified as a trust position under ARPE's Classification Plan for the Trust Service.² Dkt. No. 69, ¶ 4; Dkt. No. 81, ¶ 4; Dkt. No. 74. According to the official job description, the major duties and responsibilities of the Human Resources Director position at ARPE are as follows. The Director performs duties related to the direction, coordination, supervision and evaluation of the activities conducted in the various sections of the Human Resources office. Dkt. No. 69, ¶ 1; Dkt. No. 74-1, p.1. She is responsible for the application of and compliance with the laws and regulations related to the merit system and to personnel administration. Dkt. No. 69, ¶ 2; Dkt. No. 74-1, p. 1.³ The Human Resources Director also prepares confidential reports and participates in the formulation and implementation of public policy regarding the administration of human resources in the agency. Dkt. No. 69, ¶ 3; Dkt. No, 74-1, p. 2. The employee in this position works under the direct supervision of ARPE's Administrator. Id.

The position of Human Resources Director of AEP is also classified as a trust position. Dkt. No. 74-1, p. 17. According to the official job description, the holder of this position is in charge of promulgating and implementing the agency's labor management policy, as well as planning, coordinating, and supervising the programs and activities developed at AEP's Human Resources Office. Dkt. No. 69, ¶ 11; Dkt. No. 18, ¶ 11. The duties of this position includerecommending employment actions and advising the AEP Executive Director on collective bargaining agreements, employee benefits, and policy to be implemented for achieving the optimal utilization of human resources. Dkt. No. 69, ¶ 12; Dkt. No. 81, ¶ 12.

On October 9, 2009, O'Connell tendered her resignation from her position as Human Resources Director of ARPE, stating that such resignation would be effective on December 15, 2009. Dkt. No. 69, ¶ 6; Dkt. No. 81, ¶ 6.⁴ Shortly thereafter, O'Connell met with Méndez, the Executive Director of AEP, because he wanted to fill the position of Human Resources Director of AEP. Dkt. No. 69, ¶ 26; Dkt. No. 81, ¶ 26. On October 23, 2009, O'Connell tendered a second resignation effective October 31, 2009 because she planned to start working as Human Resources Director at AEP on November 2, 2009. Dkt. No. 69, ¶ 7; Dkt. No. 81, ¶ 7. On November 2, 2009, however, Méndez informed O'Connell that he had could not employ her as Human Resources Director. Dkt. No. 69, ¶ 56; Dkt. No. 81, ¶ 56.⁵

III. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Summary judgment shall be granted when the record shows that "there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). "A dispute is genuine if the evidence about the fact is such that a reasonable jury could resolve the point in the favor of the non-moving party. A fact is material if it has the potential of determining the outcome of the litigation.'" Farmers Ins. Exch. v. RNK, Inc., 632 F.3d 777 (1st Cir. 2011) (quoting Rodríguez-Rivera v. Federico Trilla Reg'l Hosp., 532 F.3d 28, 30 (1st Cir. 2008) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)). The party moving forsummary judgment bears the burden of showing the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986).

Once a properly supported motion has been presented before the court, the opposing party has the burden of demonstrating that a trial-worthy issue exists that would warrant the court's denial of the motion for summary judgment. Suárez v. Pueblo Int'l, Inc., 229 F.3d 49, 53 (1st Cir. 2000). For issues where the opposing party bears the ultimate burden of proof, that party cannot merely "rely on the absence of competent evidence, but must affirmatively point to specific facts that demonstrate the existence of an authentic dispute." Id. In assessing a motion for summary judgment, the court "must view the entire record in the light most hospitable to the party opposing summary judgment, indulging in all reasonable inferences in that party's favor." Griggs-Ryan v. Smith, 904 F.2d 112, 115 (1st Cir. 1990). However, the court may safely ignore "conclusory allegations, improbable inferences, and unsupported speculation." Medina-Muñoz v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 896 F.2d 5, 8 (1st Cir. 1990) (citing Rossy v. Roche Prod., Inc., 880 F.2d 621, 624 (1st Cir. 1989)).

IV. ANALYSIS

A. Section 1983 Political Discrimination

Plaintiff brings her First Amendment claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which "provides a remedy for deprivations of rights secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States when that deprivation takes place under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom or usage of any State or Territory." Lugar v. Edmonson...