Connex Credit Union v. Thibodeau

208 Conn.App. 861

266 A.3d 930

CONNEX CREDIT UNION

v.Michelle M. THIBODEAU

AC 43830

Appellate Court of Connecticut.

Argued September 16, 2021

Officially released November 30, 2021

Garrett A. Denniston, with whom, on the brief, was Marisa A. Bellair, for the appellant (defendant).

Robert C. Lubus, Jr., with whom were Andrew S. Marcucci, and, on the brief, Stephanie Ann Palmer, for the appellee (plaintiff).

Alvord, Cradle and DiPentima, Js.

ALVORD, J.

This appeal concerns the application of the statutory schemes that govern a secured party's repossession and subsequent sale of a motor vehicle in a consumer goods secured transaction. Connecticut has adopted article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC), codified at General Statutes § 42a-9-101 et seq., which governs secured transactions. Specifically at issue here is the section that governs a secured party's notification to a debtor regarding the repossession and impending sale of collateral. Connecticut also has enacted the Retail Installment Sales Financing Act (RISFA), General Statutes § 36a-770 et seq., an act that governs installment sales contracts—a specific type of secured transaction. Specifically at issue here is the section that pertains to a secured party's notification to a debtor regarding the proceeds of the sale of a repossessed and sold motor vehicle. The underlying lawsuit arose from the defendant debtor's default on her car payments and the plaintiff secured party's subsequent repossession and sale of that vehicle. In essence, we are tasked with answering two questions: (1) what must a secured party tell a debtor prior to the sale of repossessed collateral and (2) what must a secured party do after the sale of a repossessed vehicle.

The defendant debtor, Michelle M. Thibodeau, appeals from the judgment of the trial court rendered in favor of the plaintiff secured party, Connex Credit Union, in this breach of contract action. On appeal, the defendant claims that the trial court erred in determining that the plaintiff (1) provided notice of the right to an accounting as required by article 9 of the UCC, (2) provided a telephone number from which the defendant could learn the full amount she would need to pay in order to redeem her vehicle as required by article 9 of the UCC,¹ and (3) satisfied the requirements of RISFA regarding the repossession and sale of a motor vehicle. On the basis of these claims, the defendant argues that the plaintiff was precluded from recovering any deficiency upon resale due to its alleged failure to adhere to the statutory requirements.² We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The following facts, as found by the trial court in its memorandum of decision, and procedural history are relevant to our discussion of the claims on appeal. "On April 7, 2014, the defendant ... borrowed $19,993.12 [from the plaintiff] to be repaid with interest at 4.99 percent per annum over seventy-two months. The retail installment sales contract ... signed by the defendant was secured by a security interest in the defendant's 2013 Kia Rio [vehicle] .... In the [c]ontract the defendant agreed to be responsible for repossession and sales costs as well as attorney's fees."

After her October 23, 2017 payment, the defendant made no further payments on the loan, and the trial court determined that, as a result, she had defaulted. The defendant "contacted the plaintiff on or about January 16, 2018, and advised it that her vehicle had been in an accident and she wished the plaintiff to come and take possession of the vehicle."

On January 17, 2018, the plaintiff sent a document titled "Right to Redeem and Notice of Sale" (presale notice) to the defendant via certified mail. This document noted the repossession date, advised the defendant of her right to redeem her vehicle, explained how to redeem the vehicle, and listed the details of the defendant's outstanding debt.³ The defendant took no steps to redeem the vehicle.

On February 28, 2018, the plaintiff sold the vehicle in an arm's-length transaction for $4000. On March 20, 2018, the plaintiff sent the defendant a letter (postsale notice) advising her of the sale and informing her that the sale price was less than the amount that she owed. The postsale notice also informed the defendant that the plaintiff might seek a deficiency judgment against her. A named employee, identified as a collections specialist, signed the postsale notice which included the plaintiff's mailing address, website address, and phone number, and closed with the words "[i]f you have any questions, please call." The defendant did not contact the plaintiff with any questions.

In addition to the defendant's outstanding debt, the plaintiff incurred $760 in repossession and sales costs. Along with the sale proceeds, the plaintiff recovered a total of $1955.99 from the insurance it had on the vehicle. The plaintiff also applied $9 from a savings account that the defendant had with the plaintiff to the defendant's outstanding debt.

On August 30, 2018, the plaintiff commenced this action against the defendant for breach of contract. The plaintiff sought principal damages of $4495.07, prejudgment interest in the amount of $263.22, and attorney's fees in the amount of $674. In response, the defendant asserted several special defenses, including assertions that the plaintiff had failed to inform her in its presale notice that she was entitled to an accounting and had not credited her with the correct value upon selling the vehicle.⁴

The case was tried to the court, Aurigemma, J. , on September 11, 2019. At trial, the plaintiff called J. R. Roy, the plaintiff's collection manager. Roy testified as to the vehicle's condition and value. The defendant did not present evidence on the value of the vehicle and presented no witnesses and no exhibits. The parties submitted simultaneous posttrial briefs.

On January 2, 2020, the court issued its memorandum of decision, in which it found that "the plaintiff [had] proved all the necessary elements of its cause of action." In addition, the court rejected each of the defendant's special defenses. The court rendered judgment for the plaintiff and awarded damages in the amount of $5432.29. This appeal followed. Additional facts will be set forward as necessary.

I

The defendant first claims that the court erred because "(1) it ignored the plain language of [ General Statutes §§ 42a-9-614 (1) (A) and 42a-9-613 (1) (D) ] by excusing [the plaintiff's] omission of language stating [that the defendant] had the right to request a written explanation of indebtedness and the cost for doing so (if any); and (2) what the court called an ‘accounting’ in the presale notice falls well short of what the [Connecticut] UCC requires." We disagree.

We first set forth the appropriate standard of review. Here, the financial amounts listed in the notices are not in dispute; in resolving the defendant's various claims, we are only tasked with determining what the relevant statutes require of secured parties. Thus, our consideration of this appeal requires only a review of the trial court's application of the law to the undisputed facts. "The process of statutory interpretation involves the determination of the meaning of the statutory language as applied to the facts of the case, including the question of whether the language does so apply. ... When construing a statute, [o]ur fundamental objective is to ascertain and give effect to the apparent intent of the legislature. ... In other words, we seek to determine, in a reasoned manner, the meaning of the statutory language as applied to the facts of [the] case, including the question of whether the language actually does apply. ... In seeking to determine that meaning, General Statutes § 1-2z directs us first to consider the text of the statute itself and its relationship to other statutes. If, after examining such text and considering such relationship, the meaning of such text is plain and unambiguous and does not yield absurd or unworkable results, extratextual evidence of the meaning of the statute shall not be considered. ... Furthermore, [t]he legislature is always presumed to have created a harmonious and consistent body of law ... [so that] [i]n determining the meaning of a statute ... we look not only at the provision at issue, but also to the broader statutory scheme to ensure the coherency of our construction. ... Because issues of statutory construction raise questions of law, they are subject to plenary review on appeal." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Robinson v. Tindill , 208 Conn. App. 255, 264, 264 A.3d 1063 (2021).

The first issue we address is the question of what information a secured party must include in a notice to a debtor prior to disposing of repossessed consumer goods collateral. In consumer goods secured transactions,⁵ a notification of disposition of collateral requires a statement "that the debtor is entitled to an accounting of the unpaid indebtedness and [a statement of] the charge, if any, for an accounting ...." General Statutes § 42a-9-613 (1) (D) ; see also General Statutes § 42a-9-614 (1) (A). The parties agree that the notice in question did not include language expressly stating that the defendant was "entitled to an accounting ...." General Statutes § 42a-9-613 (1) (D). They disagree, however, as to whether the plaintiff's notification conforms to the statute's requirement despite the lack of the specific statement.

The defendant argues that a secured party cannot merely adhere to the "spirit" of §§ 42a-9-613 (1) (D) and 42a-9-614 (1) (A), but rather it must strictly comply with the requirements set out in the statute. The plaintiff responds that its notice "exceeded the minimum necessary contents to satisfy the statute by providing the actual accounting free of charge, rather than the right to request an accounting and the cost for the fulfillment of that request, if any." On the particular facts of this case, we conclude that the...