Connolly Ranch, Inc. v. Dep't of Parks & Recreation

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CONNOLLY RANCH, INC., Plaintiff and Appellant, v. DEPARTMENT OF PARKS AND RECREATION et al., Defendants and Respondents.

C092009

California Court of Appeals, Third District, San Joaquin

May 2, 2023

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

Order Filed Date 5/23/23

Super Ct. No. STK-CV-URP-2016-12394

ORDER MODIFYING OPINION AND DENYING REHEARING

THE COURT: It is ordered that in response to the petition for rehearing filed by plaintiff Connolly Ranch, the opinion filed in this case on May 2, 2023, be modified as follows:

1. On page 28, the last paragraph, beginning "Plainly, the jury found the Ranch," is deleted and the following paragraphs inserted in its place:

Plainly the jury found the Ranch failed to prove the causation element of its breach of contract cause of action. Indeed, it is well established that the requirement of "proof the plaintiff 'was harmed by' a defendant's breach of contract" concerns "the element of causation" of a breach of contract claim.

(Troyk v. Farmers Group, Inc., supra, 171 Cal.App.4th at p. 1353, italics added.) By finding the Ranch suffered no harm, the jury essentially found the Ranch could not establish that the Department's breach of contract proximately caused the Ranch any injury. The trial court thus could not issue a permanent injunction on the Ranch's breach of contract claim. (San Diego Unified Port Dist. v. Gallagher (1998) 62 Cal.App.4th 501, 503 ["To qualify for a permanent injunction, the plaintiff must prove (1) the elements of a cause of action involving the wrongful act sought to be enjoined (here [breach of contract]); and (2) the grounds for equitable relief"], italics added.)

The jury's verdict also rendered the second requirement for issuance of a permanent injunction lacking, i.e., grounds for equitable relief. To obtain a permanent injunction, "a plaintiff ordinarily must show that the defendant's wrongful acts threaten to cause irreparable injury meaning injury that cannot adequately be compensated in damages." (Syngenta Crop Protection, Inc. v. Helliker (2006) 138 Cal.App.4th 1135, 1167, italics added.) "Irreparable harm may be established where there is the fact of an injury, such as that arising from a breach of contract, but where there is an inability to ascertain the amount of damage. In other words, to say that the harm is irreparable is simply another way of saying that pecuniary compensation would not afford adequate relief or that it would be extremely difficult to ascertain the amount that would afford adequate relief." (DVD Copy Control Assn., Inc. v. Kaleidescape, Inc. (2009) 176 Cal.App.4th 697, 722, italics added.)

For these reasons, the trial court did not err in its interpretation that the jury's breach of contract verdict precluded equitable relief.

This modification does not change the judgment.

Appellant's petition for rehearing is denied.

ROBIE Acting P. J.

Plaintiff Connolly Ranch, Inc. (Ranch) sued defendants Department of Parks and Recreation and its Off-Highway Motor Vehicle Recreation Division and Off-Highway Motor Vehicle Recreation Commission (collectively Department) for breach of contract, breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, trespass, nuisance, and declaratory relief. The trial court bifurcated the legal and equitable claims; the jury heard and decided the legal claims first. The jury returned verdicts in favor of the Department. The trial court thereafter considered whether to conduct a bench trial on the Ranch's injunctive and declaratory relief requests. The trial court found the jury's factual findings bound the trial court and precluded equitable relief. The trial court thus found a further bench trial unnecessary. The Ranch appeals.

The Ranch presents a myriad of arguments challenging the trial court's denial of its requests for permanent injunctive relief and declaratory relief, including that the trial court misinterpreted two of the jury's special verdict findings and abused its discretion in finding the requested equitable relief was moot and unwarranted. The Ranch also challenges the jury's adverse finding on the trespass cause of action, asserting it is contrary to law and unsupported by substantial evidence. Finally, the Ranch challenges two evidentiary rulings: (1) the trial court's exclusion of certain testimony and evidence the Ranch wished to present through its retained expert, Leonard Job; and (2) the trial court's admission of testimony referencing explosive testing on two properties in the vicinity of the Ranch's property.

We find no merit in these contentions and affirm.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND^[1]

We initially admonish the Ranch for failing to provide record citations for each fact presented in its statement of facts. Some of the background facts stated herein were unsupported by citations to the record; however, the parties agreed on the unsupported facts, which we treat as mutual concessions. (Meddock v. County of Yolo (2013) 220 Cal.App.4th 170, 175, fn. 3.) We set forth the general background here and provide additional factual background pertinent to the Ranch's arguments in the Discussion post, as necessary.

The Department manages the Carnegie State Vehicular Recreation Area (recreation area), which consists of a vast area dedicated to public off-highway recreation riding. The Ranch is located adjacent to the recreation area. SRI International operates an explosive testing facility that borders both the recreation area and the Ranch.

In 1990, the Ranch and the State of California (State) entered into an Agreement and Grant of Easement (Agreement). The same year, the trial court entered a judgment, attaching a copy of the Agreement and incorporating and ordering the terms and conditions set forth therein (1990 Judgment).

In the Agreement, the State granted to the Ranch "a nonexclusive easement to use, maintain, inspect, repair and replace an existing private roadway" generally referred to as SRI Road (1990 Easement). SRI Road traverses from Corral Hollow Road, a public road, through the recreation area and onto the Ranch's property, crossing Corral Hollow Creek at a low-water crossing or spillway made of concrete. In addition to the Ranch and Department, SRI International also uses the 1990 Easement.

The 1990 Judgment provides the Department "shall erect fences or place other barriers along portions of the easement to discourage use by the public entering the [recreation area]. The [Department] shall designate crossings at certain points on the Easement to allow users of the park to cross the road. [The Ranch] shall have the opportunity to review and comment on the proposed locations of the fence and crossings. The [Department] shall post at both points at which the Easement terminates, and at any crossings or points at which the fence does not separate the road from the park, signs stating that the Easement is closed for use by the users of the park and warning that large vehicles use the easement. The [Department] shall maintain said fence, signs and designated crossings so long as current uses exist. [The Ranch] shall not call upon [the Department], nor shall [the Department] have any responsibility to perform any maintenance work or to make any repairs or improvements on said road, except that the [Department] shall repair and maintain any damage caused by the use [or] users of the park. As to those portions of the Easement closed to users of the park, if [the Ranch] feels more maintenance or repair work is needed than is actually performed by [the Department], [the Ranch] may perform such repairs or maintenance at [the Ranch's] own expense."

The Ranch sued the Department in 2016. In its operative complaint, the Ranch asserted causes of action for trespass, nuisance, breach of contract, breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and declaratory relief.^[2] The Ranch alleged the Department was interfering with and obstructing the Ranch's use of the 1990 Easement as described in the Agreement, and was using the servient tenement in a manner inconsistent with the Ranch's authorized uses. The Ranch sought damages for the Department's breach of contract in the amount of $205,102.03 to remove and replace the spillway crossing.

As to declaratory relief, the Ranch asserted an actual controversy existed concerning the parties' "respective rights and duties in that [the Ranch] own[s] and [is] entitled to continued possession, use, and quiet enjoyment of [the 1990 Easement] without unreasonable interference from recreational off-highway vehicle use and public access and the continued possession, use, and enjoyment of [its] adjoining property without being exposed to excessive and hazardous noise, runoff, and erosion." The Ranch further asserted the Department believes it has "a right to allow off-highway vehicle and public access to, and use of, the [1990 Easement] between the termination of the [1990 Easement] on Corral Hollow Road, across the Corral Hollow creek crossing and to the point at the base of the Carnegie Ridge where the easement has been fenced to prevent recreational off-highway vehicle use and public access, and to operate the Carnegie off-highway vehicle park without buffers as exist in other parks causing excessive, and hazardous noise, and runoff and erosion on [the Ranch's] property."

In its prayer for relief, the Ranch sought an injunction on "all causes of action" (capitalization underlining, &boldface omitted) and a declaration providing: (1) "[r]ecreational off-highway vehicle use or public use or access be enjoined on the [1990 Easement] except at designated crossings as shown on [attached exhibits]"; (2) "[p]ublic off-highway vehicle use, recreational use and public use or access of the Corral Hollow spillway crossing be...