O'Connor v. Jones

NYKA O'CONNOR, Plaintiff, v. JULIE JONES, et al., Defendants.

Case No. 3:15-cv-1387-J-32JBT

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA JACKSONVILLE DIVISION

December 21, 2018

ORDER¹

I. Status

Plaintiff, an inmate of the Florida penal system, is proceeding on a pro se Civil Rights Complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Doc. 1).² Throughout the pendency of this case, Plaintiff has filed several supplemental documents to support his assertions. See, e.g., Docs. 83, 90, 96, 100, 102, 111, 175, 194, 200, 201. In the Complaint, Plaintiff names as Defendants Julie Jones, the Secretary of the Florida Department of Corrections (FDOC); Dr. Shah, a "Gastro Specialist" at the Reception and Medical Center (RMC); and Dr. Contarini,a "General Surgeon" at RMC.³ Doc. 1 at 3-4. He alleges that since he had stomach surgery in 2010, he has complained about "severe gastro pains and cramps[] that prohibit [him] from walking, eating, sleeping, etc." Id. at 9. He provides additional details about his other medical and mental health ailments, and claims that Defendants have been deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs. Plaintiff also asserts that the Secretary of the FDOC has a custom, practice, or policy to unnecessarily delay providing adequate care to inmates' serious medical needs. Id. at 5. Additionally, Plaintiff relates problems with his diet and contends that the diet he is provided is insufficient and infringes on his "sincere Jewish & Siddha beliefs." Id. at 9.⁴ He also alleges violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and the Rehabilitation Act (RA), as well as breach of contract claims. Attached to the Complaint are several grievances submitted by Plaintiff and the institutional responses thereto, as well as various other exhibits in support of Plaintiff's claims.

Before the Court are dispositive motions regarding the claims against Defendants Jones and Contarini. Specifically, Defendant Jones filed a Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 136), to which Plaintiff filed an Affidavit and Response in opposition (Doc. 176). Defendant Contarini and Plaintiff filed cross-motions for summary judgment. See Defendant Contarini's Motionfor Summary Judgment (Docs. 25, 157⁵) and Plaintiff's opposition (Docs. 54, 55); Plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment against Defendant Contarini and supporting documents (Docs. 153, 154, 171)⁶ and Defendant Contarini's opposition (Doc. 159). The motions are now ripe for review.

II. Defendant Jones' Motion to Dismiss

Plaintiff lists his claims against Defendant Jones as follows: (1) "denying O'Connor adequate diet [and] salt for his gastro health [and] religion" in violation of the First and Eighth Amendments, ADA, RA, and the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA); (2) "denying O'Connor adequate care for his serious gastro [and] shoulder needs" in violation of the Eighth Amendment, ADA, and RA; and (3) "denying O'Connor adequate diet, gastro [and] shoulder care for serious medical needs [and] not accommodating constitute breach of contract under Federal Common Laws [and] Fl[orida] contract laws." Doc. 1 at 8 (capitalization omitted). He alleges that Defendant Jones "has a practice, custom, [or] policy to subject inmates to unnecessary delay to provide adequate care for serious [medical] needs, even self injuries." Id. at 5 (capitalization omitted). He asserts that the "FDOC . . . [was] well aware" of his complaints based on his "verbal disclosure, written records, past history, e-mails, etc." Id. at 13.

Defendant Jones argues that (1) Plaintiff's claims which accrued before November 17, 2011 are time-barred; (2) Plaintiff fails to state a claim under the ADA or the RA; (3) Plaintiff fails to state a claim regarding his medical treatment, and the claims regarding his diet are frivolous and/or he has failed to allege sufficient factual matter to state a claim; (4) Plaintiff should not be permitted to bootstrap unrelated claims to the claims which he used to satisfy the imminent danger exception to dismissal under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g); and (5) Defendant Jones is entitled to qualified immunity and Eleventh Amendment immunity. See Doc. 136.⁷

"To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'" Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). "A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). "Labels and conclusions" or "a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action" that amount to "naked assertions" will not do. Id. (quotations, alteration, and citation omitted). Moreover, a complaint must "contain either direct or inferential allegations respecting all the material elements necessary to sustain a recovery under some viable legal theory." Roe v. Aware Woman Ctr. for Choice, Inc., 253 F.3d 678, 683 (11th Cir. 2001) (quotations and citations omitted). The Court liberally construes the pro se Plaintiff's allegations. See Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21 (1972); Bingham v. Thomas, 654 F.3d 1171, 1175 (11th Cir. 2011).

A. Claims Relating to 2010 Surgery

Plaintiff has failed to allege sufficient factual allegations to maintain a cause of action against Defendant Jones for what occurred during his 2010 surgery or his immediate post-surgery medical care.⁸ Insofar as Plaintiff is attempting to raise any claims against Defendant Jones in that regard, the claims are due to be dismissed.

B. ADA and RA Claims

Under Title II of the ADA, public entities are prohibited from discriminating against individuals with disabilities or denying them services because of their disabilities. See 42 U.S.C. § 12132. "Only public entities are liable for violations of Title II of the ADA." Edison v. Douberly, 604 F.3d 1307, 1308 (11th Cir. 2010). State prisons are public entities for purposes of the ADA. Pa. Dep't of Corr. v. Yeskey, 524 U.S. 206, 210 (1998). The standard for determining liability under the [RA] is the same as the standard under the ADA. Ellis v. England, 432 F.3d 1321, 1326 (11th Cir. 2005) (per curiam).[⁹]

To state a claim of discrimination under Title II, a claimant must prove:

(1) that he is a qualified individual with a disability; and (2) that he was either excluded from participation in or denied the benefits of a public entity's services, programs, or activities, orwas otherwise discriminated against by the public entity; and (3) that the exclusion, denial of benefit, or discrimination was by reason of the plaintiff's disability.

Bircoll v. Miami-Dade Cty., 480 F.3d 1072, 1083 (11th Cir. 2007). Public entities must make reasonable modifications to their policies, practices, or procedures when necessary to avoid discrimination on the basis of a disability unless making the modifications would "fundamentally alter the nature of the service[s], program[s], or activit[ies]." 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(7).

A disability is "a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities," such as caring for oneself, concentrating, or thinking. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1)(A), (2)(A). A qualified individual with a disability is someone who has a disability and "meets the essential eligibility requirements for the receipt of services or the participation in programs or activities provided by a public entity," with or without reasonable modifications. Id. § 12131(2).

Owens v. Sec'y, Fla. Dep't of Corr., 602 F. App'x 475, 477-78 (11th Cir. 2015) (some internal citations modified); see Shotz v Cates, 256 F.3d 1077, 1079 (11th Cir. 2001).

Because only public entities may be liable under the ADA and RA, Plaintiff fails to state a claim against Defendant Jones in her individual capacity. See, e.g., Owens, 602 F. App'x at 477, 478; Edison v. Douberly, 604 F.3d 1307, 1308 (11th Cir. 2010) ("Only public entities are liable for violations of Title II of the ADA."); Badillo v. Thorpe, 158 F. App'x 208, 211 (11th Cir. 2005) ("[T]here is no individual capacity liability under Title II of the ADA or RA."). Therefore, the Court will grant Defendant Jones' Motion to the extent that any claims raised against her in her individual capacity under the ADA and RA are due to be dismissed.

Even assuming Plaintiff has sufficiently alleged that he is a qualified individual with a disability,¹⁰ he has failed to sufficiently allege an ADA or RA claim against Defendant Jones in her official capacity as the Secretary of the FDOC. Plaintiff does not provide factual allegations that would even lead to an inference that he was discriminated against on the basis of some disability. Plaintiff's complaint is that he was not given special accommodations as he requested; specifically, his requested diet, a no heavy lifting pass, a front cuff pass, and adequate medical care for his complex regional pain syndrome and gastro disabilities. To the extent he is basing his claims on his perceived lack of adequate medical care, claims under the ADA and RA cannot be used as a means to pursue medical malpractice claims. Indeed, the ADA was not designed to subsume medical malpractice claims, and ADA claims do not arise from a defendant's failure to provide medical care to a disabled inmate. See Jones v. Rutherford, 546 F. App'x 808, 811-12 (11th Cir. 2013); Finn v. Haddock, 459 F. App'x 833, 837-38 (11th Cir. 2012) (stating that "failure to provide adequate medical treatment . . . does not violate the ADA or [RA]" (citations omitted)). In sum, Plaintiff's conclusory allegations fail to state a claim against Defendant Jones under either the ADA or RA, and her Motion is due to be granted in that regard.

C. Medical Treatment

To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege that (1) the defendant deprived him of a right secured under...